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Preface 
Global economic integration has the potential to interconnect humans across the 
globe and to increase their wealth. It can occur in a number of ways such as trade, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and offshore outsourcing, which are central issues in 
the following chapters, especially with respect to developing countries. The question 
is in how far global integration can have positive and negative side effects. 
 Technology diffusion is one particular positive side effect of global economic 
integration. It has the potential of improving productivities of developing countries 
and hence the living standards of humans.  
 Climate change is one particular negative side effect of global economic 
integration. Global economic integration potentially increases energy use and carbon 
emissions, given it has a positive impact on economic growth. This in turn increases 
the detrimental impacts of climate change on humans and nature. While the 
industrialized countries are the main sources of climate change, the developing 
countries will be hit most severely by climate change. 
However, one solution might be the interconnection of the three issues. Global 
economic integration may enhance global welfare by fostering economic growth and 
mitigating climate change via technology diffusion at the same time. The following 
chapters try to shed some light on this threefold interconnection by using static-
theoretical, dynamic-theoretical, econometric, numerical simulation and projection 
methods. 
In the light of global economic integration, the first chapter deals with 
offshore outsourcing based on a stylized, static, microeconomic model. It assumes 
Cournot competition between an intermediate good supplier in a high-cost, high-
productivity region, denoted by the West, and an intermediate good supplier in a low-
cost, low-productivity region, denoted by the East. It examines the impact of changes 
in marginal production costs in the East and the West on the allocation of 
intermediate good production between East and West. It asks the questions in which 
cases cost changes in one of the regions likely reduce intermediate good production in 
both regions. It turns out that higher production costs in one region indeed reduce 
intermediate good production in both regions under certain conditions, since the 
intermediate good input factor can be replaced by another input factor. Moreover, the 
sensitivity of outsourcing activities to production cost changes is highest when the 
interregional cost differential is smallest. 
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Also in the light of global economic integration, the second chapter deals with 
international capital mobility based on a stylized, dynamic, macroeconomic model. It 
assumes perfect capital mobility between a high-income, high-productivity region, 
denoted by the North, and a low-income, low-productivity region, denoted by the 
South. Additionally, in the light of technology diffusion, the second chapter 
introduces dynamics of technological catching up of the South to the technology 
frontier given by the North. It examines the positive impact of capital mobility and 
technology diffusion on the development of the South with respect to aggregate 
production. It asks the question, in which cases this positive development effect likely 
fails. It turns out that the South can fall behind in terms of technologies or get trapped 
in a situation in which it is unable to attract foreign capital and embodied 
technologies if it is too far away from the technology frontier and if its absorptive 
capacity is too low. The paper reconciles the view that technological catching up is 
stronger the larger the technology gap with the alternative view that technological 
catching up is strongest at a medium technology gap. 
In the light of global economic integration, the third chapter1 deals with FDI, 
international trade and foreign aid with respect to developing countries based on state 
of the art econometric methods. Moreover, in the light of technology diffusion, the 
third chapter examines the potential of FDI, trade and aid for transferring 
technologies from industrialized countries to developing countries. In the light of 
climate change, it applies energy intensity as the dependent variable under scrutiny. It 
asks the question whether there is a significant impact of FDI inflows, imports and 
received aid on energy intensities of developing countries. It turns out that the 
hypothesis stating aggregate FDI inflows reduce energy intensities of developing 
countries is not confirmed in a robust significant way. Rather, foreign development 
aid seems to reduce energy intensities of recipient countries. 
 Furthermore, in the light of global economic integration, the fourth chapter 
deals with a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
including inter-national trade and international capital mobility based on the GTAP 7 
data set. The model also distinguishes North and South, and additionally China, 
which is known to be highly integrated into the global economy. In the light of 
technology diffusion, it transfers the stylized approach for technology diffusion of 
                                                 
1 The chapter is joint work with Andreas Keller. While Andreas Keller had some emphasize on data 
work and on elaborating the economic background, I had some emphasize on methodological and 
technical work. Nevertheless, we worked jointly and equally on all relevant aspects of the article.  
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chapter two into a CGE framework. It then exploits the existing empirical evidence 
on general and energy specific technology diffusion via FDI and trade for calibrating 
the model. It In the light of climate change, the model at first calculates carbon 
contents of traded commodities. At second, it examines carbon based border tax 
adjustment under a contraction and convergence climate policy regime focusing on 
China as the global major CO2 emitter. It asks the question whether carbon based 
border tax adjustment is an effective policy measure for emission reductions. It turns 
out that the developing countries will benefit when China joins the contraction and 
convergence regime, while the industrialized countries will be almost unaffected. 
When China does not join the regime and instead a carbon content based border tax is 
imposed, the industrialized countries will significantly benefit, while China will be 
significantly worse off. The effect of the border tax adjustment on the global carbon 
price and on global emissions seems negligible. 
 Finally, in the light of climate change, the fifth chapter2 specifically deals with 
possible future health risks and costs of climate change in Germany based on future 
climate simulations. It uses temperature data gained from the high-resolution REMO 
model for the end of the 21st century. It examines the impact of rising temperature on 
mortality, hospitalization costs and labor productivity. It asks the question whether 
Germany can expect a significant rise in health risks and costs due to climate change 
if we refuse to foster mitigation and adaptation sufficiently. It turns out that there 
could be an average increase in the number of heat induced casualties by a factor of 
more than 3. Heat related hospitalization costs could increase 6-fold not including the 
cost of ambulant treatment. The future heat load could also reduce work performance 
resulting in an estimated output loss of between 0.1% and 0.5% of GDP. 
 
 
 
Kiel, 23 October 2009 
Michael Hübler
                                                 
2 This chapter is joint work with Gernot Klepper and Sonja Peterson. While Gernot Klepper and Sonja 
Peterson were my supervisors when working on the study “Kosten des Klimawandels” and the 
technical paper “Costs of Climate Change”, I did the major work covering all relevant aspects of the 
article. 
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Chapter 1: 
The Labor Market Effects of 
Outsourcing Parts and Components 
Part 1: A Simple Model with 
 Cournot Competition 0F0F0F∗ 
Michael Hübler 1F1F1F+   
May 15, 2008 
Abstract 
The paper analyses a partial equilibrium outsourcing model with Cournot 
competition in intermediate good production. Final production is located 
in Western Europe, whereas the intermediate good can be manufactured 
by a Western (outsourcing) or Eastern European supplier (offshore 
outsourcing). The paper asks the question how changes in production 
costs, in particular wages, affect labour input in the two regions in the 
presence of Cournot competition. The main results are: higher production 
costs in one region reduce intermediate good production in both regions 
leading to a substitution effect between high- and low-skilled labour 
intensive inputs rather than between Eastern and Western low-skilled 
labour intensive inputs. The sensitivity of outsourcing activities to 
production cost changes is highest when the interregional cost 
differential is smallest. 
 
JEL Classifications: D24, D43, F20, J31 
Keywords: Offshoring, outsourcing, Cournot competition,  
 intermediate goods, high-skilled, low-skilled 
                                                 
∗ Special thanks to Günther Rehme; further thanks to Frank Bickenbach, Sonja Peterson, Andreas 
Keller, Peter Nunnenkamp, Edwin van der Werf, Henning Klodt and Min-Ching Chiou for helpful 
comments. 
+ Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Düsternbrooker Weg 120, 24100 Kiel, Germany, E-mail: 
michael.huebler@ifw-kiel.de, Tel: +49-431-8814-401. 
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1   Introduction 
The outsourcing phenomenon has been a frequently discussed topic in the United 
States since the late 20th century. The debate on the influence of globalisation versus 
technical progress on the increasing income differential between high-skilled and 
low-skilled labour is still going on. Outsourcing, or more precisely offshore 
outsourcing across borders, has also been intensively discussed in the context of the 
European Union Eastern enlargement. The question of main interest is how 
outsourcing activities, that attempt to exploit lower production costs in Central and 
Eastern European countries, affect employment in Western European countries. (Real 
wages in the East average around one-fifth of the respective wage levels in the former 
EU-15).2F2F2F1 This is the so-called vertical outsourcing in the spirit of Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996). 3F3F3F2 This issue is especially important for the debate on unions' 
bargaining and minimum wages. 
Sinn (2005) describes Germany as a Bazaar Economy importing and exporting 
large amounts of goods but adding a low production value. Indeed, the value added 
divided by the output value in the German industry declined from 40.2 % to 34 % 
between 1970 and 2003 (Sinn 2005). For example, the German Porsche Cayenne is 
actually to a large extent produced in Bratislava. Additionally, the European 
automotive industry can be characterised by the following developments (Meissner 
and Jürgens 2007): There are not only few automobile final producers, but also an 
agglomeration tendency towards oligopolies of “mega suppliers” exploiting scale 
effects and being powerful enough to bargain with the big final producers. In 
particular, in many cases there are only a few suppliers of a certain module that is 
                                                 
1 According to World Bank purchasing power parity estimates, Boeri and Brücker (2000). 
2 Outsourcing means removing part of the production process from the own company and buying it 
from an external company instead. The outsourced part can be a product or a service, but not raw 
material (Kirkegaard 2005). Offshore outsourcing in the current discussion is a certain type of 
outsourcing, namely outsourcing to a foreign country. FDI is distinguished from outsourcing and pure 
portfolio investment by the ownership criterion: The investor has a certain degree of influence on the 
foreign investment receiving country (by holding a company share of at least 10 %). The OLI 
paradigm by Dunning (1981) distinguishes three motives for FDI: ownership advantage, location 
advantage and internalisation advantage. In that respect the expression multinational firm is closely 
related to FDI (for instance Markusen and Maskus 2001). There are two types of FDI: vertical and 
horizontal. Vertical FDI is similar to offshore outsourcing, since part of the production process is done 
by the affiliate and the resulting intermediate good is transferred back. An important factor driving 
vertical FDI is the benefit from lower production costs abroad. Horizontal FDI and horizontal 
multinationals have little in common with offshore outsourcing, since the main purpose is direct access 
to a foreign market instead of exporting to that market. According to the definition by Kirkegaard 
(2005) offshoring in general encompasses offshore outsourcing as well as vertical FDI and refers to 
imports of intermediate goods across borders. 
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used in final assembly. Furthermore, price pressure forces the suppliers to cut costs 
and to offer their intermediate components at the common price given by the rivals’ 
performance and the existing technologies. 
Referring to this development within the European automotive industry, this 
paper examines an easily tractable microeconomic partial equilibrium model. 
However, the model can also be applied to other industries with similar structures. 
The model assumes one final producer and two suppliers of intermediate components 
who are forced into Cournot competition, since the final producer would neither 
accept buying the components at a price higher than the common price, nor would he 
accept relying on one supplier only. This would make the final producer totally 
dependent on the single supplier. Instead there are two suppliers with oligopolistic 
power. We assume that one of them has moved intermediate production towards 
Eastern Europe, that is into a low-wage region. The other supplier keeps production 
in the Western European region that has higher wages, but also a better productivity 
level. The paper deals with the question in what ways and how sensitively the labour 
inputs of the suppliers react when production costs, in particular wages, change. 
Wages change exogenously according to unions' bargaining and policies such as 
minimum wages. When the supplier, who is affected by the production cost change, 
adjusts his output quantity, the rival will react immediately adjusting his output 
quantity as well, both aiming to maximise profits. The question is, whether this leads 
to a one to one substitution of unskilled labour between the East and the West. It turns 
out that the sensitivity of outsourcing activities to production cost changes is highest 
when the interregional cost differential is smallest. Moreover, it is shown that higher 
production costs in one region reduce intermediate good production in both regions 
leading to a substitution effect between high- and low-skilled labour intensive inputs 
rather than between Eastern and Western low-skilled labour intensive inputs. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises the related 
theoretical and empirical literature on international outsourcing. Section 3 describes 
the model structure, section 4 introduces Cournot competition of intermediate goods 
suppliers, section 5 derives the allocation of intermediate good production and the 
elasticity of relative interregional production, and section 6 analyses the resulting 
allocation of production factors focussing on labour. Section 7 introduces transport 
costs, and section 8 provides graphical representations. Section 9 discusses 
implications and caveats, and section 10 concludes. 
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2   A Brief Review of the Outsourcing Literature 
Offshore Outsourcing has first been investigated theoretically and empirically in the 
case of the United States. Later on, a mainly empirical literature strand has examined 
the labour market effects of offshore outsourcing in the context of the European 
Union Eastern enlargement. Not surprisingly, a variety of theoretical models has been 
set up in order to better understand the determinants and effects of outsourcing 
activities. 
Concerning the United States, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a and 1996b) show 
that rising imports, reflecting the outsourcing of production activities, contributed to 
the decline of relative employment and wages of unskilled workers during the 1980s. 
When firms outsource low-skilled labour intensive activities to low-wage countries 
and import the produced intermediate goods, this will shift employment towards 
skilled labour within industries. Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (2004) refer to 
US outsourcing at the beginning of the 21st century as another phenomenon: Trade in 
services at arm's length that does not require geographical proximity of the buyer and 
the seller. This view emphasises the role of information and communication 
technology opening the possibility of outsourcing call centres, software programming 
and data analysis to Asia connected via fast internet data transfer. 
Turning to the European Union, Marin et al. (2002) indicate that the most 
dynamic and innovative segments of the German industry invest in Eastern Europe 
and that exploiting low Eastern wages is one motive for outsourcing activities. Marin 
(2006) finds empirically that falling trade costs, lower levels of corruption and 
improvements in the contracting environment in Eastern Europe influence the level of 
intra-firm imports from the East to Austria and Germany indicating more outsourcing 
to the East. Marin (2004) goes one step further, stating that German and Austrian 
firms carry out outsourcing activities towards the East in order to take advantage of 
the abundant high-skilled labour there. She finds high educational levels among 
employees and more workers engaged in R&D and engineering in Eastern affiliates 
compared to firms in Germany and Austria. Braconier and Ekholm (2001) find 
opposite results. Marin (2004) shows small job losses in the West due to outsourcing, 
because outsourcing helps Western firms to stay competitive in accordance with 
Konings and Murphy (2001). In contrast to these studies Becker et al. (2005) find a 
more substantial replacement of Western jobs by jobs in Eastern affiliates. 
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Kirkegaard (2005) identifies European companies supplying or receiving outsourced 
or offshored goods and services and consumers of the resulting final commodities as 
winners. On the other hand companies being unable to adapt to the outsourcing boom 
and workers laid off due to outsourcing are potential losers. 
In summary, the empirical outcomes point to some negative redistribution and 
employment effects for low-skilled employees. However, there is no reason for an 
outsourcing hysteria concerning production and jobs moving to low wage countries 
rapidly, considering that outsourcing improves efficiency and competitiveness and 
therefore reduces commodity prices under competitive markets making consumers of 
theses products better off. 
Various models have been recently developed due to the public awareness of 
outsourcing and its consequences. There are models with a continuum of 
(intermediate) goods or production stages in the tradition of Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996a) and Grossman and Helpman (2002 and 2003), models extending the classic 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory, models based on standard production functions combined in 
multiple stages, and there are models based on outsourcing cost considerations. 
Within the group of models with a continuum of (intermediate) goods, Wang (2006) 
develops a model of choosing between vertical integration and outsourcing depending 
on cost differentials, transport costs and costs of searching for intermediate good 
trade. Kohler (2004) models the reaction of a multi-stage industry with outsourcing to 
changes of the final good price and fragmentation costs. Mitra and Ranjan (2005) 
extend the outsourcing and FDI literature to dynamic behaviour with externalities and 
firm heterogeneity. According to their results temporary shocks can have permanent 
effects, and most productive firms move abroad first. A key issue in the research of 
Grossman and Helpman (2005) is the view of outsourcing as an activity that requires 
a costly search for a partner (in the home country or in a foreign country). Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a) propose a new conceptual framework of the global 
production process focussing on tradable tasks. They show that in contrast to 
neoclassical trade theories (under certain conditions) all domestic parties can share 
the gains from improved offshoring opportunities. (For a comprehensive theoretical 
treatment of offshoring see Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006b). A reformulation 
of the four basic theorems of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory allowing for offshoring 
(fragmentation) is provided by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007). Markusen (2005) 
applies modules from the existing trade theory to numerical analyses. Besides other 
 18
results, his simulations suggest welfare gains for the South and the global economy, 
while the outsourcing Northern country may lose if it is large. Munch and Skaksen 
(2005) combine CES and Cobb-Douglas functions in a multi-stage setup. They point 
out that outsourcing to abroad worsens the wages for unskilled-workers, whereas this 
effect cannot be expected from outsourcing within a country. Furthermore, Senses 
(2006) illustrates how the wage elasticity of low-skilled labour demand increases in 
heavily outsourcing industries and how a decline in the share of unskilled labour at 
home lowers the elasticity on the other hand. Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2005a) 
derive the optimal amount of outsourcing for a given immigration level, while the 
model by Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2005b) includes an oligopolistic export sector 
and a competitive import-competing sector and shows that an outsourcing tax can be 
justified under a minimum wage but not under flexible wages. Among the models 
applying cost function representations Egger and Egger (2004a) include 
multinationals firms’ competition in quantities and price-cost margins. Egger and 
Egger (2007) analyse the trade-off between transport costs and lower production costs 
induced by outsourcing in a multi-stage decision chain on market entry and price 
setting in a spatial world. Bartel, Lach and Sicherman (2005) show how technological 
progress lowers firms' adjustment costs of outsourcing.  
Summing up, a large variety of models has been developed to examine 
different aspects related to outsourcing, such as labour market effects, transport costs 
versus lower production costs, searching for an outsourcing partner, the relationship 
of outsourcing and migration and the role of technological progress. Accordingly, 
outsourcing is a phenomenon with many facets, some of them investigated and 
understood, others not yet understood leaving room for further research in different 
directions. 
This paper deals with a facet of high public interest, not sufficiently covered 
theoretically: The reaction of (offshore) outsourcing in the spirit of Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996a and 1996b) to changes in production costs in the presence of Cournot 
competition of suppliers of parts and components.  
 
 
3   The Model Structure 
The partial equilibrium model consists of final good Y production located in the 
Western European country, and intermediate good X production located in the 
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Western country and in the Eastern country. The model can be interpreted referring to 
the European automotive industry as motivated in the introduction. Y is produced 
with a Cobb-Douglas technology using the inputs H and X: 
 ( ) 10.5;1 <α<X+XH=Y αEWα −      (1) 
The final good Y can be an automobile produced in Germany via a complex process 
with a sophisticated technology.4F4F4F3 The final good producer takes demand, for example 
for his car type, as given by the market. (The final good market form is not of 
importance for the considerations in this paper). H is a high-skilled labour and high-
technology intensive input, which is available in the Western area only and cannot be 
outsourced. This is a conservative assumption contrasting with Marin (2004) finding 
outsourcing of high-skilled labour towards Eastern Europe, but not crucial for the 
interpretation of the outcomes. For simplicity the production factor H encompasses 
all processes involving highly educated employees such as design, engineering and 
management, the necessary high technology capital and firm specific knowledge. 
The intermediate good X production process includes all activities demanding 
low-skilled labour like manual work plus usual capital input. X represents for instance 
interior automotive parts like dashboards and seats. X can be manufactured in 
Western (XW) and Eastern Europe (XE). Low-skilled labour is supplied in both 
regions. That means, there is no offshore outsourcing with the purpose of getting 
access to well educated workers in the East as described by Marin (2004), nor service 
outsourcing according to Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (2004), but it is 
offshore outsourcing in the spirit of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a and 1996b). 
Intermediate good production can be moved to the East when production costs or 
wages are cheaper in the East, afterwards the manufactured intermediates are 
imported into the West. XW and XE are homogeneous goods and perfect substitutes so 
that they can be summed up to X = XW + XE. The assumption α > 0.5 implies a higher 
income share for the high-skilled labour and high-technology intensive input located 
in the West (under perfect competition). This means that the share of the production 
process which is mobile via outsourcing is less than half of whole production in terms 
of revenues. The intuition is that the main part of production is not outsourced but 
                                                 
3 The model could also describe any other suitable industry, where outsourcing of intermediate goods 
production occurs, and where a small number of intermediate goods producers compete. 
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kept within the company in contrast to the example by Sinn (2005).5F5F5F4 α > 0.5 is 
plausible, because H encompasses high-skilled labour as well as high tech capital. 
The Cobb-Douglas function implies the possibility of replacing part of input X, 
produced with a high amount of low-skilled labour and a standard technology by 
input H, produced by high-skilled workers and modern technologies, and vice versa. 
The Y producer minimises production costs C for a given output Y: 
 ( ) αEWα
EEWWH
X+XH=Yt.s.
Xp+Xp+Hw=Cmin
−1
       (2) 
wH is the price of high-skilled labour intensive input H, pW and pE are the prices of X, 
manufactured in the Western or Eastern region. The final good Y producer is a price 
taker; he sets the input factor amounts according to the factor prices wH, pW and pE. 
The intermediate good is manufactured by independent rivalling firms located 
in Western Europe or Eastern Europe, respectively. We call the former case 
outsourcing, the latter case offshore outsourcing. Intermediate good X production is 
represented by using Cobb-Douglas functions with the inputs capital K and low-
skilled labour L with constant returns to scale: 
 [ ]EW;=i<β<LKA=X iiβiiβiii ;10;1−      (3)  
The production processes in the West and in the East differ in technologies Ai and in 
the real wages wi. Capital is not mobile across borders. Furthermore, differences in 
the returns to capital investment ri and in the elasticities of production βi and 1-βi  are 
possible. Cost minimizing X manufacturing leads to the following marginal costs ci 
(Varian 2001): 
 ( ) iβiiβiiiβiiβii wrAββ=c −−−− − 1111        (4) 
Marginal costs ci are assumed constant and equal to the cost per unit of output. 
Marginal costs are derived from the exogenous parameters technology Ai, real wage 
wi, real return rate on investment ri and the Cobb-Douglas function exponents βi and 
1-βi. If the returns on investment and the exponents are similar in the East and West, a 
                                                 
4 The Bazaar Economy hypothesis has been rejected by other authors, for instance Horn and Behncke 
(2004). 
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cost advantage can be achieved via a more efficient technology or a lower wage level. 
X producers maximise their profits and have oligopolistic (monopolistic) power 
reflected in the price for X depending on the quantity of X, where X = XW + XE: 
( ) iiiii XcXXp=Πmax ⋅−⋅          (5) 
Without any market power of X producers prices would be equal to marginal costs. In 
general a productivity gap between the East and the West exists, and hence, under 
perfect competition intermediate good production would take place in the area with 
lower marginal costs only. 
In the case of Bertrand competition (price competition) intermediate good 
manufacturing occurs only in the cheaper region, too. Now the cheaper producer can 
increase the price for X and reduce the production quantity of X. But if he increases 
the price for X more than to the marginal costs of the rival X producer, he will lose all 
the demand for his product. 
Cournot competition (competition in quantities) is the interesting case 
referring to the current tendencies in the European automotive industry as well as 
analytically.  
 
 
4   Cournot Competition 
Production of automotive components, for example seats or dashboards containing 
numerous distinct parts, requires low-skilled manufacturing. Nevertheless, specific 
knowledge and a sufficient firm size are necessary to produce automobile parts in 
large amounts according to the final producer's needs and fulfilling the quality 
requirements. The intermediate good and the final good company agree to a long term 
contract, so that other suppliers can hardly enter the market. For that reason it is 
plausible to suppose a small number of companies being able to provide the specific 
components needed in final production, in this model in particular two suppliers. 
Under the assumption of pure Cournot competition the Eastern and Western company 
offer the intermediate good X at the same price pX = pW = pE . The firms optimise 
their supply of X taking into account the rival’s reaction and the demand function for 
X given by the Western final good Y producer. The conditional factor demand 
functions can be derived from (2) in the standard way: 
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 ( ) ( ) Ywα
αp
=p,wY,X
α
H
x
xH
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−1        (6) 
Total demand for X falls with the price pX and increases with wH, the price of the 
skilled labour intensive good H. Similarly the input quantity of H is expressed: 
 ( ) ( ) Ywα
αp
=p,wY,H
α
H
x
xH
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
1
1
       (7) 
A change in the exogenous quantity Y leads to proportional shifts of the input factors 
X and H. (The absolute value of Y is not important when dealing with relative values 
between the East and the West, since Y drops out). Solving (6) for pX yields the 
inverse factor demand function for X: 
 αYαXw
α
α=p HX
11
1 −−
       (8) 
Obviously, the intermediate good suppliers face a non-linear and downward-sloping 
inverse factor demand function with respect to the total production of X. Since α < 1, 
expanding the supply of total X leads to a more than proportional fall in the price pX. 
Hence, a monopolist would choose the output as small as possible, but in the 
oligopoly the situation is different. For every given positive quantity of one supplier 
there is an optimal output of the rival, which results in an equilibrium with positive 
quantities. In market equilibrium supply equals demand for X at the price pX, so that 
we can insert (8) into (5) recalling that the final producer is a price taker: 
 iiiHi XcXαYαXwα
α=Πmax ⋅−⋅−
− 111
    (9)  
The oligopolists maximise their profits Πi by choosing their production quantities Xi 
and taking into account the total amount X that includes their own and their rival's 
quantity. This results in the following first order conditions for profit maximisation 
representing the oligopolists’ reaction functions with i = [W; E]: 
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 0
1111
1
1 =cαX+XαX
α
αYw
α
α=
dX
dΠ
iiH
i
i −
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅
−
−−
−−
  (10)
   
The appendix6F6F6F5 (a) shows that the second order condition for a profit maximum is 
fulfilled. Dividing the first order conditions for the East and the West yields the 
intermediate good output ratio (appendix b): 
 
( )
( ) WE
WE
E
W
WE cα+α
α+cα
X
XV −
−=≡
1
1
        (11) 
VWE , a key variable in this model, is the ratio of production in the West relative to the 
East. cWE means cW / cE, that is marginal production costs in the West divided by 
marginal costs in the East, in other words the relative Western marginal costs. 
 
 
5   Allocation of Intermediate Good Production 
This section examines how the allocation of intermediate good production to Eastern 
and Western Europe reacts to changes in the production cost differential between 
those regions. For this purpose the elasticity of relative interregional production is 
defined. The first derivative of expression (11) with respect to marginal costs in the 
West relative to the East shows the reaction of relative X production VWE to changes 
in relative marginal costs cWE (more detailed in the appendix b). 
 ( )[ ] 01
21
2 <αc+α
α=
dc
dV
WEWE
WE
−
−       (12) 
α is larger than 0.5 per plausible assumption, and hence the term above is negative. 
That means, increasing marginal production costs in the West relative to the East 
lower the relative Western production VWE as expected. Facing higher production 
costs in the West, the oligopolist reduces the profit maximizing output XW, so that the 
relative Western X output falls. Now the following elasticity ε can be derived from 
                                                 
5 The mathematical appendix is available upon request, http://www.ifw-kiel.de/research/the-
environment-and-natural-resources/view?set_language=en. 
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(11) and (12) in order to analyse the sensitivity of relative X production to changes in 
relative production costs cWE : 
 ( )[ ] ( )( )
0
1
11
21
2 <
−
−⋅−
−⋅
WE
WE
WE
WEWE
WE
WE
WE
cα+α
α+cα
c
αc+α
α=
V
c
dc
dV
=ε   (13) 
This elasticity of relative interregional production is a measure for the sensitivity of 
offshore outsourcing to interregional production cost changes. When it is high, cost 
deviations at home lead to a large relative production shift to abroad. Term (13) and 
the graphical representation in Figure 1 show that the elasticity of relative 
intermediate good production is a function of relative production costs. (Note that the 
graph is symmetric, that is the branch left of the minimum is the inverse of the branch 
on the right hand side of the minimum, so that the results are independent of looking 
at cW / cE or at cE / cW). The elasticity curve is steep near its extremum, while it is 
flatter, when relative production costs deviate more from 1. We now analyse the first 
derivative of the denominator of equation (13) in order to find an extremum of ε: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 101111 22 =c=cαα+
c
αα+α+α
dc
d
WEWE
WEWE
⇒⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−  (14) 
It can be shown that ε has a minimum lower than zero for cWE = 1 (appendix b). For 
cWE towards infinity or towards zero the elasticity goes towards zero (Figure 1).  
With the definition of VWE according to (11) in the middle bracket and some 
algebra (see appendix, c) XE and XW can be expressed as: 7F7F7F6 
;
11
1;
1
1 Y
V
+c+c
w
α'=XY
V+c+c
w
α'=X
WE
α
EW
H
W
WE
α
EW
H
E ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
                (15)  
where  
( )
α
α
α
=α'
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −− 121
  
We write α' for simplicity. 1 / (1 + VWE) is the Eastern European share of X 
production, and 1 / (1 + 1/VWE) is the Western share of total X production. The 
Eastern supply of X increases proportionally with the exogenous final output Y. The 
                                                 
6 The errors in the published article have been corrected. 
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higher the sum of marginal costs in the West and the East compared to the price for 
high-skilled labour wH, the lower the input of XE and also the input of XW in final 
production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Elasticity ε of intermediate good production in the West relative to the East 
(VWE)  with  respect  to  relative  production  cost  changes  (cWE),  example  with 
halflogarithmic scale, α = 0.66 
 
Equation (10) represents a Nash equilibrium, because both oligopolists maximise 
their profits taking the rival's behaviour into account, and the firm that deviates from 
this optimal production will suffer a lower profit. Adding the Eastern and the Western 
output derived from (10) leads to total supply of  X: 
 Y
c+c
w
α'=X+X=X
α
EW
H
EW ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
      (16) 
The equilibrium price pX, which is identical for XW and XE per assumption, becomes 
obvious by comparison of the above term with expression (6). It follows:  
 
α
c+c=p EWX 12−
         (17) 
The equilibrium price of X is a linear function of the sum of the marginal costs in the 
regions. The input of X as a production factor in final production decreases when pX  
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rises. Consequently, higher costs in one region not only reduce the output in this 
region, but also total supply of the intermediate good X by increasing pX. Hence it is 
not immediately clear, if higher production costs in the East increases or decreases 
absolute X production in the West. This depends on whether the production shift from 
East to West is lower or higher than the negative effect of the total X production 
decline. The magnitude of pX movements due to marginal cost changes is determined 
by the coefficient 1 / (2 – 1 / α). For α approaching 1, pX is approximately the sum of 
marginal costs. This would imply a very high exponent in the Cobb-Douglas function 
for H and a very low exponent for the input X. The magnitude becomes higher and 
higher, when α falls towards 0.5, keeping in mind, that 0.5 is a lower bound for α in 
this model. 
The profits of the intermediate good suppliers can easily be expressed with the 
help of the price pX: 
 iiixi XcXp=Π ⋅−⋅         (18) 
As the simulation will show, profits decrease with increasing costs as expected. But 
not only the profits of the producer facing rising costs do fall, the other supplier's 
profits also slightly fall together with a small output reduction. 
 
 
6   Allocation of Production Factors 
This section describes the profit maximizing allocation of production factors 
depending on production costs. We concentrate on labour inputs, while absolute and 
relative capital inputs can be derived in an analogue way. The analytic relationships 
are then used to carry out simulations in section 7. 
At first we look at the input of high-skilled labour intensive input H by 
plugging pX into (7): 
 ( ) Y
w
c+c
α'
=c,c,wY,H
α
H
EW
EWH
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ 11      (19) 
It follows for the ratio of H to X: 
 27
 
α
w
α
α
c+c
w
c+c
α'
α
w
α
p
X
H
H
EW
H
EW
H
X
12
1
1
11
−−
==−=     (20) 
This cost minimizing ratio of high-skilled labour intensive input H to the low-skilled 
manufactured input X is the standard microeconomic outcome, but with pX expressed 
as shown before. A rising sum of marginal costs in X manufacturing shifts the input 
intensity in final production from X to H. In contrast to the standard microeconomic 
relationship the impact of α is unclear, as α also affects pX via the factor 1 / (2 – 1 / α). 
At second we write the standard conditional factor demands for low-skilled 
labour Li derived from the production function (3) with i = [W; E] in order to produce 
the amounts Xi at minimal costs (Varian 2001). Note that capital and labour are 
specific for each region, that is immobile between the regions, so that there is not 
factor price equalisation, which implies a short- or medium-run point of view. 
 ( ) ( ) ii
β
ii
ii
i
iiii Xwβ
rβ
A
=w,r,XL ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −11
     (21) 
The ratio of labour inputs is expressed using the definition of VWE according to (11): 
( )
( )
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where   ⎟⎟
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The minus signs indicate that VWE is a falling function of AE / AW, wW / wE and rW / rE. 
The labour input in the West compared to the East is therefore determined by the 
relative productivity, the relative Western return rate on investment and the relative 
Western wage level. Within a region it depends on the price of capital relative to the 
price of labour as usual. When β = βW = βE, the relation simplifies to: 
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A higher relative Western wage clearly lowers the labour input in the West in 
comparison to the East (directly in 22 and indirectly via VWE), but the impacts of 
changes in rW / rE and AW / AE are per se not clear. On the one hand, a higher Western 
return rate on capital shifts production towards more labour input in the West; on the 
other hand, a higher return rate increases overall production costs, which drives 
production and thus labour and capital inputs from the West to the East. The result of 
a productivity improvement in the West is ambiguous, too: It lowers production costs 
extending Western X production, but at the same time a given output Y can be 
produced with less labour and capital inputs. 
To conclude, the analysis has shown that the wage for high-skilled workers wH 
compared to the sum of marginal production costs in the East and West determines 
the ratio of H to X in final good production, while the marginal cost ratio cW / cE 
determines the distribution of X production to the West and to the East. 
 
 
7   Transport Costs 
Manufacturing the intermediate good X in the Eastern region and importing it for 
final production into the Western region creates transportation costs for X. Referring 
to the classic approach by Samuelson (1954), transport costs CT are represented by a 
quantity melting like ice. For that purpose an additional factor (1 – CT) is introduced 
in (3) and for simplicity combined with the productivity coefficient AE: 
 ;1 EβEE
β
E
'
EE LKA=X
−     where      ( ) 10;1 <CAC=A TET'E ≤−    (24) 
It is immediately obvious that transport costs lower the Eastern productivity or in 
other words increase Eastern marginal production costs and hence shift production 
from the East to the West. Transport costs will be included in the simulations in the 
next section. 
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8   Graphical Representations 
The following graphs visualise the effects of a change in relative production costs in 
form of a rising Western wage level. The simulations are based on the equations 
derived in sections 5, 6 and 7 and the analogue expressions for capital inputs. 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in absolute amounts of X production in the East 
and the West and the corresponding profits ΠW and ΠE (according to equations 15 and 
18), when the Western wage rises relative to the Eastern wage, while the Eastern 
wage is fixed.8F8F8F7 
 
Figure 2: Absolute production allocation depending on an increasing western wage 
 
The following assumptions on parameter values have been made for the functions of 
the model:9F9F9F8 For any given relative wage the graphs show the inputs necessary to 
produce one unit of final output Y. The Cobb-Douglas exponent for the high-skilled 
labour intensive input α equals 0.66 and that one for the X input 0.34. The price of H 
is set 15 times higher than the payment for Eastern low-skilled workers (wE = 1). 
                                                 
7 The profits are divided by 10 to scale them down in the figure. 
8 For a comparison of relative wages, productivity and labour costs between Germany and Austria and 
Eastern European regions see Marin (2004). 
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Accordingly, there is a much higher income share for high-skilled workers such as 
managers, engineers and designers creating H than for low-skilled workers 
manufacturing X in the East. In the graph the Western wage (wW) rises exogenously 
from 1 up to 5 relative to the Eastern wage. For example the labour cost ratio between 
Germany and the Czech Republic amounts to about 5 and might decrease in the 
future. Returns on capital in the East and West are set equal to one, since the graph 
focuses on wage differentials. The exponents βi related to capital inputs in 
intermediate good production are assumed to be 0.34 in both regions. The exponents 
1-βi for labour inputs consequently lead to higher income shares for low skilled-
workers than for capital owners in every region. The Western X producer has an 
advantage in total factor productivity, for simplicity AE is set to 1 and AW to 2. The 
intuition is access to better production technologies in the West. Finally transport 
costs CT are included amounting to 10% of the transferred good X causing a further 
cost disadvantage for the East. 
Consequently, for equal wages (wW / wE = 1, left hand side of Figures 2 and 4) 
the manufactured quantity of X in the West is higher than in the East because of the 
higher Western productivity level and the transport costs of importing XE from the 
East to the West. As expected, rising the Western wage while holding the Eastern 
wage constant reduces Western X production strongly. Surprisingly, at the same time 
Eastern X production slightly decreases resulting in an even larger decrease in total X 
supply. The reason is that higher Western production costs increase pX (the common 
price for Eastern and Western good X) proportionally as shown in equation (17). 
When the price for the intermediate good X increases, the final good producer 
replaces X by H leading to a (substantial) decline in the demand for X. Hence, total X, 
which is the sum of XW and XE, also falls. Corresponding to the quantities Western 
profits decrease strongly with rising labour costs, and Eastern profits fall slightly. 
Figure 3 points the mechanisms on the X supply side out. The curves are the 
graphical representations of the reaction functions in (15) of the Western and the 
Eastern firm, each representing profit maximizing output as a function of the rival's 
output. 
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Figure 3: Profit maximizing reaction functions 
 
The parameter values are set as before. The curves are again asymmetric because the 
Eastern oligopolist faces transport costs and an inferior technology. Obviously, the 
reaction curves are upward sloping, so that one firm reacts to a higher quantity of the 
other firm with another output expansion. In certain regions of the curves and for 
certain parameter values it is also possible to find downward sloping or 
approximately vertical or horizontal reaction curves. Then the firm reacts to the rival's 
output expansion with an output reduction or is not affected at all. But the typical 
case in this model framework is that of upward sloping reaction curves causing the 
important result of an output reduction in both regions for a cost increase in one 
region. This means, the intermediate good production factor is replaced by the high-
tech production factor. Is a zero-zero solution without intermediate good production 
feasible? The quantities XW and XE are endogenous and will never become jointly 
zero, nor will one quantity become zero. This means, the model cannot represent the 
non-production case and the monopoly case. Even when a very large inter-regional 
cost differential exists, there will be a marginally small rest of production in the high-
cost region. 
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As shown in Figure 3, a Western wage raised from 1 to 5 relative to the Eastern wage 
shifts the Western reaction curve downwards lowering Western output strongly (dXW) 
and decreasing Eastern output slightly (dXE). 
 
Figure 4: Relative factor allocation depending on an increasing western wage 
 
Figure 4 plots the relative factor distribution, that is Western in relation to Eastern X 
production, Western compared to Eastern low-skilled labour and capital inputs as 
well as the ratio of the Western high-skilled labour intensive factor H to low-skilled 
labour intensive X being produced in the West and the East (equations 11, 21 and 
similarly for capital inputs). Again the Western wage is exogenously increased 
relative to the fixed Eastern wage. 
All parameter values are the same as before and the results are in accordance 
with those of Figure 2. For the case of identical wages (left hand side) the output of X 
in the West is higher than in the East (XWE > 1) because of the Western technological 
advantage and the Eastern transport costs disadvantage. Nevertheless, low-skilled 
labour input is lower in the West than in the East, and capital input is lower in the 
West, too. This follows from the fixed final good Y output limiting the demand for 
factors H and X and from the Western productivity advantage reducing the required 
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input quantities to produce a certain output quantity. 
Obviously all curves in figures 2 and 4 have a sharper (rising or falling) slope 
when labour costs are similar (left hand side) in accordance with the higher elasticity 
of relative production for equal marginal costs derived in chapter 5 (equation 13). 
This is caused by the strictly convex inverse factor demand function (8) which is 
steeply falling for low prices in combination with the reaction functions (15). 10F10F10F9 
 
 
9   Interpretation and Caveats 
The model analysis has the following implications: It reveals that the elasticity of 
interregional outsourcing activities as a reaction to interregional cost changes depends 
on the original gap in production costs between the regions. When intermediate good 
production occurs in two regions with similar production costs, any cost change in 
one region will have strong re-allocation effects. Hence, for example a higher wage 
agreement for the Western intermediate good firm or a higher wage level after 
bargaining with unions lowers the Western intermediate good production relative to 
the Eastern one a lot in terms of relative changes. In the same way higher additional 
labour costs (taxes and insurance) have a strong negative influence on Western 
production and labour input. Given a situation of a large East-West production cost 
differential and completed offshore outsourcing activities, additional cost changes 
will have little effect on outsourcing, thus contradicting outsourcing fears. 
Moreover, higher marginal costs in one region not only reduce intermediate 
good output in this region, but also in the other region due to a rising common 
intermediate good price, which reduces demand for the intermediate good. Thus, the 
cost increase reduces intermediate good production in both regions. Of course the 
output decline is higher in the region, where the cost increase occurs. In order to keep 
final output constant low-skilled labour intensive intermediate good input is 
substituted by the high-skilled labour (and advanced technology rich) input located in 
Western Europe. Consequently, any rise in intermediate good production costs 
benefits Western high-skilled workers. The outcome for low-skilled workers in the 
region with rising costs depends on whether the cost increase includes higher wages. 
In case of higher wages the entire group of low-skilled workers in that region can still 
                                                 
9 Since a Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale implies a decreasing marginal product 
of labour, the inverse factor demand function has a convex falling shape. 
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lose because the production decline due to higher costs eliminates jobs. If the wage 
increase overcompensates the reduced labour input, the workers can all be better off 
after redistribution. However, this is unlikely the case. We saw that a cost increase in 
one region also slightly reduces intermediate production in the other region. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus capital owners and workers involved in intermediate 
production in the other region also lose to some extent. We conclude that there is no 
direct competition between low-skilled workers in the East versus the West, but 
mainly between Western high-skilled on the one hand and both Eastern and Western 
low-skilled workers on the other hand in terms of absolute input quantities. Of course, 
referring to relative quantities, any cost increase in one region lowers the relative 
production share of this region compared with the other region. According to the 
graphical interpretation for a specific parameterisation, an advantage via a higher 
productivity leads to a higher intermediate good output with relatively lower factor 
input quantities.  
When applying and interpreting the model several caveats should be 
considered: The paper is a typical partial equilibrium analysis. It abstracts from trade 
and terms of trade effects. Therefore, it is not possible to carry out a general welfare 
analysis. 
The model concentrates on the supply side, assuming a constant demand for Y. 
The analysed changes in factor prices or production technologies do not affect the 
price for Y, either. But since the development of consumer tastes and technological 
change during the allocation process are unknown, it seems reasonable to set these 
variables exogenous and constant. 
An oligopoly in intermediate good production is a sensible assumption for 
certain sectors of the economy, but of course not for all sectors. The automobile 
industry has been chosen as an example. However, the oligopoly assumption would 
also be sensible in final good production, which has been neglected here in order to 
keep the model analytically tractable. Furthermore, a typical automobile producer has 
to some extent market power concerning the purchase of parts and components. This 
model is in favour of the intermediate good suppliers concerning market power. 
Furthermore, the findings are based on convex decreasing inverse factor demand 
functions derived from Cobb-Douglas technologies. Thus, the intermediate good 
producers tend to keep their output low for the purpose of holding the price high. The 
results probably also hold when assuming CES production functions. However, the 
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substitution effect between high-skilled and low-skilled labour will be stronger, when 
the elasticity of substitution of the CES function is higher. On the other hand, a higher 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in intermediate production will 
probably make the outsourcing behaviour less sensitive to labour cost changes, 
because capital can more easily substitute for labour within intermediate in one 
region. 
The exponent of the high-skilled labour intensive input in the Cobb-Douglas 
function is assumed to be larger than one half, so that the exponent of the low-skilled 
labour intensive input is smaller than one half. This necessary assumption seems 
sensible, since it implies a higher income share for the combination of high-skilled 
labour and high technology capital found in the Western region than for the low-
skilled labour intensive input that is outsourced. It indicates in a way that production 
is mainly located in the Western region. 
When a very large inter-regional cost differential exists, there will still be a 
marginally small rest of production in the high cost region. In that sense, the Cournot 
competition assumption is not realistic for very large cost differentials. On the other 
hand, a large cost differential points to a big difference in per capita incomes and the 
levels of development. Hence, poor infrastructure, unsecured property rights, 
corruption and other disadvantages and risks dominate the outsourcing decision of 
investors rather than pure production costs. These factors prevent higher outsourcing 
into the low cost country even when a large cost differential exists. Moreover, the 
results show the strongest elasticity of outsourcing activities to production cost 
changes when the interregional cost difference is smallest, that is the countries are 
similar. In reality there is a sluggishness of production movements due to the home 
bias and costs of planning and organizing the outsourcing activity. This sluggishness 
opposes the offshore outsourcing incentive, and the outsourcing costs create a 
threshold, that is a minimum cost differential, which is necessary to cause any 
offshore outsourcing. 
Do the results of the simulations hold for all parameter values? Actually, it is 
possible to find certain parameter values that yield the classic outcome: One 
oligopolist reduces output due to higher production costs and the other firm reacts 
with an output expansion. Another possibility is a reaction function that is locally 
vertical or horizontal. Then the first firm can change output without affecting the 
second firm. Nevertheless, these are special cases, while the normal behaviour for 
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most parameter values within this model framework is as explained before. 
Finally, a precondition for the analysis is a situation of completed adjustment 
of factor allocation according to efficiency or profit maximisation, respectively. 
When applying the model to the current situation of the European Union we need to 
take into account, that dynamic adjustment processes are still in progress. 
Consequently, adjustment processes towards the equilibrium offset the outcomes 
resulting from the model. The model does not assume factor price equalisation. This 
means, it has a medium-run point of view, or there are persistent barriers to trade or 
factor movements. 
 
 
10   Conclusion 
This paper deals with the question, how and how sensitively outsourcing from a high-
technology area with high production costs like Western Europe to a low-technology 
and low-cost area like Eastern Europe reacts to changes in production costs. It refers 
to current tendencies in the (European) automotive industry: Concentrations of firms 
in final production as well as in production of parts and components, increasing 
market power of the suppliers, but at the same time price or cost pressure, and 
offshore outsourcing to Eastern European countries with lower wage levels. 
The model presented here is a two stage model based on Cobb-Douglas 
technologies and Cournot competition in intermediate goods as perfect substitutes. 
Final good production takes place in Western Europe, while the intermediate activity 
can be located in Western Europe (outsourcing) or Eastern Europe (offshore 
outsourcing). 
It is shown how relative production costs, determined by technology levels, 
wages and returns on investment, influence the allocation of production and of labour 
input between the two regions. The first key result is, that intermediate good 
production falls in region A relative to B, when production costs in A rise relative to 
B. But intermediate good output in B does also slightly fall in absolute terms as a 
result of the Cournot competition. Graphical simulations illustrate the findings. Thus, 
there is a substitution effect between high-skilled and low-skilled labour rather than 
between low-skilled labour in the East and in the West. 
The second key result is that the sensitivity of outsourcing behaviour to 
production cost changes is higher the smaller the cost difference between the regions 
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is. Consequently the effect of changes in wage agreements or labour taxes depends on 
the original cost gap. Given a situation of a large East-West production cost 
differential and completed outsourcing activities, additional cost changes will have 
little effect on outsourcing behaviour. This contradicts the fear of production rapidly 
moving towards East once Western wages or labour taxes change slightly. Moreover, 
the simulation example shows that a superior technology in one region leads to a 
higher relative output and lower relative factor inputs in that region compared to the 
other region.  
Currently labour costs differ strongly between Eastern European countries. 
According to this simplified model and ignoring other factors driving outsourcing 
decisions, the sensitivity of Western outsourcing activities to production cost changes 
in countries like Czech Republic and Hungary is higher than in Romania and 
Bulgaria, since the wage levels of the former countries are closer to the Western wage 
level than those of the latter countries. When the Eastern production cost level 
converges to the Western level, the outsourcing sensitivity will increase. However, 
the analytical model does not capture outsourcing determinants like infrastructure and 
the legal framework predicting the most offshore outsourcing into countries with the 
lowest labour costs. 
The model serves as an easily tractable analytical tool and can be 
implemented in a more detailed general equilibrium model. Particularly, the final 
good demand side and international trade can be implemented. Income effects for 
high- and low-skilled workers and capital owners in the two regions can then be 
investigated in a more detailed way, and a general welfare analysis can be done. 
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Abstract 
This paper contributes to Hübler (2008) who analyses a partial 
equilibrium model of outsourcing with Cournot competition in 
intermediate good production. Final production is located in Western 
Europe, whereas the intermediate good can be manufactured by a 
Western (outsourcing) or Eastern European supplier (offshore 
outsourcing). The paper asks the question how changes in production 
costs, in particular wages, affect output and thus labor input in the two 
regions. The paper proves analytically that under certain conditions 
higher production costs in one region reduce intermediate good 
production in both regions.  
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1   Introduction 
A main result in Hübler (2008) is the possibility of “adverse Cournot competition”. 
This means, one producer decreases output as a reaction to an output decrease of the 
other producer. Thus, if the first producer faces a cost increase, he will decrease his 
output, and the second producer will also do so, however to a smaller extent, so that 
the second producer will produce more relative to the first producer. While Hübler 
(2008) derives this result from numerical simulations, this paper derives the necessary 
conditions for this outcome strictly analytically in section 4. Section 2 repeats the 
model setup described by Hübler (2008). Section 3 provides the proof that the second 
order condition for a profit maximum in Hübler (2008) is indeed fulfilled. Section 5 
contains corrections of Hübler (2008). Section 6 concludes. 
 
2   Model setup 
The partial equilibrium model set up in Hübler (2008)2F2F2F 1 consists of final good Y 
production, located in the Western European region, and intermediate good X 
production located in the Western and in the Eastern European region. 
  ( ) 10.5;1 <α<X+XH=Y αEWα −     (1) 
The final good producer takes demand as given by the market. (The final good market 
form is not of importance in this case.) H is a high-skilled labor and high-technology 
intensive input, which is available in the Western area only and cannot be outsourced.  
 The process of intermediate good X production includes all activities requiring 
low-skilled labor like manual work and usual capital. X can be manufactured in 
Western (XW) or Eastern Europe (XE). Low-skilled labor is supplied in both regions. 
Intermediate good production can be moved to the East when production costs or 
wages are cheaper in the East, afterwards the manufactured intermediates are 
imported to the West. XW and XE are homogeneous goods and perfect substitutes so 
that they can be summed up to X = XW + XE. The assumption α > 0.5 implies a higher 
income share for the high-skilled labor and high-technology intensive input located in 
                                                 
1 This section is partly a citation of Hübler (2008), section 3. 
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the West (under perfect competition). The Cobb-Douglas function implies the 
possibility of replacing part of input X, produced with a high amount of low-skilled 
labor and a standard technology, by input H, produced by high-skilled workers and 
modern technologies, and vice versa. 
 The Y producer minimizes production costs for a given output Y: 
  
( ) αEWα
EEWWH
X+XH=Yt.s.
Xp+Xp+Hw=Cmin
−1
     (2) 
wH is the price of high-skilled labor intensive input H, pW and pE are the prices of X, 
manufactured in the Western or Eastern region. The final good Y producer is a price 
taker, he sets the input factor quantities according to the factor prices wH, pW and pE. 
 The intermediate good is manufactured by independent rivalling firms located 
in Western Europe or Eastern Europe, respectively. We call the former case 
outsourcing, the latter case offshore outsourcing. Intermediate good X production is 
represented by using Cobb-Douglas functions with the inputs capital K and low-
skilled labor L with constant returns to scale: 
  [ ]EW;=i,<β<LKA=X iiβiiβiii 10;1−     (3) 
The production processes in West and East differ in technologies Ai and in real wages 
wi. Capital is not mobile across boarders. Furthermore, differences in the returns to 
capital investment ri and in the elasticities of production βi and 1 - βi  are possible. 
 Cost minimizing X manufacturing leads to the following marginal costs ci: 
  ( ) iβiiβiiiβiiβii wrAββ=c −−−− − 1111      (4) 
Marginal costs ci are assumed constant and equal to the cost per unit of output. 
Marginal costs are derived from the exogenous parameters technology Ai, real wage 
wi, real return rate on investment ri and the Cobb-Douglas function exponents βi and 
1-βi. If the returns on investment and the exponents are similar in the East and West, a 
cost advantage can be achieved via a more efficient technology or a lower wage level. 
 X producers maximize their profits and have oligopolistic (monopolistic) 
power reflected in the price for X depending on the quantity of  X = XW + XE: 
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  ( ) iiiii XcXXp=Πmax ⋅−⋅      (5) 
Without any market power of X producers, prices would be equal to marginal costs. 
In general a productivity gap between East and West exists, and hence intermediate 
good production takes place in the area with lower marginal costs only. 
 In the case of Bertrand competition (price competition) intermediate good 
manufacturing occurs only in the cheaper region, too. Now the cheaper producer can 
increase the price for X and reduce the production quantity of X, but if he increases 
the price for X more than to the marginal costs of the rival X producer, he will loose 
all the demand for his product. 
 Cournot competition (competition in quantities) is the interesting case 
referring to the current tendencies in the European automotive industry as well as 
analytically. Under the assumption of pure Cournot competition the Eastern and 
Western company offer the intermediate good X at the same price pX = pW = pE . The 
firms optimize their supply of X taking the rivals reaction and the demand function 
for X given by the Western final good Y producer into account. The conditional factor 
demand function can be derived from (2): 
  ( ) ( ) Ywα
pα=p,wY,X
α
H
x
xH
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−1      (6) 
Total demand for X falls with the price pX and increases with wH, the price of the 
skilled labor intensive good H. Solving (6) for pX yields the inverse factor demand 
function for X: 
  αYαXwα
α=p HX
11
1 −−
      (7) 
Obviously, the intermediate good suppliers face a non-linear and downward-sloping 
inverse factor demand function with respect to total X. Since α < 1, expanding the 
supply of total X leads to a more than proportional fall in the price pX. Hence, a 
monopolist would choose the output as small as possible, but in the oligopoly the 
situation is different. For every given positive quantity of one supplier there is an 
optimal output of the rival, which results in an equilibrium with positive quantities. 
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 In market equilibrium supply equals demand for X at the price pX, so that we 
can insert (7) into (5): 
  iiiHi XcXαYαXwα
α=Πmax ⋅−⋅−
− 111
   (8) 
Accordingly, the oligopolists maximize their profits Πi by choosing their production 
quantities Xi and by taking the total amount X that includes their own and their rival's 
quantity into account. This results in the following first order conditions for profit 
maximization representing the oligopolists reaction functions with i = [W; E]: 
  0
1111
1
1 =cαX+XαX
α
αYw
α
α=
dX
dΠ
iiH
i
i −
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅
−
−−
−−
 (9) 
 
3   Second order condition for a profit maximum 
Now we want to show that the second order condition for the profit maximization 
problem in equation (8) is indeed fulfilled. We first rewrite the first order condition in 
equation (9) above using equation (7): 
 0
11 =−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂
i
i
X
i
i c
X
Xp=
X
Π
α  
 
X
ii
p
c
X
X =−⇔ α
11         (10) 
The second order condition for a profit maximum is the derivative of (9) and can be 
rewritten using (10): 
 01
1112
2
<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂
∂
∂
X
X
X
p
X
X
X
p=
X
Π iXi
i
X
i
i
αα     (11) 
This condition is obviously fulfilled: 
i
X
X
p
∂
∂  is negative according to equation (7) with 
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[ ]EW;=iXX i i ,∑=  and in accordance with basic economic intuition. XXiα11−  is 
positive according to (10). Herein, equation (7) ensures that pX is indeed positive, 
while marginal costs ci and α are positive per definition. Finally, in the last term in 
(11), 
X
X i−1  is positive, because all output values are positive and Xi cannot exceed X. 
(Xi never becomes zero as long as marginal production costs ci are positive.) 
 
4   Condition for adverse Cournot competition 
This section proves analytically that a cost increase in a region reduces output in this 
region as expected. It then shows mathematically that under certain conditions a cost 
increase in one region not only decreases output in this region, but additionally 
slightly decreases output in the other region. Such an adverse Cournot behaviour is a 
main result of the considerations and simulations in Hübler (2008). This surprising 
result stems from the interconnection of production in the two regions via Cournot 
competition. 
 We recall and rewrite equation (11) in Hübler (2008), where cE denotes 
marginal production costs in the East, cW denotes marginal production costs in the 
West, and cWE = cW / cE. 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) WE
EW
WE
WE
E
W
WE cα+cα
αc+cα
cα+α
α+cα
X
XV −
−=−
−=≡
1
1
1
1
    (12) 
and insert this expression into Hübler (2008), equation (15),  second expression:  
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) Ywα'
c+c
cα+cα
c+c
cα+cα
c+c
αc+cαcα+cα
cα+cα
c+c
Y
cα+cα
αc+cα+c+c
w
α'=X
α
H
EW
EW
EW
EW
EW
WEEW
EW
EW
EW
WE
α
EW
H
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=Θ−Θ=−Θ=
−+−
−Θ=
−
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+ ,)(
11
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1
11
1
)(
1
1
11
1
1 αα
α    (13) 
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We first calculate a differential that tells us how production in the West (in absolute 
terms) reacts to marginal production cost changes in the West (in absolute terms), 
keeping all other variables constant. (Note that calculating the differential dXE / dcE 
leads to analogue results, i. e. the model is symmetric.) 
 
( ) ( )[ ]( )
( ) ( )[ ]( )
( )
α
α
α
αα
+
+
+
+
−+−−−Θ=
+−−−Θ=
+−−−Θ
2
2
2
)1(2
1
)(
)12(1
)(
11)(1
)(
)(11)(1
EW
EW
EW
EWEW
EW
EWEWEW
W
W
c+c
cααcαα
c+c
αcα+cαc+cα
c+c
c+cαcα+cαc+cα=
dc
dX
  (14) 
Is this expression smaller or larger than zero? At first, all variables are positive per 
economically plausible assumption. At second, we assume α = ]0.5; 1[ throughout the 
paper. It follows that the numerator is clearly negative, while the denominator is 
clearly positive. Therefore, the whole differential is negative. As a consequence, 
higher production costs in the West, for example due to a rising Western wage level, 
reduce Western production and hence Western employment in absolute terms as 
expected. 
 We now derive a differential from (13) that tells us how production in the 
West (in absolute terms) reacts to marginal production cost changes in the East (in 
absolute terms), keeping all other variables constant: 
 
( )[ ]
( )[ ]( )
α
α
α
αα α
+
+
+
+
−++−Θ=
+−−Θ=
+−−Θ
2
22
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)1(2
1
)(
)1(
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))(1(1)(
EW
WE
EW
EWEW
EW
EWEWEW
E
W
c+c
cααcα
c+c
αcα+cαc+cα
c+c
c+ccα+cαc+cα=
dc
dX
   (15) 
The condition for the differential to be smaller than zero is: 
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 0)1( 22 <−++− WE cααcα  
 EW
W
E c
c
c
α
αα :12
2
=<−+⇔        (16) 
If the condition is fulfilled, a cost increase in the East results in an output decrease in 
the West, this means there is “adverse Cournot competition”. We first check in which 
cases this condition is fulfilled for α = ]0.5; 1[ as assumed throughout Hübler (2008). 
If α is slightly below one, the whole expression on the left hand side of (16) is also 
slightly below one. Then condition (16) is still fulfilled when cE is at least as large as 
cW. This leads to the first result: Rising costs in the high-cost region always reduce 
output in the low-cost region. (Note that calculating the differential dXE / dcW leads to 
analogue results, i. e. the model is symmetric.)  
 If α is slightly above 0.5 the left hand side of condition (16) is slightly higher 
than -1. Solving 012 =−+ αα  yields 2
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2,1
±−=α . The positive solution is α1 ≈ 
0.618. This leads to the second result: In the interval α = ]0.5; 0.618[ rising costs in 
the low-cost region always reduce output in the high-cost region, independent of the 
production costs in the East and the West. On the contrary, in the interval α = [0.618; 
1[ rising costs in the low-cost region can decrease or increase output in the high-cost 
region depending on the cost differential cEW. This leads to the third result: In the 
interval α = [0.618; 1[ rising costs in the low-cost region reduce output in the high-
cost region only if the cost difference between the high- and low-cost region is small 
(so that cEW is high). If the cost difference is large (so that cEW is small), rising costs in 
the low-cost region increase output in the high-cost region. 
 In the simulations in Hübler (2008), section 8, we assumed α = 0.66. This 
leads to a critical cost ratio cEW ≈ 0.219. If the cost ratio cEW is higher than this critical 
value within the interval α = [0.618; 1[, the differential in (15) becomes negative, 
otherwise it becomes positive. The cost ratio with respect to average wage levels 
between the Czech Republic and Germany, for example, is just in the area of this 
critical value. Hence, according the model, further rising costs in the Czech Republic 
would likely have a slightly negative impact on German intermediate output. On the 
other hand, cost increases in a country like Romania would have a positive effect on 
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German intermediate output, because the cost ratio is larger than the critical value.3F3F3F2 
 Moreover, α represents the income share of the high-skilled labor and high-
tech intensive input factor. This kind of input is used in final production, which is 
only located in the West. Thus, following the results above, a higher income share of 
the high-skilled and high-tech intensive factor reduces the likelihood that cost 
increases in the East are harmful for intermediate production in the West. 
 However, we need to take into account that in our partial equilibrium analysis 
the output of the final product is kept constant. Therefore, the analysis does not take 
into account how cost changes in intermediate production affect the output quantity in 
final production. 
 
5   Errata 
The last sentence in Hübler (2008), page 177 should read: For cWE towards infinity or 
towards zero the elasticity goes towards zero (Figure 1). 
 The first equation in (15) in Hübler (2008), page 178 correctly reads: 
 YV+c+c
w
α'=X
WE
α
EW
H
E 1
1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
 
 
6   Conclusion 
The analytic treatment of the model set up in Hübler (2008) has provided some new 
insights. Naturally, rising costs in one region reduce intermediate good output in the 
same region. The interesting question is under which conditions rising costs in one 
region also reduce output in the other region to some (possibly small) extent. This is 
the case of adverse Cournot competition. 
 The analysis shows that rising costs in the high-cost region always reduce 
output in the low-cost region. Furthermore, if the factor demand function is relatively 
steep, rising costs in the low-cost region always reduce output in the high-cost region, 
independent of the production costs in the East and the West. On the contrary, if the 
                                                 
2 Note that according to the model a large cost differential between Romania and Germany implies that 
the main part of intermediate production is located in Romania. 
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factor demand function is relatively flat, rising costs in the low-cost region can 
decrease or increase output in the high-cost region depending on the cost differential 
between East and West. In this case, rising costs in the low-cost region reduce output 
in the high-cost region only if the cost difference between the high- and low-cost 
region is small. 
 To illustrate the results, suppose the income share of the high-tech and high-
skilled labor intensive input factor is relatively high so that the factor demand 
function is relatively flat. Then according to the model, rising costs in the Czech 
Republic would likely have a negative impact on German intermediate good output. 
On the other hand, cost increases in a country like Romania would have a positive 
effect on German intermediate good output, because the cost ratio is larger than the 
critical value. Believing this result, policy makers need not be too concerned about 
reallocation of production to Eastern European countries with very low production 
costs due to changes in production costs (for example via wage bargaining) within 
Eastern countries. They should be more concerned about the reallocation effects due 
to production cost changes in countries where production costs are only slightly lower 
than in the home country. This is in accordance with the previous outcome of Hübler 
(2008), stating that changes in relative costs cause larger re-allocations of 
intermediate production, if the interregional cost difference is smaller.  
 Finally, following the results, a higher income share of the high-skilled and 
high-tech intensive factor reduces the likelihood that cost increases in the East are 
harmful for intermediate production in the West. This implies that a policy that 
fosters education and innovation as “assets” for production at home, makes 
companies less “vulnerable” to cost changes in other countries when taking offshore 
outsourcing into account. 
 However, the analysis says nothing about the magnitude and the economic 
significance of the results, and the caveats pointed out by Hübler (2008) apply. 
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This paper analyzes a stylized model of international capital mobility and diffusion
of embodied technologies from North to South. The South can fall behind in
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alternative view that technological catching up is strongest at a medium technology
gap. The closer the South is to the technology frontier the more beneficial is a
higher income share of foreign capital.
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1 Introduction
Technology diffusion from industrialized to developing countries is a promising way of
economic development (compare World Bank 2008). Moreover, the potential of inter-
national technology diffusion for reducing the energy intensities of economic activities
in developing countries and thus for reducing greenhouse gas emissions has become
increasingly important. The 2007 Bali conference on climate policy emphasized the re-
sponsibility of the industrialized countries to help the developing countries to achieve
their emission targets. Most likely, adopting advanced technologies from industrialized
countries is much faster and more efficient than inventing own technologies in devel-
oping countries. Among the potential channels of international technology diffusion -
trade, foreign direct investment, migration, patent citations, scientific literature, com-
munication and information technologies - this paper focuses on international capital
movements or in other words foreign direct investment (FDI). Capital flows jointly with
embodied technologies to recipient countries, improves their capital and technology en-
dowments and additionally creates technology spillovers to local firms (via imitation
of products and machinery, demonstration effects, labor turnover and vertical linkages,
increased competition of foreign and domestic firms; compare Saggi 2002).
While some developing countries have been able to converge towards the industri-
alized countries in terms of technology levels, other developing countries have fallen
further behind (World Bank 2008). Herein, the human capital endowment of a recipient
developing country is a main determinant of the success of technology adoption (see for
instance World Bank 1993). Additionally, own innovation performed in a developing
country might be an effective substitute or support for technology adoption (Lall and
Urata 2003).
While there is a broad strand of empirical literature on the effects of capital inflows
on productivity and growth, theories on technology diffusion via capital inflows are rare
(for example Findlay 1978, Wang and Blomstro¨m 1992, Das 1987, Mayer-Foulkes and
Nunnenkamp 2009). And there is no common intuitive theory that describes the dynamic
interactions of international capital movements, technology diffusion, innovation and
absorptive capacities of recipient countries.
Our study therefore investigates the dynamic interaction of North-South capital mo-
bility and technology diffusion building on Nelson and Phelps (1966, in the following
denoted by N&P). Our study deals with the question, whether market forces enable inter-
national transfer of capital and embodied technologies in such a way that the technology
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growth rate of a developing country catches up with the growth rate of an industrial-
ized country so that the technology gap narrows. If there is an automatic technology
diffusion mechanism that narrows the technology gap, this will be an argument for de-
velopment and climate policy not to overreact and to let market forces work instead. If,
on the other hand, there is a risk that technology diffusion does not occur sufficiently
based on market forces, there will be need for policy interventions that actively support
technology diffusion processes and that improve the absorptive capacities of developing
countries.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical explanation for a
phenomenon frequently identified in the empirical literature and for example discussed
by the World Bank (2008): The North-South technology gap widens and convergence of
technology growth rates fails in some developing countries despite increasing global eco-
nomic integration via international investment and other channels. Our analysis there-
fore provides one possible explanation (among others for example described by Hanson
2001) for the diverse results of the econometric literature about the impact of FDI on
growth and the role of human capital for technology diffusion. A consecutive question is,
whether own innovation in developing countries can remedy such a convergence failure.
Furthermore, there is the point of view that technology diffusion is strongest at a
medium technology gap as described by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005). So far, this has
been an artificial construction in order to explain the observation that certain countries
fall behind in terms of technologies. A contribution of this paper is to derive this outcome
theoretically through the introduction of international capital mobility (for the special
case of technology diffusion via capital mobility).
We also examine the potential of own innovation in the South for narrowing the
technology gap and for preventing a convergence failure. Although technology diffusion
and own innovation in the South are basically substitutes, they can positively interact
as complements in the short-run. The reason is that innovations raise total factor
productivity, which in turn attracts more foreign capital and embodied technologies.
On the other hand, own innovation in the South cannot prevent falling behind in terms
of technologies in the long-run, except when the South is as innovative as the North.
Different to the original theory by N&P, in our model a higher initial technology level
(innovative capability) in the North increases the technology gap in the presence of own
innovation in the South, because performing own innovation reduces the North-South
technology gap and hence the possibility to adopt foreign technologies via international
technology diffusion.
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According to our model, a larger income share of internationally mobile foreign cap-
ital is more beneficial for technology diffusion when the South is close to the technology
frontier.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related theoretical and
empirical literature. Section 3 re-interprets the N&P theory in the context of FDI in
general form. Section 4 introduces international capital mobility explicitly in a myopic
market solution approach. Section 5 critically discusses the results of the paper. Section
6 concludes.
2 Literature Background
This section at first describes empirical studies on FDI induced productivity gains and
then presents theoretical approaches dealing with productivity gains via international
capital mobility.
There is a broad strand of empirical research on international technology diffusion
via FDI including cross-country panel analyses as well as case studies for specific coun-
tries. Numerous econometric studies examine the effects of FDI inflows on GDP growth
of recipient countries or productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms - with
diverse results. (Kokko 1992, Blomstro¨m and Kokko 1998, OECD 2002, Saggi 2002,
Keller 2004 and Hoekman and Javorcik 2006 provide detailed literature surveys. Chen
and Dunning 1994 also include comprehensive theoretical background information. Con-
cerning East Asian economies see Lall and Urata 2003.) A number of studies confirm
the positive effect of human capital on technology diffusion (Benhabib and Spiegel 1994,
Crispolti and Marconi 2005, Kneller 2005, Girma 2005, Lai et al. 2006), while others
do not confirm it (Sjo¨holm 1997, Xu and Wang 2000). Some papers additionally find
a minimum human capital level which is necessary to enable technological catching up
(Borensztein et al. 1998, Crespo et al. 2004, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005, Ciruelos and
Wang 2005, also see OECD 2002). Mayer-Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2009) observe that
FDI accelerates economic convergence among high-income countries, while it widens the
income differential between the USA and low- and middle-income countries.
Moreover, the econometric literature examines the role of the technology gap between
the technology in practice in the recipient country and the technology frontier. Some
studies find evidence for the hypothesis that the technology diffusion strength increases
the larger the technology gap (Griffith et al. 2002, Girma 2005, Griffith et al. 2004,
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weak evidence by Kokko et al. 1996). Others support the hypothesis of an inverted U-
shaped relation of the technology gap and the technology diffusion strength (Benhabib
and Spiegel 2005, Girma et al. 2001) or a U-shaped relation (Girma and Go¨rg 2007).
The World Bank (2008) summarizes the effects of technology diffusion to developing
countries as follows:
”The level of technological achievement in developing countries has converged
with that of high-income countries over the past 15 years. A sustained policy
of increased openness to foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI),
plus increased investments in human capital, have contributed to substan-
tial improvements in technological achievement in developing countries over
the past 15 years. And despite rapid progress at the technological frontier,
technological achievement in both low- and middle-income countries has in-
creased much more rapidly than in high-income countries. As a result, de-
veloping countries have closed the relative gap with high-income countries.
However, the gap remains large. Moreover, the strong aggregate perfor-
mance of low-income countries reflects large improvements in technological
achievement by some, but much more modest advances by the majority. As
a consequence, many are only maintaining pace with, or even losing ground
to, high-income countries.”
An important strand of the theoretical literature deals with endogenous growth via
horizontal or vertical product (variety) improvements, for example Krugman (1979),
Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Aghion
and Howitt (2005). Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2003a, 2003b) provide full micro
founded analyses of imitation and innovation dependent on the distance to the technol-
ogy frontier.
Our study abstracts from the sources of innovation and economic activities on the
micro level and rather examines technology diffusion processes on a macro level in or-
der to understand the large-scale time paths and interactions. We build on Nelson and
Phelps (1966, henceforth denoted by N&P). In their macroeconomic model, N&P for-
malize the so-called Veblen-Gerschenkron effect.1 Their intuitive approach has been
applied in a number of studies.2
Only few theoretical models specifically deal with FDI as a channel of technology
transfer. Findlay (1978) sets up a model of technology diffusion through FDI, where
the rate of technical progress in the recipient backward region is a negative function of
the technology level in the backward region relative to the level in the advanced region,
and a positive function of the stock ratio of foreign to domestic capital within the
1Gerschenkron (1962) studies the phenomenon of economic catching up of countries that have fallen
behind.
2Aghion (2007), for instance, applies the N&P approach to examine the effect of education on growth.
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backward region. Das (1987) examines the optimal dynamic behavior of multinational
firms when knowledge spillovers to rivals in the host country occur. He shows that the
indigenous firms do not necessarily benefit from the technology transfer to subsidiaries
of multinationals firms, while the host economy as a whole always benefits. Wang and
Blomstro¨m (1992) endogenize technology transfer via capital mobility including costs of
transferring technologies and of learning. Building on N&P, Diao et al. (2005) multiply
the share of intermediate goods imports in GDP by the share of imported capital in
GDP and by the distance to the technology frontier. Their approach takes into account
that foreign firms likely import advanced capital goods (from their home countries).
Mayer-Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2009) show which conditions concerning the strength
of technology transfer and convergence forces must be fulfilled in order to guarantee
international convergence of economic growth rates.
Nonetheless, the existing theories do not directly explain the empirical facts de-
scribed before. Against this background, the contribution of this paper is to provide an
intuitive theoretical description of international technology transfer via capital mobility
that provides one possible reason (among other reasons) for the mixed empirical
evidence described above.
3 The Nelson and Phelps Theory in the Context of Inter-
national Capital Mobility
The considerations of N&P are based on the Veblen-Gerschenkron effect (Gerschenkron
1962). According to the N&P theory, technological catching up is faster the larger the
gap between the technology in practice and the technology frontier and the better the
educational attainment. When the technology level of the ”learning” country is low,
most of the newly arriving technologies are not yet known and therefore beneficial. The
higher the level, which the ”learning” country has reached, the more newly appearing
technologies are already known and therefore without an additional benefit. Human
capital (educational attainment) enhances the technology diffusion speed for every given
technology gap, since it improves the ability to adopt and apply new technologies. In
case of exogenous technological progress of the frontier, the technology in practice follows
the frontier with the same rate of technological progress and with a constant relative
technology gap.
The N&P theory can be applied to an industrialized country (technological leader,
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denoted by North) that creates the leading technologies and a developing country (tech-
nological follower, denoted by South) that adopts technologies from the North and fol-
lows with a certain technology gap (compare Benhabib and Spiegel 2005). While in
N&P the technology diffusion speed only depends on educational attainment, in our re-
interpretation technology diffusion additionally depends on the volume of foreign capital
in the South, similar to Findlay (1978). In this context, we re-interpret educational at-
tainment as the absorptive capacity, including all factors that determine the ability of
host countries to absorb transferred technologies and to benefit from them.
In contrast to the original N&P theory, empirical evidence shows that many devel-
oping countries are not able to catch up. For that reason, the original equation by N&P
has been artificially modified in the literature so that catching up is fastest at a medium
technology gap and decreases the larger the gap and also the smaller the gap (logistic
model, e.g. described by Benhabib and Spiegel 2005). As a consequence, it is possible
that convergence fails so that a country falls further behind in terms of technology lev-
els. But this assumption seems intuitively not convincing. Why should a country with
high educational attainment, a stable political and legal system and good infrastructure
not be able to catch up in a certain sector or field of technology such as solar energy
generation where it has completely missed the newest technological development? The
inability of developing countries to catch up probably rather lies in the determinants of
technology accumulation like education and the legal system, not in the low technology
level itself (compare OECD 2002). If these determinants of technology diffusion are suf-
ficiently present, technological catching up is possible even far away from the frontier.
Our considerations therefore follow this point of view.
Van Meijl and van Tongeren (1999) assume that international spillovers from trade
are quantitatively higher when countries are similar in their economic structure. This
view is in accordance with our model. Given a high education level, infrastructure etc.
in the leading industrialized country, the improvement of these factors in the developing
country makes it more similar to the developed country and thus increases the technology
spillover strength.
The first section 3.1 explains how technological catching up of the South is influenced
by the rate of technological progress in the North and by the absorptive capacity of
the South based on N&P. Section 3.2 introduces own innovation in the South and
investigates its interaction with technology diffusion. 3.3 briefly explains the allocation
of internationally mobile capital in the long-run.
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3.1 A Re-Interpretation of the Nelson and Phelps Theory
The equations below describe the basic model formulated by N&P. Our extension is the
introduction of capital as a determinant of the technology diffusion speed. Throughout
the paper, n denotes the North, and s denotes the South.3
A˙s = φs(An −As), φs = φs(H,K) (1)
An = An(0)eλt (2)
As is the endogenous technology level in practice in the destination country, the South.
An is the level of the exogenous technology frontier in the North. We assume that capital
transferred from the North to the South embodies technologies up to this frontier level.
An and As can be interpreted as knowledge capital stocks that are accumulated and
that determine total factor productivity. Technology diffusion increases total factor
productivity in the South As. λ is the exogenous growth rate of the technology frontier.
An(0) is the level of the frontier at t = 0. φs is the (in this section completely exogenous)
spillover strength including the imitation capability of the South and has the following
properties:
∂φs(H,K)
∂H
> 0,
∂φs(H,K)
∂K
> 0
φs is an increasing function of the relative human capital (educational attainment)
H = HsHn , i.e. the human capital level of the South relative to the human capital
level of the North. Throughout the paper, we interpret H in a broader sense as the ab-
sorptive capacity including infrastructure, the legal and political framework etc. of the
recipient country. A specification in relative terms seems reasonable, because technolo-
gies are invented in the North given the North’s educational level and absorbed by the
South given the South’s educational level. The chance to absorb Northern technologies
successfully, increases when the South’s educational level comes closer to the North’s
level. H also incorporates naturally given factors that influence technology diffusion. H
increases ceteris paribus with the spatial concentration of economic activities, because
spatial concentration eases productivity spillovers in accordance with agglomeration the-
ory. China, for example, has established Special Economic Zones in order to concentrate
foreign economic activities and to maximize spillovers. Also, small economic areas with
3As and An are time dependent variables. Time indices of variables are not shown explicitly. Time
derivatives are denoted by dots.
58
high population densities like Hong Kong and Taiwan have shown amazing catching
up and economic growth performances. H furthermore captures natural conditions. It
decreases if the land is mountainous and landlocked and hence difficult to access, if
the climatic conditions are problematic and so forth. We may think of sub-Saharan
African countries facing severe detrimental political and natural conditions that prevent
the transfer of capital and technologies. H may also increase with the size of the labor
force, since the pool of workers suitable for employment in multinational enterprises
increases with its size. All kinds of policies that improve technology diffusion can be
modeled by raising H. For example, the establishment of China’s Special Economic
Zones, the Chinese policy to enforce joint ventures of foreign investors with domestic
firms, and the Chinese policy to grant foreign investors privileges of various forms.
Compared to N&P, we additionally assume that φs increases with the South-North
ratio of internationally mobile (high-tech) capital K = KsKn . This approach is a modifi-
cation of Findlay’s (1978) model. The underlying assumption is that high-tech capital
is built up in the North and embodies advanced technologies that have been invented
in the North. Capital and embodied technologies are simultaneously transferred to the
South. But the technologies are not immediately available in all Southern production
processes. They rather need time to diffuse into and through the Southern economy
(via product and process imitation, learning from foreign managers, engineers or work-
ers, vertical and horizontal linkages between suppliers and customers, productivity gains
through increased competition etc.). The quality of the technologies embodied in foreign
capital is supposed to rise at the constant rate An over time due to Northern innovation
activities. We meanwhile assume K to be exogenously given at each certain point of
time.
H andK act as complements, i.e. they enhance each other.4 More foreign investment
potentially yields even larger positive spillovers when at the same time the absorptive
capacity is higher, in accordance with the empirical findings. Technology diffusion ceases
if H or K are zero.
Without technological progress of the technological frontier, the technology level of
the developing country catches up completely with the frontier. Following N&P, we
rather assume exogenous exponential technological progress of the frontier and reinter-
pret their results with respect to K. Like N&P, we first solve differential equation (1)
and then calculate the relative long-run technology gap. The conclusions of N&P con-
4This is satisfied in a multiplicative specification that we will use in section 4, but not in an additive
specification.
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cerning the effect of H on technology diffusion can then be directly transferred to the
effect of K.5
An −As
As
=
λ
φs
(3)
A :=
As
An
=
φs
φs + λ
=
1
1 + λφs
< 1 (4)
Equation (4) shows that in the long-run the technology level of the South has a constant
ratio A to the technology level of the North, whenK and H stay constant. Since φs is an
increasing function ofK, a higher foreign capital intensityK and a higher human capital
endowment H reduce the relative equilibrium technology gap as shown in equation (4).
The elasticity of the Southern technology level in the steady state with respect to
the foreign capital intensity reads:6
∂As
∂K
K
As
=
∂φs
∂K
φs
Kλ
φs + λ
(5)
According to (5), the relative increase in the technology level due to a relative increases
in foreign capital is greater the higher the technological progress λ of the frontier. A
subsidy on internationally mobile foreign capital can be economically justified because
of the positive technology spillover of mobile capital (based on the stylized narrow view
of this model). A subsidy increases the foreign capital share. It follows from (5) that
the benefit of the subsidy is greater when technological progress in the North is higher.
3.2 Innovation in the South
According to equations (3) and (4), the technology gap cannot be completely closed
through technology diffusion as long as H and K are finite. A possible remedy is to
add own innovation in the South as described by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005). Our
contribution is to solve the differential equation including innovation in the South.7 We
5For more detailed calculations see N&P and our calculations in equations 6 to 10, which are a
generalized form of the following basic calculations.
6As is given by equation (9) with θs set to zero.
7Our basic relation implies imperfect technology diffusion. Perfect technology diffusion, i.e. φs →∞,
would make own innovation in the South superfluous. For a further discussion see Grossman and
Helpman (1991).
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set up a diffusion equation similar to Benhabib and Spiegel (2005):
A˙s = φs(An −As) + θsγeγt (6)
φs = φs(H,K), θs = θs(Hs, Rs), γ = γ(Hs, Rs) (7)
We assume an exogenous Southern innovation rate γ which increases with the input of
R&D resources Rs and with Hs.8 θs is the Southern innovation level in t = 0, which can
be interpreted as the accumulated knowledge up to this point of time. In this sense, it
depends on the values of Hs and Rs before t = 0. Similar to φs, θs determines how suc-
cessfully new technologies can be implemented into production processes in the South.
Human capital, infrastructure etc. improve φs, the technology diffusion capability, as
well as θs which we call in the analog way innovative capability. Herein, we make a
simplifying assumption: The time lag between the appearance of new technologies and
their full implementation in production is relatively small in case of Southern innova-
tions, because they are directly created for local production and for the local market
and fit to the local abilities and circumstances. Foreign technologies on the other hand,
often exceed the existing local abilities by far and do not directly fit to the local circum-
stances. To make the argument more illustrative: Sub-Saharan African countries might
develop a new water extraction and storage system through public funding that will be
used almost everywhere within a couple of years and that will create a welfare gain. But
they will certainly not be able to adopt all relevant chemical know-how from US firms
which would be necessary to produce the same advanced pharmaceutics autonomously,
although it would certainly boost African welfare.
The solution of differential equation (6) becomes (like in N&P plus the additional
source of technological progress):9
As =
[
As(0)− φsAn(0)
φs + λ
− γθs
φs + γ
]
e−φst +
φsAn(0)
φs + λ
eλt +
γθs
φs + γ
eγt (8)
The first term describes the transition process and vanishes as t → ∞. In accordance
with Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), the leader and the follower still grow at the same rate
and a certain relative gap in the long-run, when the additional technological progress
term is added. Complete catching up of the South’s technology level to the North’s
8Here we write indices s, because the influence of human capital, infrastructure, R&D etc. in the
South on Southern innovation is independent of the corresponding Northern values.
9Note that the start value As(0) includes knowledge gained from technology diffusion as well as from
own Southern innovation.
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technology level is only possible, if the South’s own innovative capability is (at least)
identical to the North’s innovation capability, i.e. γ = λ and additionally θs = An(0).
But this case occurs unlikely in reality, since the innovative capability is lower in de-
veloping countries than in industrialized countries. However, own innovation in the
South has the potential to accelerate the convergence process, in other words, it has the
potential to lift up the South to a higher transition path.
Different to the literature, we now assume γ = λ , i.e. identical innovation rates
in the North and in the South so that θs becomes the policy parameter controlling the
innovation strength, since in general θs 6= An(0).10 We can then derive the long-run
technology level of the South:
As =
φsAn(0) + λθs
φs + λ
eλt (9)
We express the long-run technology ratio A, now including the South’s own innovation
level, as:
A =
φsAn(0) + θsλ
φsAn(0) +An(0)λ
=
1
λ +
θs
φsAn(0)
1
λ +
1
φs
< 1 (10)
This equation clearly shows that complete catching up is possible in two ways: At first,
the spillover strength φs becomes infinitely strong (due to an infinitely large absorptive
capacity or an infinitely high foreign capital intensity). At second, the Southern innova-
tive capability θs becomes equal to the leading innovative capability An(0). Both ways
seem not realistic, the latter at least for developing countries. Furthermore, when the
rate of technological progress (which is assumed to be equal in the North and South) in-
creases, the relative technology gap will mainly be determined by the South’s innovative
capability θs relative to the North’s innovative capability given by An(0). According to
the original N&P model, the level An(0) of the technology frontier does not influence
the relative technology gap, while a higher rate of technological progress of the frontier
increases the gap. Our model additionally considers own innovation in the South. Now,
in the presence of innovation, a higher initial technology level of the frontier An(0), i.e. a
better innovative capability of the North, widens the gap. The intuition is the following:
In our model framework a higher level of Northern technologies enlarges the North-
South technology gap which in turn enhances the technology diffusion speed. On the
10While in the former analysis a higher technological progress λ of the technological leader made
technology adoption more effective, the influence of λ on the technologies used in the South is now
ambiguous, because innovation in the South is assumed to grow with λ, too.
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other hand, own Southern innovations reduce the North-South technology gap, which
in turn reduces international technology diffusion. For this reason, the South cannot
fully benefit from a higher Northern technology level in the presence of own Southern
innovation. The consequence is, that the North fully benefits from its new innovations,
while the South does not. Thus, the relative gap increases with An(0) in the presence
of own innovation in the South.
While both alternatives of complete catching up seem not realistic, we now examine
the effectiveness of investing into a higher innovative capability θs. Technology transfer
and innovation are always beneficial from the point of view of the model, but the effec-
tiveness of certain policy measures depends on the other model parameters. Following
N&P, we derive a technology elasticity, in our case with respect to innovation in the
South. This allows us to investigate the effectiveness of enhancing Southern innovation
for narrowing the North-South technology gap:
∂As
∂θs
θs
As
=
1
φsAs(0)
λθs
+ 1
(11)
According to (11), the relative change in the Southern technology level due to a relative
change in the Southern innovative capability (around a certain value of the innovative
capability) is higher when φs and As(0) are low. We recall that φs is an increasing
function of the absorptive capacity and of the foreign capital intensity. The intuition is
similar to what we considered before: Own Southern innovations increase the Southern
technology level and decrease at the same time the North-South technology gap so that
international technology diffusion slows down. In this sense, technology diffusion and
own innovation act as substitutes.
Now we relax the assumption that Northern and Southern innovation processes have
the same rate of progress again. In general, it is plausible to assume that the Southern
innovation process has a lower rate than the Northern frontier process, i.e. γ < λ. We
divide equation (6) by As to obtain the growth rate of the Southern technology level
Aˆs = A˙sAs , where A =
As
An
:
Aˆs = φs
(
1
A
− 1
)
+
θsγe
γt
As
(12)
As grows with the same rate λ as the technology frontier in case of convergence of growth
rates, while own innovations grow at a lower rate γ per plausible assumption. Hence,
the last term in the equation above will vanish over time, so that the benefit of Southern
63
innovation vanishes. Nevertheless, innovation in the South accelerates the convergence
process to the steady state.
However, the optimal decision on investment in enhancing technology diffusion
needs to include the related costs which are neglected in our analysis.
3.3 International Factor Allocation in the Steady State
We now turn to the question how technology diffusion affects the allocation of inter-
nationally mobile capital between North and South in the long-run steady state when
all adjustment processes are completed. Does the international capital allocation still
change in the steady state after the catching up process has been completed?11 The an-
swer is no, which can easily be seen. In the ideal case (neglecting transaction costs) the
marginal products of mobile capital and hence their prices are equal in the North and in
the South (factor price equalization). If there are transaction costs, there will be a con-
stant difference between the marginal products. The N&P equation yields equal growth
rates λ of the technology of North and the South and a constant relative technology
ratio A in the steady state.
Hence, with or without transaction costs, in the long-run total factor productivities
and marginal products of capital in the North and in the South have a constant ratio,
which makes any adjustments of mobile capital stocks economically superfluous (as
long as there is no external shock). Moreover, the higher the technology level of the
South relative to the technology level of the North, the higher the quantity of mobile
capital allocated to the South relative to the quantity of capital allocated to the North.
4 Endogenous International Capital Mobility
While the foreign capital intensity was exogenous in the last section, it is now endo-
genized in a simple straightforward way: Marginal products of internationally mobile
high-tech capital are equalized across North and South.12 The question is how capital
mobility and technology diffusion through capital mobility interact. There is potentially
a positive feedback mechanism: A better absorptive capacity and a higher foreign cap-
11Own innovation in the South may or may not be present at any rate γ ≤ λ.
12The following outcomes also hold when including transaction costs of capital movements. In this
case there is a constant difference between the marginal products in the steady state.
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ital intensity enhance the technology diffusion speed. This in turn raises the marginal
product of internationally mobile capital and thus attracts more mobile capital and so
forth. On the other hand, a situation of a low foreign capital endowment and a low
absorptive capacity in the South results in a slow technology diffusion speed. This in
turn increases the technology gap so that even less capital is allocated to the South.
Hence, the South might get trapped concerning its technological development and for-
eign capital accumulation if the technology diffusion speed does not increase sufficiently
far away from the technology frontier.
This section examines these questions. Subsection 4.1 describes the model setup,
subsection 4.2 interprets the model.
4.1 The Model
In the following stylized model, the international allocation of capital is purely driven
by differences in marginal products of capital without perfect foresight and without
internalizing the social benefit of technology transfer. Therefore, our model can be
called a myopic market solution approach. So far, a logistic function approach has been
used in the literature to model a slower diffusion speed when the technology gap is either
small or large (Benhabib and Spiegel 2005). This assumption implies an inverted U-
shaped relation between the technology gap and the technology diffusion speed without
a direct theoretical explanation. In our model international capital allocation is the
explicit mechanism that leads to such a relationship.
We first write the technology diffusion equation (6) without innovation in the South,
explicitly including the influence of the absorptive capacity and of foreign capital on
technology diffusion:
A˙s = φs(An −As) (13)
φs = HµKν (14)
H is the absorptive capacity that rises with the Southern human capital endowment,
infrastructure, labor endowment and other economically beneficial factors and decreases
with economically detrimental factors such as missing access to the sea. H is measured
as a South-North ratio, so that a higher similarity between the South and the North
enhances the chance to transfer technologies successfully. (Compare section 3.1.) As
before, international technology diffusion is driven by foreign capital (FDI, multina-
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tional enterprises) building on the broad empirical literature. Also as before, a higher
South-North ratio of foreign capital K induces a faster technology diffusion when there
is a better absorptive capacity H. Therefore, K and H act as complements. This
multiplicative specification follows the empirical literature applying interaction terms
(e.g. Borensztein et al. 1998, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005, Girma and Go¨rg 2007). It
seems reasonable to assume µ + ν ≤ 1 i.e. a decreasing or constant returns to scale
specification.
In the next step we derive K from profit maximization of firms under perfect compe-
tition and perfect capital mobility, given a Cobb-Douglas type production function. This
constant returns to scale production function encompasses total factor productivity Ai,
foreign (high-tech) capital Ki, domestic (low-tech) capital Di and the aggregate input
Hi. The additive combination of foreign and domestic capital in the production function
implies the co-existence of foreign firms (multinational enterprises) and domestic firms
that produce the same output Yi. Hi encompasses human capital and infrastructure,
labor, land and other factors as described before. All factors that enhance (hinder)
technology diffusion probably also enhance (hinder) production.
Yi = Ai(Kαi +D
α
i )H
1−α
i = (K
α
i +D
α
i )(A˜iHi)
1−α (15)
Herein, we use the notation i = n, s and Ai = A˜i
1−α
. High-tech capital Ki is built
up in the North and perfectly mobile between North and South. It is assumed to stay
constant so that Kn+Ks = 1. This assumption implies that high-tech capital is a scarce
resource.13 The marginal product of Ki can be derived as follows:
∂Yi
∂Ki
= αKα−1i (A˜iHi)
1−α (16)
Perfect international mobility of high-tech capital equates the marginal products of Ki:
αKα−1n (A˜nHn)
1−α = αKα−1s (A˜sHs)
1−α
⇔ kn = ks (17)
⇒ K = A˜H (18)
13Note that in this model the transfer of capital is beneficial both for the North and the South, because
in the initial situation the mobile capital earns a higher return in the South than in the North and the
return on foreign direct investment is transferred back to the North. Otherwise, no capital would be
transferred from North to South.
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In the second equation we write Ki in efficiency units ki = KiA˜iHi . In the last equation
K, A˜ and H all denote South-North ratios.
Domestic (low-tech) capital is assumed to be internationally immobile and without
any influence on international technology diffusion. Different to Ki, Di is accumulated
in the North and in the South via saving and investing part of income Yi. (More details
are presented in the Appendix.) In case of closed economies, Ks is zero. In this case,
our model coincides with the standard Solow (or alternatively Ramsey) model of a
closed economy, and the South grows due to own (exogenous) innovation and due to
accumulation of capital Ds. (Own innovation in the South was discussed in section
3.2.) In the following analysis we basically assume that the South rather follows a
purely imitation based strategy, i.e. technological progress in the South is dominated
by technology diffusion from the North via the transfer of high-tech capital.
Now we simply insert equation (18) with A˜ = A
1
1−α into (13) and (14) to obtain:
A˙s = Hµ+νA
ν
1−α (An −As) (19)
Equation (21) can be re-written in terms of the growth rate Aˆs = A˙sAs :
14
Aˆs = Hµ+ν A
ν
1−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
density
(A−1 − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
distance
(20)
⇔ Aˆs = Hµ+ν
(
A
α+ν−1
1−α −A ν1−α
)
(21)
4.2 Interpretation
This section interprets equations (20) and (21) derived above. Obviously, a higher H is
always beneficial for technology diffusion, since it enhances the diffusion speed as well
as output per assumption. Both effects enhance each other in a complementary way.
In an analog way, a widespread, unaccessible area with disadvantageous natural and
climatic conditions and other economically detrimental factors always impede technology
diffusion.
Our main aspect under scrutiny is technological catching up and convergence of
technology growth rates. Equation (20) decomposes the impact of the technology gap
between An and As into two opposing parts: The first ”A term” means that a lower
ratio of As to An reduces the relative amount of foreign capital in the South. It describes
14The variable A has a maximal value of one, and the exponent of the first ”A term” in parentheses
in equation (21) is always smaller than the exponent of the second ”A term” in parentheses so that the
whole expression never becomes negative.
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that more foreign capital is allocated to a region if its relative technology level is higher
so that technology diffusion is also higher. Let us call this density effect. At the same
time, the second ”A term” in equation (20) states that a larger technology gap increases
the possibilities to adopt new technologies so that the technology diffusion speed rises.
Let us call this distance effect.
It is a priori not clear, which effect dominates. The outcome depends on the values
of α and ν. Suppose, the technology growth rate of the South Aˆs is lower than the
technology growth rate of the North Aˆn in the initial situation. If the distance effect
dominates, the South will fall behind in terms of the technology level until the distance
to the technology frontier is so large (i.e. A is so small) that the South’s technology
growth rate becomes equal to the North’s growth rate. In other words, the technology
gap widens, but growth rates finally converge. If the density effect dominates, Aˆs steadily
decreases with a lower A. In this case, there is no automatic convergence mechanism.
Without own innovation in the South and without policy intervention, the South falls
increasingly behind in terms of technologies, and the amount of foreign high-tech capital
allocated to the South asymptotically drops towards zero. - The South is trapped.
In order to find the condition for the possibility of a convergence failure, we note
that in (21) the second term in parentheses vanishes, if the technology ratio A becomes
smaller due to a difference in the technology growth rates, Aˆs < Aˆn. If the first term
in parentheses also decreases in A, the South will be trapped. This situation can only
occur when ν + α > 1. This is more likely the case, when α and ν are large, because
then the foreign capital endowment in the South reacts more strongly to changes in the
technology level As. In this case, lowering As shifts away a relatively large amount of
foreign capital. In case of a linear diffusion model with ν = 1, the condition for the
possibility of a growth trap is always fulfilled.
We can now derive another interesting aspect by plotting the function expressed by
equations (20) and (21) for different values of α as shown in Figure 2 in the Appendix:
The larger the exponent α, which means the income share of foreign capital,15 the closer
the point of maximal diffusion speed is to the technology frontier and the lower the value
of As is in the maximum. Therefore, a higher income share of foreign capital becomes
more beneficial the closer the economy is to the technology frontier. Farther away from
the technology frontier, a lower income share of foreign capital becomes more beneficial.
15For reasons of mathematical simplicity, we have also chosen the income share of domestic low-tech
capital to be α. But what matters for this outcome is the income share of foreign high-tech capital, not
the income share of domestic low-tech capital. Hence, the result would also hold for different exponents
of Ki and Di.
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This outcome stems from the fact, that the demand for foreign capital in the South
as a function of Ai described by equation (16) is steeper the higher α. Consequently,
when A = AsAn is large, a higher value of α attracts more foreign capital to the South.
When A is small so that the South is far away from the technology frontier, a higher
value of α attracts less capital to the South. This result is in accordance with what we
found before: The likelihood of a convergence failure is higher when α is larger. The
reason is that a higher value of α leads to a stronger reaction of the international capital
allocation driven by changes in the South-North technology ratio. Thus, the density
effect becomes stronger for a higher value of α, and more mobile capital is shifted away
from the South when the South falls behind in terms of technologies. Also note that
according to Figure 2, increasing α above 0.5 raises Aˆs only slightly. That means, there
seems to be a small additional benefit for technology diffusion of an income share of
foreign capital higher than 0.5.
We now set ν = 1 and α = 12 , which yields an illustrative quadratic form:
Aˆs = Hµ+1
(
A−A2) (22)
Note that the following considerations qualitatively also hold for other values of α.
Figure (1) is the (qualitative) graphical representation of equation (22). On the right
hand side of Figure 1 the South’s technology level is close to the technology frontier
given by the North, i.e. A is close to one. On the left hand side it is far away from the
technology frontier. The vertical axis shows the technology growth rate of the South Aˆs
as a function of the technology ratio A on the horizontal axis. Obviously, the maximal
diffusion speed is reached at half the distance to the technology frontier. (This outcome
changes, when another value for the income share of foreign capital α is chosen as
discussed before. Compare Appendix, Figure 2.)
We notice that starting at a high level of A on the right hand side of Figure 1 in area B1,
the Southern rate of technological progress Aˆs increases, while the technology ratio A
decreases. (We always move on the parabola.) The technology gap widens. In the steady
state the technology growth rate of the South has converged to that of the North. Full
convergence of growth rates as well as of technology levels implies limt→∞A = 1. This
case does not occur in this model with exogenous exponential technological progress. It
occurs however, if the technology frontier stays constant. (Then λ is zero in equation 4
resulting in A = 1.)
We then start at a medium distance to the technology frontier in the middle of Figure
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Figure 1: Areas of convergence and divergence of technology growth rates in the North
and the South dependent on the distance to frontier
1 in area B2 above the critical value Ac. As is larger than λ, so that the technology
gap narrows, i.e. A increases. Economies fulfilling such initial conditions are able to
catch up in terms of technologies up to a certain ratio A < 1, which fits to the growth
performances of the ”Asian Tiger” countries.
Starting on the left hand side of Figure 1 in area B3 we identify the case of a growth
trap. A is smaller than the critical value of Ac. We find the situation λ > Aˆs which
leads to a movement on the parabola to the lower left hand side. The economy is too
far away from the technology frontier. Moreover, the marginal product of capital in the
South is too low relative to the marginal product of capital in the North to attract more
foreign capital. This means that the developing economy is scarce in foreign capital
and the technology diffusion speed is low due to an insufficient absorptive capacity.
As a consequence, the South will end up with almost no foreign capital and very low
technology diffusion. We observe this kind of behavior for example in the case of sub-
Saharan African countries.
How can economic policy remedy such a convergence failure? One possibility is
to increase the absorptive capacity Hs, which shifts the parabola in Figure 1 upwards
so that the economy can move from a point in the divergence area to a point in the
convergence area. A higher absorptive capacity prevents the convergence failure even
in the long-run. The farther the South is away from the technology frontier, the more
human capital is necessary to enable catching up.
Another possibility is to introduce own innovation with a certain rate in the follower
country, which also shifts the parabola upwards. Hence, technology diffusion and
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innovation positively interact as complements. But recalling equation (12), we notice
that the last term steadily decreases over time as long as γ, the innovation rate in the
South, is smaller than λ, the innovation rate in the North. λ is also the growth rate of
As in the case of convergence. γ is likely smaller than λ, since the South is probably
not as innovative as the North. Thus, at a certain point of time the South will fall
back into the divergence area, when the difference between the technology level in the
North and the technology level in the South has become too large. Alternatively, a
subsidy on foreign capital gives an additional payoff to the foreign investment, i.e. is
added to the marginal product of foreign capital expressed in (16). (For a discussion on
promoting FDI see Hanson 2001.) The subsidy will be an effective remedy if it is high
enough to overcome the critical point of a convergence failure. But again, only in the
short-run. We can see from equation (16) that a constant subsidy becomes relatively
unimportant when Ai and hence the marginal products of Ki grows in an exponential
way. Therefore, the subsidy would have to rise together with technological progress in
order too have a medium- or long-run effect.
5 Discussion
Our considerations along the line of the N&P theory describe that a better absorptive
capacity as well as a higher volume of foreign capital narrow the technology gap be-
tween the North and the South until the technology growth rate of the South equals the
growth rate of the technology frontier given by the North. In this case, there will be no
reallocation of internationally mobile capital in the long-run. If the absorptive capacity
of the South is below a certain threshold value, if the South is far away from the technol-
ogy frontier and if certain preconditions are fulfilled, convergence of technology growth
rates fails. As a consequence, the South falls further behind in terms of technologies,
and foreign capital tends to be completely withdrawn from the South. The South is
trapped.
Different to the literature so far (for example described by Benhabib and Spiegel
2005), we derive this outcome theoretically through the introduction of international
capital mobility. A main contribution of our paper is therefore to reconcile the assump-
tion that technological catching up is stronger the farther the distance to frontier with
the alternative view that the diffusion speed is strongest at a medium distance to fron-
tier (both discussed by Benhabib and Spiegel 2005) by introducing international capital
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mobility. As a consequence, we identify the following trade-off: Far away from the
technology frontier, there is a high potential for adopting new technologies, but there is
also a lack of foreign capital. Close to the technology frontier, more foreign capital is
allocated to the South, but there are fewer technologies left that can be adopted. Hence,
the optimal technology diffusion speed is achieved somewhere at a medium distance to
frontier. Therefore, our model is able to provide one possible explanation (among other
explanations for example given by Hanson 2001) for the mixed findings in the empirical
literature on technology spillovers via FDI and the empirical facts, for instance reported
by the World Bank (2008): Some developing countries are able to catch up in terms of
technologies, others are not, or even fall further behind.
We also examine the role of innovation in the South and its potential to narrow the
North-South technology gap. In contrast to N&P, a higher initial level of technological
progress in the North, interpreted as a better innovative capability of the North, widens
the international technology gap in the presence of own innovation in the South. The
reason is that own innovation in the South reduces the North-South technology gap
which in turn reduces the possibility to exploit Northern technologies. In this sense,
technology transfer and own innovation in the South are basically substitutes. They be-
come complements in the short-run, since own innovations increase the marginal product
of capital, which in turn attracts more foreign capital embodying advanced technolo-
gies. But in the long-run Southern innovation cannot prevent the South falling behind in
terms of technologies, except when the South becomes as innovative as the North. This
result is in accordance with Acemoglu et al. (2003a), stating that technological leaders
follow an innovation-based strategy, while technological followers do not. Our long term
outcome, that innovation is not an appropriate option for technological catching up of
developing countries that lack in human capital, infrastructure and so forth, is in line
with Acemoglu et al. (2003b). They show that imitation activities are more important
far away from the technology frontier.
Our considerations also show that a larger income share of internationally mobile
foreign capital is more beneficial for the South in terms of technology diffusion the smaller
the North-South technology gap. Indeed, in China the revenue share of enterprises
with Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and foreign funds in the revenue of all enterprises
rose from 0.20 in 1998 to 0.24 in 2006 (China Statistical Yearbook 2006). Therefore,
according to our stylized model, the Chinese policy of relaxing the requirements for
FDI in China and supporting FDI inflows has been beneficial for technology diffusion.
On the other hand, a constant subsidy on FDI inflows has only a short-run effect and
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cannot prevent a convergence failure in the medium-run. The subsidy would have to
rise in line with technological progress in order to stay effective. Taking the related
fiscal burden into account, this sheds a somewhat critical light on such a policy in line
with Hanson (2001). Thus, our outcomes support the need for a critical assessment of
potential benefits of subsidizing FDI while considering the specific state of the economy
in terms of existing technologies, human capital, infrastructure, the legal system and
other country specific circumstances like the spatial distribution of economic activities
in the light of agglomeration theory. Supporting FDI inflows in general without such a
critical assessment can lead to substantial welfare losses for recipient countries.
Under the assumption of an economy that is closed for FDI inflows the model col-
lapses to the standard Solow (or alternatively Ramsey) model where growth is driven
by (exogenous) local innovation and domestic capital accumulation. In this sense the
model is in line with success stories of economic growth without allowing significant
foreign capital inflows such as in Japan and Korea.
However, the analysis is based on a simple stylized macroeconomic model that ne-
glects endogenous innovation in the North and other channels of technology diffusion
besides international capital mobility. It cannot capture other determinants of capital
mobility (or FDI) besides returns on capital, either. Furthermore, capital transfer, ab-
sorption of technologies and innovation are costly. And keeping the absorptive capacity
on a sufficiently high level requires permanent investment. In order to set up the optimal
policy mix, policy makers need to know such costs, which are certainly hard to quantify.
However, the previous analysis is not a cost benefit analysis, but rather a qualitative
policy assessment.
Moreover, the analysis focusses solely on positive productivity spillover effects
through technology diffusion. As pointed out by Hanson (2001), the entrance of for-
eign (multinational) enterprises can have negative effects on domestic enterprises and
may lower the welfare of the host country because of several reasons. If the production
factors intensively used by foreign enterprises are in inelastic supply, the entrance of for-
eign enterprises will put upward pressure on the related factor prices and thus increase
production costs for domestic and foreign enterprises. Furthermore, in case of horizontal
FDI, foreign enterprises may occupy a higher market share from domestic enterprises
if the demand for their final products is in inelastic supply. Finally, the entrance of
multinational firms likely increases competition in a non-competitive local market. The
increased competition on the one hand enhances efficiency, on the other hand diminishes
profits of domestic enterprises. Since multinational firms repatriate their profits, host
73
country welfare may decline. Such aspects cast doubt on a purely optimistic point of
view of FDI that results in policies of promoting FDI inflows in general. However, such
aspects canot be captured by our stylized model.
Empirically, vertical productivity spillovers within the production chain seem to be
more significant than horizontal spillovers between competing firms within sectors (for
instance Javorcik 2004). In the case of vertical spillovers, negative impacts of FDI on
rivaling domestic firms are less likely since these firms operate within the same produc-
tion chain and not as rivals. Therefore, the distinction between horizontal and vertical
linkages is important for economic policy. Furthermore, FDI seeking for the exploration
of natural resources has a low potential for creating positive technology spillovers. How-
ever, our stylized macroeconomic model is not able to disentangle different kinds of FDI
and spillovers within host economies.
Our considerations recommend opening developing countries for FDI inflows
and improving the absorptive capacities at the same time in order to benefit from
international technology diffusion successfully and to avoid poverty traps. The question
remains why this does not happen in reality in many cases, for instance in Sub-Saharan
African countries. Some obstacles for international transfer of capital and technologies
are naturally given, such as landlockedness. Other factors such as education and
infrastructure could be improved, but they are not because governments do not take
the responsibilities. But this argument is not directly valid for opening the economy for
FDI, because there are no directly related costs like in the case of educational invest-
ment. Nevertheless, FDI may create negative effects for host economies as described
above. Consequently, certain stakeholders may be worse of due to the entrance of
foreign enterprises and therefore lobby against opening the economy for FDI inflows, al-
though such a policy might be beneficial for the economy as a whole (compare Das 1987).
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed a stylized macroeconomic model of North-South technology diffu-
sion via capital mobility. The results show that one cannot rely on market forces as a
guarantee for convergence of the Southern technology growth rate with the Northern
technology growth rate via international capital mobility. Convergence of growth rates
requires a sufficiently high absorptive capacity of the South (via education, infrastruc-
ture, legal framework etc.) in order to adopt new technologies successfully (additional
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to certain preconditions discussed in the paper). Hence, according to the model it is
not sufficient to rely on market driven international capital mobility or just to transfer
capital and embodied technologies to developing countries. Such policies can be a waste
of resources, if development policy does not ensure that the absorptive capacities of the
recipient countries determined by education, infrastructure, the legal framework and
other factors suffice.
Furthermore, fostering own innovation in the South positively interacts with tech-
nology diffusion in the short-run. But it cannot prevent the South falling behind in
terms of technologies in the long-run, except when the South becomes as innovative as
the North. This outcome confirms the importance of improving technology diffusion
to developing countries rather than trying to create own innovations within developing
countries, at least in early stages of development. Similarly, a subsidy on internationally
mobile foreign capital yields a positive short-term effect that vanishes in the long-run.
In order to stay effective, the subsidy would have to rise together with technological
progress over time.
Moreover, the analysis suggests that a larger income share (possibly up to about 0.5)
devoted to foreign capital is more beneficial when the technology level is closer to the
technology frontier. This means that financial and tax advantages for foreign investors
can be ill-designed, when the developing economy lacks in existing basic technologies
and in absorptive capacity which are both necessary to attract foreign investment.
Further research could analyze the diffusion mechanism studied in this paper
in an inter-temporal optimization framework including costs of capital transfer and
innovation. It would yield the optimal allocation of foreign capital to the South along
the optimal time path. The distinction of vertical and horizontal FDI as well as vertical
and horizontal spillovers seems to be a fruitful avenue for further research. One could
also attempt to include the technology diffusion framework of this paper into a general
equilibrium framework with factor and product markets. This would allow to contrast
the positive external effect of technology spillovers with possible negative effects of FDI
for recipient countries. Moreover, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model
analysis could apply the diffusion mechanism to real data and reveal country and sector
specific differences in the technology diffusion behavior.
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8 Appendix
In the following we examine the accumulation of domestic, internationally immobile,
domestic (low-tech) capital Di referring to the model presented in section 4.1. We
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assume a constant savings rate s a la Solow and a depreciation rate δ.16
D˙i = sYi − δDi (23)
The division of this equation by A˜iHi yields a reformulation in efficiency units ki = KiA˜iHi
and di = DiA˜iHi :
D˙i
A˜iHi
= s(kαi + d
α
i )− δdi
We transfer this expression following Barrow and Sala-i-Martin (2004):
d˙i =
D˙i
A˜iHi
− ˆ˜Aidi
⇒ d˙i = s(kαi + dαi )− ( ˆ˜Ai + δ)di
In the long-run, we find limt→∞(kαi + d
α
i ) = d
α
i since Di is accumulated, while Ki is
not. Thus, setting d˙i = 0 implicitly yields the following volume of domestic capital in
efficiency units in the asymptotic steady state:
s(d∗i )
α = ( ˆ˜Ai + δ)d∗i (24)
Accordingly, Di asymptotically grows with the same rate as Ai, and Yi grows with
the same rate, too. In case of convergence, the Southern and the Northern economy
therefore grow with the same rate An which is determined by the technological progress
in the North. The steady state value d∗i rises with the propensity to save and invest
and declines with the depreciation rate and with the rate of technological progress. As
a consequence, the ratio of domestic capital to the technology level declines when the
rate of technological progress becomes higher.
Moreover, we are able to determine the volume of high-tech capital Ks in absolute
terms (not only for the steady state but for any point of time) using equation (18) and
our initial assumption Kn +Ks = 1:
Ks
1−Ks = A˜H
⇔ Ks = A˜H
1 + A˜H
(25)
16Alternatively, capital could be accumulated via an inter-temporarily optimal choice of consumption
a la Ramsey.
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The closer the Southern technology level catches up to the Northern level and the higher
the absorptive capacity of the South, the more high-tech capital is obviously allocated
to the South.
Finally, Figure 2 plots Aˆs as a function of A for different values of α.
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Figure 2: Rate of technological progress in the South dependent on the distance to
frontier for different income shares of foreign capital in the South
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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the influence of foreign direct investment inflows on 
energy intensities of developing countries empirically. We first replicate a 
simple OLS estimation, as it is found in the literature, that suggests energy 
intensity reductions from FDI inflows. However, the OLS estimation turns out 
to be spurious and only a starting point for further research. In our regressions 
we use macro level panel data on 60 developing countries for the period 1975-
2004 including other potential determinants of energy intensities and carry out 
robustness checks with more specific data. The results do not confirm the 
hypothesis that aggregate FDI inflows reduce energy intensities of developing 
countries. Rather, foreign development aid seems to be related to energy 
efficiency gains. 
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1 Introduction 
While economic growth in developing countries is a desirable goal, its side effects of 
rising energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions are problematic in light of global 
warming. The controversial discussions during the Bali climate policy conference in 
2007 showed that including the developing countries in a post-Kyoto agreement in a 
fair way is a challenge, and it was emphasized that the industrialized countries need 
to support the developing countries by technical, financial and educational measures. 
One possibility to slow down rising emissions is energy saving technology 
transfer to developing countries since energy use is strongly related to carbon 
emissions. It is thus important to detect how international technology transfer occurs 
and how it affects energy supply and demand. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
regarded as one important channel for technology transfer in general (e.g. Keller, 
2004). Empirical evidence on energy saving international technology transfer could 
answer the question whether more FDI flows to developing countries can effectively 
help to restrain energy use and thus greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper we use a 
large macro level panel data set and investigate empirically whether FDI inflows have 
a significant effect on the energy intensity of developing economies. 
Despite the relevance of the topic, only little empirical evidence exists 
regarding the transfer of energy saving technologies. Some case studies and micro-
econometric work using firm-level data indicate that foreign owned firms in specific 
developing countries indeed use less energy than their indigenous counterparts 
(Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Fisher-Vanden et al., 2004). However, comprehensive 
studies on an aggregate level with cross-country data are missing. This is unfortunate 
since they can potentially give a broader picture of the issue at hand and can answer 
the question whether the findings from specific plant-level studies can be generalized 
on a global scale. The question of generalization is important in light of recent 
worldwide initiatives to reduce energy use and emissions. Mielnik and Goldemberg 
(2002) use data on 20 developing countries and find a negative effect of FDI on 
energy intensity. However, this analysis controls for no other influences on energy 
demand and does not take the unit root behavior of the variables into account. Hence, 
rather than providing general evidence, the results by Mielnik and Goldemberg open 
a promising way for further research. 
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In this paper we use a large macro level panel data set and an extended 
econometric model in order to broaden the analysis and to investigate whether FDI 
has a general impact on energy intensity. The data set includes 60 developing 
countries for the years 1975 to 2004. In contrast to the hypothesis proposed by 
Mielnik and Goldemberg (2002), we find no robust energy reducing effect of FDI 
inflows in developing countries. The interactions of FDI inflows with country-
specific characteristics yield no significant results, either. For policy makers who seek 
to achieve energy reductions in developing countries, our results imply that a general 
support of FDI inflows is not enough; it is rather necessary to explicitly encourage 
that kind of foreign direct investment that brings about energy reducing technology 
transfer. Issue-linkage, as for example the clean development mechanism in the 
Kyoto Protocol, might be a way to achieve this objective. 
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical background 
and reviews related empirical evidence in the literature. We furthermore replicate a 
simplified regression analysis as in Mielnik and Goldemberg (2002) and show why 
an extended empirical approach is needed to generate meaningful results. In section 3, 
we first derive our empirical model based on the insights from the theoretical 
considerations. We then specify our estimating equations, apply regression analyses 
and discuss the results. Section 4 presents our robustness checks using a modified 
database. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 The influence of FDI inflows on energy use 
In this section we first present the conceptual background for the hypothesis that 
foreign direct investment has an energy reducing effect in the destination country. 
Then we give an overview of the empirical literature examining the evidence on 
energy reducing technology transfer via FDI and discuss in more detail the analysis 
by Mielnik and Goldemberg (2002). 
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2.1 Theoretical background 
In the literature on trade and the environment, it has become common to decompose 
the effects of economic activity and trade on pollution into a scale, a composition and 
a technique effect. This decomposition was introduced by Grossman and Krueger 
(1993), who examined data on concentrations of sulphur dioxide and suspended 
particulate matter. It was later on backed up with formal theory by Antweiler et al. 
(2001) and further elaborated by Copeland and Taylor (2003). As argued by Cole 
(2006), the framework from the trade and environment literature is also applicable to 
energy use since energy use is the principal cause of most air pollutants. In our 
analysis, we adapt the concept developed by Antweiler et al. (2001) and examine how 
scale, composition and technique effects influence total energy use. 
For simplicity, we split up total economic activity into two sectors with 
different energy intensities: industry and non-industry. Energy use in the non-industry 
sector relative to its output value is defined by e(A) with the properties e(A) > 0 and 
e’(A) < 0, where A is a proxy for the average technology in use. We assume that the 
energy intensity in the industry sector is always μ times higher than e(A). Measuring 
total output by GDP and denoting the share of industrial value added in output by 
IND, total energy use can be written as: 
 
( ) )(1 AeINDINDGDPE ⋅−+⋅⋅= μ  (1) 
It follows from (1) that total energy use in a country can be decomposed into three 
factors: the scale of overall economic activity (GDP), the relative importance of 
energy-intensive sectors in economic activity (IND), and the energy intensity of the 
technology in use (e(A)). In analogy to Antweiler et al. (2001), changes in these 
factors can be interpreted in the following way: The first term is obviously the scale 
effect and reflects the impact of increasing or decreasing economic activity on total 
energy use when holding constant the mix of sectors as well as the technology. The 
second term is the composition effect: Holding scale and technology constant and 
producing relatively more energy-intensive goods due to a sectoral shift leads to an 
increase in energy use. The last term captures the technique effect resulting from the 
implementation of a more energy efficient technology A that reduces the input of 
energy into the production process. 
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Having set out the fundamental factors affecting energy use, we can now identify the 
variables that influence these factors. In this context, we pay special attention to the 
effects of foreign direct investment inflows. 
The scale effect can be directly measured by changes in the observable 
variable GDP. For constant returns to scale of production functions, an output 
increase leads to a proportional increase in energy inputs. This means that energy 
intensity, defined as energy use divided by GDP, remains constant.3F1 Foreign direct 
investment can influence the scale effect indirectly: Since FDI inflows are assumed to 
stimulate economic growth and since expanded economic activity is related to higher 
energy use, the scale effect resulting from FDI inflows is positive and its extent 
depends on the magnitude of the influence of foreign direct investment on GDP. 
Changes in the relative importance of the production of energy-intensive 
goods, i.e. the composition effect, are determined by changes in the sectoral structure 
of an economy. A typical empirical observation is that in early stages of a country’s 
economic development, economic activity shifts from the agricultural to the industrial 
sector. Since the latter is more energy intensive than the former, this implies a 
positive composition effect. Later in the development process, activity moves 
typically from the industry to the service sector or from the heavy to the lighter 
industry. This implies a negative composition effect in this stage as the service sector 
and the light industry are less energy intensive (Stern, 2004). One reason for such a 
development pattern can be changes in the comparative advantage of an open 
economy in the world market. The comparative advantage can be influenced by 
variables like the capital-to-labor ratio, environmental regulations, or the share of 
skilled labor. Foreign direct investment inflows contribute to the composition effect if 
they change the sectoral structure of an economy. In equation (1) we measure sectoral 
shifts directly by changes in the share of industrial value added in GDP. This means 
that all the indirect influences on the sectoral structure, including the composition 
effect of FDI, are already captured by the inclusion of this variable. 
The technique effect covers the impact of employing new technologies or 
management practices on energy use. We hypothesize that novel technologies 
developed with a higher level of knowledge are more productive and hence more 
energy efficient than old technologies. In analogy to Arrow (1962), we propose that 
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learning is a function of cumulated gross investment, which we denote by GI.4F2 This 
means that accumulated knowledge increases with every new capital good being 
available. The hypothesis brought forward by Mielnik and Goldemberg (2002) is that 
imported investments via FDI in developing countries have a stronger energy 
reducing effect than new domestic investments. This can be the case through 
technology transfer via FDI so that developing countries are able to ‘leapfrog’ over 
traditional technologies in use. In order to test this hypothesis, we explicitly consider 
the accumulated FDI inflows GFDI as a determinant of energy intensity, which 
represents a source of accumulated knowledge that might differ from accumulated 
domestic investment in its strength. We furthermore add the accumulated import 
value GIM and the accumulated foreign aid value GAID as further potential sources of 
technology transfer. All three variables are expressed as shares relative to overall 
cumulative gross investment GI since the shares of foreign capital (embodied in FDI, 
imports or aid) in total capital represent the relative importance of transferred 
knowledge in the economy (similar Aitken and Harrison, 1999). A different driver of 
the energy saving technique effect can be income per capita, which can be explained 
by a political economy mechanism: Since environmental quality is assumed to be a 
normal good, rising per-capita income leads to higher public appreciation of a clean 
environment. The rising demand for environmental quality may then result in the 
adoption of stricter environmental regulation that typically also provides incentives to 
reduce energy use.5F3 Firms react to the regulation by the introduction of cleaner and 
more energy efficient technologies. This effect, which is related to the so-called 
environmental Kuznets curve, is in the following referred to as income induced 
technique effect.6F4 Summing up, we expect that the energy intensity of a country’s 
technology e(A) depends negatively on accumulated gross investment GI and might 
                                                                                                                                           
1 Note that this implication would not hold in the case of economies of scale, i.e. when an expansion of 
output needs a proportionally lower or higher increase in input quantities. 
2 Other variables that are typically used as a proxy for learning and technical progress are accumulated 
GDP or GDP per capita. 
3 This is obvious in the case of energy taxes but applies as well to other environmental policy measures 
like stricter regulations of pollutant emissions arising as a by-product from the use of fossil energy 
resources. 
4 The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) stands for the impact of a country’s per capita income on 
(per capita) pollution suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship. Although the EKC is a well-known 
concept and is regarded as a stylized fact in environmental economics, its existence has recently been 
challenged on both theoretical and empirical sides (e.g. Stern, 2004; Siebert, 2005). The environmental 
Kuznets curve has traditionally been applied to emissions of local pollutants, but recent studies also 
apply this concept to CO2 emissions (e.g. Mazzanti et al., 2006) as well as energy intensity (Galli, 
1998). 
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be reduced further by the extent of the respective shares of accumulated FDI, imports 
and aid in accumulated investment. Furthermore, the income level per capita (YPC) 
might reduce energy intensity so that e(A) is a function of: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛= YPC
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With regard to FDI, it is also possible to establish an indirect link to the income 
induced technique effect, namely under the assumption that openness to trade and 
foreign direct investment enhances growth and hence per capita income. Grossman 
and Krueger (1993) emphasize especially this indirect effect when they analyze the 
technique effect of trade liberalization. In the theoretical model by Antweiler et al. 
(2001), the income induced technique effect is the only technique effect resulting 
from increasing openness.7F5 While the literature on trade and the environment has 
mainly focused on the income induced technique effect, the broader literature on 
technological change has recently expanded with numerous studies on technology 
transfer resulting from openness to trade and foreign direct investment (for an 
overview see Keller, 2004). Technology transfer via FDI, which potentially also 
reduces energy use, can occur in two ways: First, directly via more efficient foreign 
firms operating in the host country and second, indirectly through technological 
spillovers from foreign firms to indigenous firms. For these mechanisms to be 
effective, we make the assumption that the technology used by foreign investors is 
typically superior to the technology that is currently in place in developing countries. 
The direct effect implies that the foreign owned firm, compared to a similar 
indigenous firm, uses less energy and hence contributes to the technique effect. 
Regarding the technological spillovers, the literature suggests three potential 
channels: demonstration effects, which stand for imitation and reverse engineering by 
local firms, labor turnover, which implies the transfer of knowledge by workers who 
change their employer, and vertical linkages, which involve that multinationals 
transfer technology to their suppliers or customers (Saggi, 2002). Additionally, higher 
exports and imports as well as foreign direct investment inflows likely lead to 
                                                 
5 In the empirical estimation of their model, Antweiler et al. (2001) provide a sensitivity test where 
they explicitly allow for a direct effect of FDI on SO2 concentrations. However, they find no 
substantial relationship between the extent of FDI in an economy and the pollution level. 
 89
increased competition. Firms need to become more productive in order to stay 
competitive in the export market or to compete with imports and new foreign 
companies in the domestic market. For instance, Corcos et al. (2007) apply a 
theoretical model with heterogeneous firms and assume that international trade 
increases aggregate productivity through a selection effect: The least productive firms 
leave the market under increased pressure from competition. One can expect that 
higher productivity also implies more efficient energy use in production. 
Though we identified several indirect influences of FDI inflows on energy use 
through scale, composition and technique effects, note that all the indirect effects are 
implicitly included in the variables GDP (scale effect), IND (composition effect) and 
YPC (income induced technique effect). We therefore propose that any remaining 
direct influence of FDI can be attributed to technology transfer and the main 
contribution of our analysis is to identify and quantify this influence empirically. 
 
 
2.2 Empirical literature on energy saving technology transfer via FDI 
 
There is a large and growing empirical strand of literature on productivity improving 
technology transfer and spillovers through FDI. The evidence is mixed, but Keller 
(2004) notes in his survey article that “recent micro productivity studies tend to 
estimate positive, and in some cases also economically large spillovers associated 
with FDI” (p. 771).8F6 Among other studies, Tybout (2002) finds evidence for 
efficiency improvements due to higher exposure to foreign competition as predicted 
by the New Trade Theory. However, he points out that it is not clear according to the 
related literature whether international activities cause the improved efficiency or vice 
versa. Furthermore, none of these empirical studies sheds light on the effects of 
spillovers and productivity gains on energy efficiency. 
In the following, we focus specifically on energy saving technology transfer 
via FDI. Peterson (2008) reviews the existing evidence and remarks that although 
there may be a large potential for such technology transfer, there is a lack of 
knowledge about its empirical magnitude and its drivers, and the topic remains 
insufficiently researched. The hypothesis that foreign owned companies use less 
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energy than their indigenous counterparts in developing countries is confirmed by 
studies based on firm-level data. In their analysis of manufacturing plants in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mexico and Venezuela, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) find that foreign 
ownership is associated with less energy use. A similar result is documented by 
Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004), who find a negative impact of foreign ownership on the 
energy intensity of Chinese companies. These examples suggest that the more 
efficient technologies of foreign firms can indeed contribute to an energy reducing 
technique effect via technology transfer. 
On an aggregate level, only very few studies link openness and FDI to energy 
saving technology transfer. Cole (2006) uses a variation of the model developed by 
Antweiler et al. (2001) to examine the impact of trade intensity (while not explicitly 
including FDI) on energy use in 32 developed and developing countries. His panel 
estimation yields that the effect of liberalization is country-specific and can be 
positive or negative, depending on whether the country is importing or exporting the 
energy-intensive good. 
Based on previous evidence that developing and industrialized countries are 
converging to a common pattern of energy use (Mielnik and Goldemberg, 2000), 
Mielnik and Goldemberg (2002) carry out a simplified regression as a starting point 
for further research. Their results indicate that the quantity of foreign direct 
investment inflows has a negative influence on energy intensity. They use a sample of 
20 developing countries9F7 for the years 1987 to 1998, aggregating all countries to one 
time series, and estimate the regression: 
 
t
t
t
t I
FDI
EI εββ ++= 10  (3) 
The dependent variable EIt is energy intensity in year t, i.e. the sum of total energy 
use in all 20 countries divided by their GDP, which is measured in purchasing power 
parity. The explanatory variable FDIt / It represents inflows of foreign direct 
investment as a fraction of total gross investment in all countries. εt is the error term. 
                                                                                                                                           
6 Aitken and Harrison (1999), Javorcik (2004), Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) and Keller and Yeaple 
(2009) are prominent examples for examinations of spillovers to domestic firms via FDI. 
7 The countries are in alphabetical order: Algeria, Brazil, Chile, China (PR), Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay. 
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First, we reproduce the regression by Mielnik and Goldemberg with the same 20 
countries, but for an extended time span. Complete data on gross fixed capital 
formation (gross investment) is available for each of the 20 countries from 1979 to 
2003. We evaluate our dataset with the same regression model as Mielnik and 
Goldemberg and find a similar result, which supports the view of a strong energy 
reducing impact of foreign direct investment: FDIt / It has a negative coefficient β1 of 
-0.774, the constant β0 is 0.320, and R2 is 0.818. However, the result of this OLS 
estimation relies critically on the stationarity assumption of the involved variables.10F8 If 
at least one variable is instead integrated, which implies non-stationarity, standard 
OLS regression analysis is not appropriate and can result in a spurious regression 
(compare Granger and Newbold, 1974). 
We check the variables for the stationarity property via the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots. According to obvious trends in the data, we test both 
variables against stationarity around a deterministic trend.11F9 The null hypothesis of a 
unit root cannot be rejected in all tests of the variables in levels, but can be rejected in 
case of the first differences. Thus, the variables energy intensity and foreign direct 
investment as a fraction of total investment are both integrated of order one. 
Furthermore, we employ the Johansen cointegration test. Using the variables EIt and 
FDIt / It and examining three possible model specifications, no cointegration can be 
found in any case. The results of the preceding tests show that the estimation results 
obtained from the classical OLS regression are likely to be misleading and we need to 
treat a simplified regression analysis with caution. 
 
 
3 Panel data analysis 
In order to find empirical evidence for energy saving international technology transfer 
via foreign direct investment, we use aggregated country-level data for 60 developing 
countries in the period 1975 to 2004. Thereby we refer to all Non-Annex I Parties of 
                                                 
8 A time series X={x1, …, xm} is called stationary if it has 
1. a constant and finite mean over time: E[xt]=μ for all t 
2. a constant and finite variance over time: Var[xt]=σ2 for all t 
3. and constant covariances over time: Cov[xt,xt+s]=σs2 for all t, s. 
9 For the additional Figure A1 illustrating the trends of both variables and for the additional Tables A1 
and A2 with the results of the test statistics please see the Online Appendix at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/EDE. 
 92
the Kyoto Protocol as developing countries. Excluding countries with insufficient 
data availability (among them all countries that have emerged from the former Soviet 
Union) results in our sample of 60 countries.12F10 Data on total primary energy supply 
are taken from the International Energy Agency (2007). Data on all other variables 
are found in the World Development Indicators by the World Bank (2007) and, if not 
available there for specific countries, from the Balance of Payments Statistics and the 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (2007a; 2007b). 
An exact definition of the variables and units used in the regressions is presented in 
Table 2 in the Appendix. For a detailed data description, please see the Online 
Appendix at http://journals.cambridge.org/EDE. 
In our extended empirical specifications we take potential non-stationarity of 
the time series into account and use several control variables derived from our 
theoretical framework. Moreover, we account for the heterogeneity of countries by 
applying panel data methods. This is recommendable since the aggregation of all 
countries would eliminate heterogeneity, which is obviously present in our sample of 
60 countries. 
 
 
3.1 Derivation of the empirical model 
We derive our empirical model for energy use from the theoretical framework and the 
variables presented in section 2.1. Hence, we need to add up the scale effect, the 
composition effect and the technique effect. In the case of constant returns to scale, 
the absolute size of an economy measured by GDP has no influence on energy 
intensity. We therefore leave the scale effect aside and analyze energy intensity EI as 
the dependent variable, i.e. total primary energy supply divided by GDP (as in 
Mielnik and Goldemberg, 2002; Cole, 2006), where GDP is measured in purchasing 
power parities.13F11 Furthermore using a multiplicative form for equation (2), inserting it 
                                                 
10 The data are available upon request. The countries are in alphabetical order: Algeria, Angola, 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, China (PR), Colombia, 
Congo (DR), Congo (Rep), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Korea (Rep), Lebanon, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
11 For a discussion on purchasing power parities in measuring energy intensity see Birol and Okogu 
(1997). 
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in (1) and taking logs, the energy intensity of developing country i at time t can be 
expressed as: 
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We are not able to include all various influences on energy use since many of them 
are determined on the micro level and the necessary micro data is not available for 
most developing countries. Examples are the detailed sectoral structure of the 
industry, local economic and environmental regulations or energy prices. The way 
how we will implicitly capture country- or time-specific effects in the estimation is to 
use panel data models with cross-section fixed or random effects as well as time fixed 
effects. 
We test the available variables for the presence of a stochastic trend and thus 
on stationarity. We apply several unit root tests for panel data and allow for 
individual trends and intercepts.14F12 Not surprisingly, we find unit roots for total 
primary energy supply, GDP and GDP per capita (as confirmed in other empirical 
studies, e.g. Perman and Stern, 2003).15F13 Regarding energy intensity (primary energy 
supply divided by GDP) the unit root hypothesis is rejected. However, the probability 
of error in this case is close to 5 percent, which indicates some uncertainties about the 
properties of this variable. As a consequence of the unit root tests’ results, we 
transform our estimation model into first differences, where according to the test 
statistics all variables are stationary without doubt. 
Approximating ( )itit INDIND −+⋅ 1ln μ  in equation (4) by ( ) itIND⋅−1μ  and 
taking first time differences leads to: 
                                                 
12 We employ unit root tests by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) (based on Dickey and Fuller, 
1979; Phillips and Perron, 1988) as well as Levin, Lin and Chu (2001) and Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003). 
13 Though total primary energy supply and GDP do not show up in equation (4), we will later estimate 
an alternative specification that explicitly includes the scale effect and therefore uses total primary 
energy supply as the dependent variable and GDP as one of the explanatory variables. 
 94
 
( ) ( )
it
itAID
it
itIM
it
itFDI
it
itI
it
itit
YPC
G
AID
G
IM
G
FDI
G
IINDEI
ln
1ln
5432
4321
Δ++++
+−−−+Δ⋅−=Δ
αααα
ααααμ
 (5) 
Note that lnΔ  can also be expressed by relative changes; for instance Iit / itIG  means 
gross investment flow in year t over cumulative gross investment up to year t. We 
now assume for reasons of data availability that accumulated flows of investment, 
FDI, imports and aid are proportional to the GDP of the respective economy in year t, 
for example ititFDI YG 2σ= . Equation (5) then reads: 
 
( ) ( )
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
itit
YPC
Y
AID
Y
IM
Y
FDI
Y
IINDEI
ln
1ln
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
4321
Δ++++
+−−−+Δ⋅−=Δ
ασ
α
σ
α
σ
α
σ
ααααμ
 (6) 
Writing the coefficients in a more comprehensive way and, for convenience, denoting 
the shares of investment, FDI, import and aid flows in GDP by Iit, FDIit, IMit and 
AIDit leads to our empirical model: 
 
ititititititit YPCAIDIMFDIIINDEI lnln 654321 Δ+++++Δ=Δ ββββββ  (7) 
 
Linking the model to our conceptual framework, the coefficients of FDIit, IMit and 
AIDit encompass international technology transfer, while the coefficient of Iit also 
includes a domestic vintage capital effect that may contribute to a reduction of energy 
intensity. The composition effect is captured by ΔINDit, the change in the share of 
industrial value added in GDP. The income induced technique effect, which FDI may 
also bring about via rising incomes, is accounted for by the relative change in per 
Composition 
effect Technology transfer 
Vintage capital 
effect 
Income induced 
technique effect 
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capita income Δln YPCit. The scale effect is implicitly included since we examine 
energy use relative to the size of the economy represented by GDP. 
Our hypothesis of energy savings via FDI implies that b3 is negative. The 
interpretation is straightforward: FDI inflows in a certain year decrease energy 
intensity in relative terms, whereas ceteris paribus energy intensity stays constant if 
there is no FDI inflow. The higher the FDI inflow intensity, the higher is the relative 
reduction of energy intensity. This is consistent with the notion that foreign direct 
investment inflows continuously bring about technology transfer that can reduce 
energy intensity. The coefficients of imports and aid can be interpreted in the same 
way. 
 
 
3.2 The estimating equations 
Since there is considerable heterogeneity in the development of energy intensities 
among countries, we allow for unobserved effects in the estimation. To check the 
need for country-specific effects we carry out LR-tests (likelihood ratio tests) and F-
tests on poolability. (Note that country-specific effects in the differenced equation 
imply country-specific time trends in the equation in levels.) The tests reject the null 
hypothesis that fixed effects are redundant in all cases. We then compute Hausman 
tests for choosing between fixed and random effects, which show that random effects 
are consistent only in model specification A following below. In principle, changes in 
the relative price of energy should be considered since they have an effect on the 
technology and the relative employment of input factors. Unfortunately, we were not 
able to obtain energy prices over the sample period for most of the developing 
countries. Nevertheless, it is possible to include worldwide changes in energy prices 
indirectly via time-specific fixed effects. These effects are furthermore able to capture 
any other time-specific influences that affect all countries in the sample in a similar 
way. 
In our parsimonious model specification A we follow Mielnik and 
Goldemberg and explain energy intensity by the variable FDIit / Iit, i.e. foreign direct 
investment relative to total investment: 
it
it
it
tiit I
FDIEI εβθχα ++++=ΔΑ 1ln:  (8) 
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α is the overall constant, χi are country-specific effects, and θt are period-specific 
effects. The εit are the error terms. Following the Hausman test result, we start with 
cross-section random effects in regression A1 (without period-specific effects, 
because we cannot use both cross-section and period random effects in our 
unbalanced panel). Since we would also like to capture time dependent effects and 
since the F-/LR-tests reject the redundancy of time dependent effects, we turn to 
specification A2 with both country and time fixed effects. As in Mielnik and 
Goldemberg (2002), we do not include further control variables in these 
specifications. 
This estimation, however, will suffer from an omitted variable bias if other 
determinants of energy intensity are partially correlated with FDI and not captured by 
the country- or time-specific effects. Therefore we turn to specification B that directly 
follows from equation (7) and additionally includes a constant plus country- and 
time-specific effects. For the exact definition of the variables see Table 2 in the 
Appendix. 
 
itititit
ititittiit
YPCAIDIM
FDIIINDEI
εβββ
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+Δ+++
++Δ+++=ΔΒ
ln
ln:
654
321  (9) 
Throughout specification B, we apply cross-section and time fixed effects since on 
the one hand, the F-test rejects the hypotheses of redundant cross-section as well as 
period fixed effects and on the other hand, the result of the Hausman test suggests that 
random effects are inconsistent. The pair wise correlations between the explanatory 
variables are all low, so that multicollinearity should not be a problem (for the 
correlation matrix see Table A4 in the Online Appendix at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/EDE). The highest correlation of FDI with another 
variable is found regarding imports with 0.35. To be on the safe side, we always 
complement each regression by first omitting imports and then omitting FDI. In these 
additional regressions, we find no significantly different results than the results we 
present for the full spectrum of variables. 
It is furthermore noteworthy that due to the estimation in first differences, the 
regression is not able to capture those technological spillovers that occur only with a 
time lag after the FDI inflow has been recorded. Knowledge transferred from abroad 
likely diffuses further within the country with a time delay. We also notice that GDP 
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is part of the dependent variable and several explanatory variables. This is appropriate 
as long as the resulting intensity variables develop independently from GDP over 
time. If GDP fluctuates in the short run while energy supply, FDI, imports, aid, the 
investment share and the industry share all adjust sluggishly, we can possibly detect a 
resulting correlation between energy intensity and the regressors since they are all 
influenced by GDP fluctuations. Especially, if energy intensity is strongly affected by 
short term GDP fluctuations, the effect of income, measured by GDP per capita, on 
energy intensity might be caused by the design of the variables.16F14 In order to remedy 
the potential problems, we employ specification B2 where we replace the values of all 
explanatory variables by their one-period lagged counterparts (B1 is the variant 
without time lags). This means that FDI inflows affect energy intensity in the year 
after the actual inflow.17F15 In order to explicitly allow for a longer time lag in spillover 
effects, we furthermore employ specification B3, where we use moving averages of 
the past three years for the variables FDI, imports and aid inflows. 
In the alternative specification C, we use total primary energy supply E as the 
dependent variable and replace income per capita (YPC) by total GDP (Y) as an 
explanatory variable. In this case, Y captures both the income induced technique 
effect and the scale effect without imposing the restriction of constant returns to 
scale.18F16 An advantage compared with model B is that GDP is no longer part of the 
dependent variable, therefore reducing distortions caused by short-term GDP 
fluctuations. 
itititit
ititittiit
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Nevertheless, there is still the possibility of an endogeneity bias since the change in 
energy use might itself affect GDP or even FDI. Therefore, we again employ a second 
                                                 
14 According to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, we find that GDP per capita is endogenous. 
We therefore use a TSLS (two stage least squares) estimation as a robustness check for specification 
B1 and employ GDP per capita lagged for one period as an instrument for current GDP per capita. 
Testing for the presence of a weak instrument by running a reduced form regression finds no indication 
of a weak instrument. The Sargan test for overidentification does not suggest including GDP per capita 
lagged for two periods as an additional instrument. 
15 Note that an inflow of FDI typically takes place at one specific point in time during the year. If the 
inflow is recorded at the end of the year it is reasonable that the effect on energy intensity takes place 
only in the following year. Furthermore, a lag of one year takes delayed spillovers at least partially into 
account. 
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specification C2 where we replace the values of all explanatory variables by their 
one-year lagged counterparts, while C1 is without time lags. To furthermore test for 
delayed spillover effects in technology transfer, we employ specification C3 with 
moving averages of the past three years for FDI, imports and aid. Note that 
specifications C2 and C3, in contrast to all other specifications, do not control for 
contemporary changes in real GDP so that the scale effect of FDI is implicitly 
included in the coefficient of FDI.19F17 
 
3.3 Regression results 
The results referring to specifications A, B and C are reported in Table 1. 20F18 Due to 
potential endogeneity in specification B1, we favor specifications B2 and B3. When 
computing significance levels, we always use heteroscedasticity consistent 
covariances since heteroscedasticity tests (Szroeter, 1978; White, 1980; Cook and 
Weisberg, 1983) indicate heteroscedasticity in all cases. Testing for autocorrelation in 
panel data (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003) on the other hand yields no clear 
indication for serial correlation in the residuals. However, since in some cases 
autocorrelation problems become obvious when regressing residuals on preceding 
residuals, we also use heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors (Newey-West). 
The F-tests for all coefficients jointly being zero reject the null hypothesis in all 
cases. However, the reported (adjusted) R² values are relatively low. One reason for 
the low explanatory power is that we estimate in first differences. The examination of 
the residuals’ distributions reveals in all cases very high Jarque-Bera statistics mainly 
stemming from high Kurtosis values. Since this finding rejects the normal distribution 
                                                                                                                                           
16 Note that including total income as well as per capita income simultaneously would lead to a 
multicollinearity problem. 
17 Analog to specification B1, we also employ GDP lagged for one period as an instrument for current 
GDP in specification C1 following the result of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity. Again, 
there is no indication for the presence of a weak instrument and the Sargan test does not suggest 
including GDP lagged for two periods as another instrument. 
18 The results of the TSLS estimations of models B1 and C1 with GDP (per capita) instrumented by the 
corresponding lagged variable are not reported since all coefficients are insignificant. Endogeneity, 
especially of GDP (per capita), obviously is a caveat when interpreting the regression results. The 
results not reported here as well as standard errors and statistics of the various tests are available upon 
request. 
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assumption of the residuals, the reported significance levels should be interpreted 
with some caution. We could not remedy this problem by redefining the estimation 
model, changing the sample size or eliminating outliers. 
Specification
Method
Observations
Countries
Years
Depend. var.
CONST 0.004 0.004 * -0.012 -0.025 ** -0.024 ** 0.001 0.016 * 0.014
ΔIND 0.005 0.027 -0.008 -0.001 0.102 * 0.098 *
I 0.146 *** 0.127 ** 0.111 ** 0.153 *** 0.068 ** 0.062 *
FDI / I -0.031 ** -0.027
FDI 0.064 0.050 -0.042 0.072 0.196 *** 0.139
IM -0.017 0.014 0.022 -0.010 0.002 0.007
AID -0.030 -0.117 *** -0.107 * -0.024 0.010 0.029
Δln(YPC) -0.788 *** 0.002 -0.004
Δln(Y) 0.210 *** 0.078 ** 0.086 **
Adj. R 2 0.003 0.071 0.408 0.076 0.070 0.191 0.126 0.105
F -stat. 5.973 2.414 12.571 2.352 2.190 4.972 3.358 2.861
Prob(F -stat.) 0.015    0    0    0    0    0    0    0
* Significant at the 10 % level,  ** significant at the 5 % level,  *** significant at the 1 % level;
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors; Δ = first time differences;
Country-RE = country-specific random effects; FE = country- and time-specific fixed effects;
B3 and C3 use lagged regressors and FDI, IM, AID are moving averages of the past 3 years.
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Table 1:  Estimation results for specifications A, B and C 
 
The coefficient of the variable of main interest, FDI inflows, is significant and 
negative in specification A1, which confirms the finding by Mielnik and Goldemberg 
(2002). In the slightly modified specification A2 with time- and country-specific 
fixed effects, the probability that the coefficient is different from zero already falls 
below any common significance level while the coefficient stays negative. In 
specification C2, where changes in total energy use are examined, the coefficient of 
lagged FDI inflows is positive and highly significant. According to the estimate, a 
one percentage point increase in FDI intensity raises total energy supply by about 0.2 
percent. This finding is likely to stem from the scale effect: FDI inflows in the 
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previous year induce increasing economic activity in the current year, which results in 
higher energy use. All other regressions do not confirm any significant effect of FDI 
on energy intensity. Using our theoretical background, the results imply that it is not 
possible to identify a robust energy reducing effect of technology transfer via FDI in 
this macro panel. 
We now compare the results for FDI with those for IM and AID and I. While 
imports do not show a significant effect in any regression, AID is significant and 
negative in specifications B2 and B3. This energy intensity reduction by aid inflows 
is in line with the expectations that industrialized donor countries promote energy 
saving technologies in developing countries. According to the results of B2, aid 
inflows amounting to one percent of GDP of the recipient country reduce the 
country’s energy intensity by about 0.1 percent. On the contrary, the investment share 
in GDP labeled I is significantly positive in all specifications. Gross investment of 
one percent of GDP increases energy intensity or total primary energy supply by 
about 0.1 percent. The hypothesis that new capital investment brings about energy 
saving technical progress is therefore challenged. It is on the other hand possible that 
the investment variable absorbs part of the composition effect: Since energy intensive 
sectors are typically also capital intensive, a strong increase in investment may reflect 
an expansion of the energy intensive sectors and could therefore lead to an increase in 
energy intensity. This view is supported by the fact that our existing measure of the 
composition effect, namely the share of industrial value added in GDP, is rather crude 
and cannot capture all sectoral changes in the economy. 
Regarding the remaining control variables, income per capita growth 
Δln(YPC) is highly significant and negative in specification B1, but not in 
specifications B2 and B3 where it appears as a lagged variable. According to B1, a 
one percent increase in per capita income would reduce energy intensity by 0.79 
percent. This strong effect is likely to stem from short-term GDP-fluctuations, where 
energy intensity, defined as energy supply over GDP, typically moves to the opposite 
direction than GDP. If a longer term influence really existed, we would find a 
significant result in specifications B2 or B3, but this is not the case. Furthermore, the 
significance of GDP per capita disappears also in specification B1 when the variable 
is instrumented by lagged GDP per capita as a robustness check. In models C1, C2 
and C3, the change in total income Δln(Y) has a significantly positive influence on 
total energy supply as expected (scale effect). The coefficient varies between 0.21 in 
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C1 and 0.08 in C2. Concerning the share of industrial value added in GDP, we always 
find a positive sign, but the coefficient is significant only in specifications C2 and C3. 
It is likely that the sectoral change between the industry sector on the one hand and 
agriculture or services on the other hand is less important than sectoral changes 
within the industry sector. Unfortunately, no such detailed data are available for the 
countries in our sample, so it is also likely that part of the composition effect is 
implicitly included in the coefficient of FDI. 
We also extend the basic model (specification B) in order to investigate the 
interaction of FDI with country-specific characteristics. We add interaction terms of 
the aggregate FDI inflow intensity with changes in the share of industrial value added 
in GDP, with the import intensity and with shares of energy sources in total primary 
energy supply (particularly coal, oil, gas, nuclear power and hydro power). The 
interaction of the FDI inflow intensity with the industry share in GDP examines 
whether FDI inflows coming along with changes in the sectoral composition 
influence the energy intensity in a country differently. Note that this interaction term 
includes the composition effect of FDI in the case of a systematic influence of FDI 
inflows on the industry share. The interaction of the FDI inflow intensity with the 
import intensity examines whether FDI and imports jointly affect the energy intensity 
due to increasing intra-firm imports by multinational enterprises. The interaction of 
the FDI inflow intensity with shares of energy sources determines whether the 
potential of FDI to affect energy intensity is related to the energy mix of a country. 
We run several regressions, including only one interaction term at the same time.21F19 
We find no evidence for an energy reducing effect of the aggregate FDI inflow 
intensity, and none of the interaction terms leads to significant results. Nevertheless, 
the interaction term analyses show a way for further research, focusing more on the 
interactions of FDI with other economic indicators. 
 
 
                                                 
19 When adding the interaction term “FDI multiplied with the share of the energy source” we also add 
the share of the energy source as a separate regressor. 
 
 102
4 Robustness checks 
In the robustness checks we address the following concerns: Technological 
improvements can foremost be expected from greenfield investment, i.e. installations 
of new production facilities and machinery, and not so much from pure ownership 
changes. Hence we correct our FDI data by subtracting mergers and acquisitions in 
part 4.1. It would also be interesting to distinguish market seeking horizontal FDI 
from low production cost seeking vertical FDI, but such an empirical analysis is not 
possible due to a lack of data. Another reason for the inability to find any robust 
influence of FDI on energy intensity might be the fact that we use aggregated data 
without a distinction between sectors and between source countries of FDI. While 
FDI flows into energy intensive sectors might have a significant potential for 
reducing economy-wide energy use, this might not be the case for FDI flows into 
other sectors. Furthermore, FDI from the U.S. might embody different technologies 
than FDI from Germany or Japan and therefore lead to other effects on energy use. In 
order to address these issues, we introduce new sectoral data for the U.S. as a source 
country of FDI in developing countries in part 4.2. Unfortunately, the robustness 
checks cannot be scrutinized with the full original data sample because of insufficient 
data availability. The price we have to pay is a reduced or modified sample in both 
robustness checks. 
 
 
4.1 M&A correction of FDI 
To get an approximation for greenfield investment, we subtract values of mergers and 
acquisition (M&A) from the FDI values we used before.22F20 The M&A data are taken 
from UNCTAD (2008), the other data are the same as before. Due to a lack of data in 
the M&A database, the original sample is now reduced to the time frame of 1987 to 
2004 and to 58 countries. 23F21 
In general, the results confirm those found before (see Table A5 in the Online 
Appendix at http://journals.cambridge.org/EDE). In none of the specifications, there 
                                                 
20 This is no exact way of computing greenfield FDI values, but probably the best available 
approximation. 
21 Without Benin and Togo. 
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is a significant energy reducing effect of FDI. As with the original dataset, we find a 
significantly positive effect of the FDI intensity on the growth rate of total energy use 
in specification C2, which arises from the scale effect of FDI. The reduction of the 
growth rate of energy intensity via aid inflows can be confirmed in specifications B1, 
B2 and B3. Aid inflows of one percent of GDP reduce energy intensity by about 0.06 
to 0.19 percent. The coefficient of aid is also significantly negative in C1 and C3. In 
contrast to the former regressions with the larger dataset, imports turn out to increase 
energy intensity in specifications B2 and B3. However, this effect is only weakly 
significant, both statistically and economically. 
 
 
4.2 Sectoral data for the United States as a source country 
Finally, we look specifically at FDI outflows from the United States and apply data 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2008). Due to restricted data availability for 
the recipient countries we need to narrow the sample to 10 developing countries24F22 and 
four sectors25F23 from 1982 to 2003. Sectoral value added data are taken from UNIDO 
(2006) and energy data are IEA data as before. Both energy intensity and FDI in each 
country’s sector are measured relative to the value added in the respective sector. In 
order to obtain consistent estimates for energy intensity, the value added data are 
converted into constant PPP using the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2006) and a 
U.S. consumer price index (International Monetary Fund, 2007b). We employ a 
parsimonious model specification in first time differences with the logarithm of 
energy intensity as the dependent variable and FDI as the only explanatory variable. 
In the second specification, we employ one-year lagged FDI values as the explanatory 
variable. We estimate a system of four equations, one for each sector, and apply the 
technique of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). This technique has the 
advantage that we gain separate results for each of the sectors. At the same time, it 
exploits the common information in the residuals across sectors and is therefore 
potentially more efficient than four separate regressions. We include a constant and 
                                                 
22 The countries are: Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, South 
Africa, Venezuela. 
23 The four sectors are on a 3-digit ISIC level: chemical products (industrial and other chemicals 
without petrochemical industry); food, beverages and tobacco; machinery (non-electrical and 
electrical); metals (including iron and steel and non-ferrous metals). 
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estimate a pooled regression without fixed effects since the F-/LR-tests do not reject 
the null hypothesis of redundant fixed effects.  
In the results (see Table A6 in the Online Appendix at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/EDE), the coefficient of FDI inflows is not statistically 
significant in any of the sectors and once again, the hypothesis of energy saving 
technology transfer via FDI is not supported. Note that one reason for the inability to 
identify an energy reducing technology effect might be a composition effect of FDI 
towards more energy intensive products within the still aggregated sectors chemicals, 
food, machinery and metals. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
Referring to the hypothesis of energy saving technology transfer proposed by Mielnik 
and Goldemberg (2002), this paper examines whether foreign direct investment 
inflows reduce energy intensities of developing countries. Such reductions are 
desirable against the background of climate change mitigation since energy use is 
strongly related to emissions of carbon dioxide. Theoretically, the impact of FDI 
inflows can be decomposed into a scale, a composition and a technique effect 
(Grossman and Krueger, 1993). Using the theoretical principles provided by 
Antweiler et al. (2001) and applying the concept to energy use, we set up an empirical 
macro-level model in order to identify the effects of technology transfer via FDI on 
energy intensities in developing countries. 
We investigate cross-country panel data on 60 developing countries for the 
years 1975 to 2004. In the results, we find no energy reducing effect of FDI inflows. 
Thus we cannot confirm the hypothesis of energy saving technology transfer via FDI 
by Mielnik and Goldemberg (2002) in general. Regarding the influence of foreign aid 
inflows on energy intensity, we find a significantly negative effect in several 
specifications. In order to take country-specific characteristics into account, we also 
examine the interaction of FDI inflows with changes in the industry share, with 
imports and with shares of energy sources (particularly coal, oil, gas, nuclear power 
and hydro power). We find no evidence for a significant joint effect of FDI inflows 
together with the other determinants on energy intensity. Finally, we carry out 
robustness checks with modified and new data sets. Correcting FDI inflow values by 
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data on mergers and acquisitions as an approximation for greenfield investment 
confirms in general the original results. While energy savings via FDI cannot be 
found, the energy efficiency gains from foreign aid are confirmed. Focusing on the 
U.S. as a single source country and using sectorally disaggregated data, we find again 
no indication for energy savings via FDI. 
However, there are caveats when interpreting the regression results. At first, 
the explanatory power of our model is low. On the one hand, this is caused by the loss 
of information due to differencing the estimating equation; on the other hand, the 
energy intensity of a country is determined by many technical, infrastructural, 
economic and political factors that cannot all be captured in a macro model, because 
the necessary data are not available. To consider as many unobservable effects as 
possible, we use panel data models with time- and country-specific effects. The 
second caveat is the high kurtosis of the residual distribution that biases the standard 
errors and consequently the significance levels. Reducing outliers from the sample 
and different model variants could not remedy this problem. If we restricted the study 
on time series of single countries, the vast heterogeneity in the sample would be 
reduced, and the properties of the residual distribution would be more favorable. 
Then, however, it would no longer be possible to derive general results. Finally, it is 
possible that while some FDI might reduce energy intensity via technology transfer, 
other FDI might induce a shift towards more energy intensive production via a 
change in the sectoral composition of production. The significance of the results thus 
possibly suffers from the fact that we cannot fully disentangle technology transfer 
from the composition effect. 
Nevertheless, our results suggest that energy efficiency gains in developing 
countries via FDI do not occur automatically and without climate or energy policy. 
Thus, it is sensible to make use of issue-linkage, as for instance intended by the clean 
development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol (for technology transfer in CDM 
projects see Seres, 2007) or international energy technology collaboration (Justus and 
Philibert, 2004) to explicitly encourage foreign direct investment that brings along 
energy reducing technology transfer. A technology fund governed by the World Bank 
may also help to direct investment into energy saving projects in developing 
countries. Note furthermore that our results could change in the presence of a carbon 
price in the countries under scrutiny since pricing carbon creates an incentive to 
invest into energy saving technologies. 
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A challenge for further research is to identify country-specific characteristics that 
enhance technology transfer via FDI. This can be accomplished by using interaction 
terms of FDI and country-specific variables. Departing from the panel analysis, it can 
be helpful to use data on specific countries in order to analyze whether FDI inflows 
reduce energy intensity in these specific cases. There is a broad literature on 
technology spillovers in general, but technology spillovers affecting energy intensity 
have not been investigated in depth. One can include long-run effects to examine 
whether spillovers from FDI decrease energy intensity with a time delay. Where 
sectoral data is available, the analysis can be performed in a more detailed way and 
one can try to distinguish explicitly the composition effect from the technology 
transfer. A better understanding of international technology diffusion in the context of 
climate change is highly important for supporting developing countries in achieving 
lower energy and carbon intensities than the industrialized countries did in the past. 
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Appendix 
 
Variable Definition Unit
E Total primary energy supply ktoe
EI Energy intensity in purchasing power parity (total primary 
energy supply divided by GDP in PPP)
ktoe per (constant 2000) 
million dollar in PPP
IND Share of industrial value added in GDP -
I Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP -
FDI / I Net inflows of foreign direct investment as a share of gross 
fixed capital formation
-
FDI Net inflows of foreign direct investment as a share of GDP -
IM Imports as a share of GDP -
AID Official Development Assistance and Official Aid inflows as 
a share of GDP
-
Y Total income (measured by GDP in PPP) (constant 2000) million dollars 
in PPP
YPC Per capita income (measured by GDP in PPP) (constant 2000) dollars in PPP 
per capita
 
Table 2: Definition of variables 
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Section 2.2 
 
     Energy intensity       FDI as a fraction of total investment 
 
Figure A1: Trends of the variables in the simplified model with 20 countries, 1979‐2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In levels in 1st differences
With constant and linear trend -1.76 (-3.61) with constant -5.39 (-3.00)
Only with constant -0.64 (-2.99) no constant -5.43 (-1.96)
In levels in 1st differences
With constant and linear trend -0.96 (-3.61) with constant -9.73 (-3.00)
Only with constant -1.01 (-2.99) no constant -9.85 (-1.96)
In parentheses: 5% critical values to reject the unit root null hypothesis.
Energy Intensity
FDI as a fraction of total investment
 
Table A1:  Unit root test statistics (Augmented Dickey Fuller) for the variables in the 
simplified model 
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Model Specification
Intercept in CE, none in VAR 16.37 (20.26)
Intercept in CE and VAR 7.10 (15.49)
Intercept and trend in CE, intercept in VAR 20.90 (25.87)
In parentheses: 5% critical values to reject the null of no cointegration.
Trace statistic
 
Table A2:  Johansen cointegration test of the variables in the simplified model 
 
 
Section 3: Detailed data description 
Table A3 gives an overview on the data that is used in our empirical estimations. The large 
differences between the minimal and maximal values of the variables in the sample indicate 
an obvious heterogeneity of countries and years. For instance, per capita income YPC ranges 
from about 485 to 23,266 dollars in PPP. The heterogeneity of countries is also apparent from 
the rising, falling and undefined time trends of energy intensity and foreign direct investment. 
Figures A2 and A3 visualize that in graphs of four typical countries of the sample. It is also 
noteworthy that some countries exhibit negative FDI inflows in certain years. This can for 
instance be the case when foreign companies withdraw from the market or disinvest. 
Variable E EI IND I FDI / I FDI IM AID Y YPC
Obs. 1794 1750 1696 1700 1688 1745 1741 1733 1756 1756
Mean 42,565 0.257 0.331 0.215 0.082 0.017 0.346 0.041 176,962 4,581
Min. 276 0.040 0.062 0.021 -1.389 -0.122 0.030 -0.007 955 485
Max. 1,609,348 1.176 0.775 0.606 1.983 0.401 1.075 0.956 7,023,283 23,266
Std. dev. 128,874 0.182 0.116 0.069 0.147 0.028 0.184 0.069 486,419 3,622  
Obs. = number of available observations, which differs between variables; std. dev. = standard deviation. 
Table A3: Descriptive statistics of the sample of 60 developing countries in 1975‐2004 
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Figure A2: Time trends of energy intensity 1975‐2004 in four countries of the sample 
 
Figure A3: Time trends of FDI in percent of GDP 1975‐2004 in four countries of the sample 
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The following paragraphs describe obvious trends of important variables revealed by a closer 
look at the distinct time series. 
As expected, GDP (in PPP), denoted by Y, rose during this period in all countries. A 
number of countries show a continuous increase, for example China, India and Pakistan. 
While India’s and Pakistan’s GDP expanded during these 30 years by a factor of almost 5, 
China’s GDP exploded by a factor of 13. However, there are economies with tremendous 
GDP fluctuations such as Nicaragua or Peru. In many countries YPC, income per capita, grew 
in a similar way as total GDP, but this is not necessarily the case. Nicaragua and Venezuela 
for instance show a falling trend, other countries’ income per capita fluctuated around a 
constant level. 
Since increasing production and consumption reflected by GDP growth lead to higher 
energy demand, it is not surprising that total primary energy supply E clearly rose in all 
countries as well. While most countries’ total energy use increased in a smooth continuous 
way, some countries like Peru and Uruguay show large fluctuations. Such energy use and 
GDP changes might stem from political disturbances or other economic shocks, which cannot 
be captured in the econometric analysis and will probably create estimation errors. The 
development of energy intensities EI is ambiguous across countries. In 17 countries 
(including China, India and Peru) energy intensity declined. China’s energy intensity, starting 
from a high level in 1975, decreased by approximately 75 % until 2004. On the other hand, 
energy intensity increased in 21 countries (Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and others). 22 
countries show no obvious tendency. Having a closer look at the time series of energy use E 
and GDP Y, it becomes obvious in a number of cases that GDP short-time fluctuations or 
shocks do not correspond with proportional fluctuations of energy supply. In these cases, 
GDP jumps up or down while energy supply is sluggish. As a consequence energy intensity 
defined as E / Y moves to the opposite direction of the GDP fluctuation. This is an important 
observation, which has to be taken into account in the specification of the estimation models. 
(Another question not discussed here is the role of measurement errors and measurement 
difficulties.)  
A number of countries (such as Bangladesh, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Republic of 
Korea, Senegal and Thailand) show a clearly rising share of the industry sector IND over 
time. Other countries (like Argentina, Oman and Zambia) have falling shares. In the 
remaining cases IND fluctuates or shows upward or downward trends within the time frame 
of the sample. In China the industry share remained relatively stable over time, reaching its 
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maximum of 48.2 % relative to GDP in 1978 and its minimum of 41.6 % in 1990, while the 
2004 share was 46.2 % of GDP. 
Gross investment in absolute terms had an upward sloping tendency, and several 
economies had a stable continuing increase in investment during the sample period (Chile, 
China, India, Korea, Pakistan and others). This upward trend vanishes in many cases when 
looking at I, gross investment relative to GDP. Investments in China rose from 39.2 billion 
USD (29.4 % of GDP) in 1975 to 658.2 billion USD (38.4 % of GDP) in 2004. 
Net FDI inflows (In US Dollars referring to the year 2000) show a rising tendency in most 
countries, especially during the 1990s. FDI relative to GDP, here labeled FDI, also rose in 
many countries, but this trend is less obvious than the increase in absolute FDI inflows. Some 
countries show periods with high fluctuations or plummeting FDI shares. FDI inflows to 
China increased strongly from 51 million USD (0.03 % of GDP) in 1980 to 48.7 billion USD 
(2.8 % of GDP) in 2003. The highest ratio of FDI to GDP (in other words the highest 
intensity of FDI inflows) was reached in 1993 with 6.3 %. When dividing FDI inflows by 
gross investment instead of GDP, the resulting time series data are very similar. 
Besides FDI, imports are another indicator for the integration of a country into the 
world economy and a potential channel for technology transfer. Their value had an upward 
sloping trend between 1975 and 2004 in all countries, while periods of decline or years of 
plummeting imports occurred in some countries. The imports relative to a country’s GDP, 
denoted by IM, clearly rose only in 23 countries. The other countries show decreases in 
import intensities or fluctuations. China’s import value increased from roughly 6.1 billion 
USD (4.6 % of GDP) in 1975 to 538.5 billion USD (31.4 % of GDP) in 2004. The reception 
of international aid is a further potential source of international technology transfer. In 
contrast to FDI and trade, there is no clear trend of aid inflows when examining the time 
series of the 60 countries in the sample. Referring to aid inflows relative to GDP, called AID 
in the data set, some countries show an upward trend (e.g. Ghana) and other countries have 
falling aid intensities (e.g. India, Tunisia). Absolute and relative aid flows to China reached 
their maximum in 1993 and declined in the following years. 
We conclude that there are increasing time trends of energy supply, imports and 
foreign as well as gross investment in accordance with GDP growth. It is difficult to observe 
any direct relationship between energy and these variables besides the time trend. When 
looking at intensities, i.e. the variables divided by GDP, a different picture with considerable 
heterogeneity of the 60 countries arises. An econometric analysis of this panel data may 
reveal whether FDI has a significant influence on energy intensity. Figure A4 visualizes the 
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facts about the Chinese economy discussed before. Obviously FDI and international trade 
have played an increasingly important role. However, this effect is weaker or not detectable 
in other developing countries. 
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Figure A4: Indicators of the Chinese economy, 1975‐2004 
 
 
 
Section 3.2 
 
ΔIND I  FDI IM AID Δln(YPC) Δln(Y)
ΔIND 1
I 0.016 1
FDI 0.063 0.135 1
IM 0.050 0.351 0.350 1
AID 0.031 -0.069 0.022 0.184 1
Δln(YPC) 0.166 0.275 0.113 0.149 -0.018 1
Δln(Y) 0.167 0.276 0.088 0.156 0.020 0.984 1  
Table A4: Pair wise correlations of the explanatory variables 
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Section 4.1 
 
Specification
Method
Observations
Countries
Years
Depend. var.
CONST 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.017 -0.031 0.011 0.038 *** 0.023 *
ΔIND -0.029 0.302 *** 0.208 * -0.030 0.172 *** 0.122 **
I 0.099 ** -0.038 0.033 0.102 ** -0.013 0.027
FDI / I -0.022 -0.024
FDI 0.045 -0.025 -0.217 0.044 0.143 * 0.032
IM -0.019 0.081 * 0.091 * -0.012 -0.010 0.018
AID -0.061 ** -0.117 *** -0.185 ** -0.054 ** -0.039 -0.107 **
Δln(YPC) -0.746 *** 0.120 0.182 **
Δln(Y) 0.251 *** 0.057 * 0.084 **
Adj. R 2 0.003 0.042 0.380 0.091 0.090 0.139 0.075 0.067
F -stat. 3.287 1.561 8.168 2.352 2.035 2.881 1.899 1.752
Prob(F -stat.) 0.070 0.002    0    0    0    0    0    0
* Significant at the 10 % level,  ** significant at the 5 % level,  *** significant at the 1 % level;
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors; Δ = first time differences;
Country-RE = country-specific random effects; FE = country- and time-specific fixed effects;
B3 and C3 use lagged regressors while FDI, IM and AID are moving averages of the past 3 years.
58
1989-2004
Δln(EI)
C3
FE
lagged 
regressors 
and MA
1441
60
1978-2004
Δln(EI)
C2
FE
lagged 
regressors
871
58
1988-2004
Δln(EI)
FE
58
1990-2004
Δln(EI)
C1
FE
924
Δln(EI)
58
1989-2004
Δln(EI)
FE
lagged 
regressors
869
lagged 
regressors 
and MA
804
B3A1 A2 B1 B2
Country- FE FE
RE
924
58
1988-2004 1988-2004 1988-2004
956 956
Δln(EI) Δln(EI)
58 58
 
Table A5: Estimation results for specifications A, B and C with M&A corrected FDI 
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Section 4.2 
 
Method
System Obs.
Countries
Years
Depend. var.
Sector
Observations
CONST -0.017 -0.026 * -0.014 -0.004 -0.020 -0.017 -0.011 -0.007
FDI -0.064 0.276 0.328 -3.235 0.240 -0.645 0.491 3.104
R 2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.017
* Significant at the 10 % level,  ** significant at the 5 % level,  *** significant at the 1 % level;
Δ = first time differences, Chem. = Chemicals, Mach. = Machinery
130150 128 48
Food Mach.
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Metals Chem.
pooled,  lagged FDI values as regressor
Metals
149 130 44
pooled
131
454 456
1010
Mach.
1983-2003 1983-2003
Δln(EI) Δln(EI)
Chem. Food
 
 
Table A6: Estimation results for the sectoral dataset with the United States  
as source country 
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Abstract
We estimate CO2 implicitly contained in traded commodities based on the GTAP 7
data: While net carbon imports into the industrialized countries amount to 15% of
their total emissions, net carbon exports of the developing countries amount to 12%
of their total emissions, and net carbon exports of China amount to 24% of China’s
total emissions. We also analyze policies under a global per capita emissions based
contraction and convergence regime with emission trading: When China joins the
regime, the developing countries will benefit, while the industrialized countries will
be almost unaffected. When China does not join the regime and instead a carbon
content based border tax is imposed, the industrialized countries will significantly
benefit, while China will be significantly worse off. The effect of the border tax
adjustment on the global carbon price and on global emissions seems negligible.
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1 Introduction
The necessary drastic reduction in global CO2 emissions critically depends on the in-
clusion of the developing and emerging economies, especially of China. - If China stays
reluctant to join a binding post-Kyoto regime, China’s emissions can possibly be reduced
by imposing a border tax based on the carbon content of the traded commodities, since
China is a major exporter of commodities. If such a border tax is imposed, China might
react by imposing import tariffs as well. The question is how such policies affect global
emissions or the global carbon price, and welfare given a certain climate policy scenario
such as a contraction and convergence regime.
In this context, Paul Krugman writes in his New York Times blog under the title
”The WTO is making sense” (Krugman 2009):
”There was some question about how the WTO would handle cap-and-trade
whether it would accept the need for carbon tariffs, if some countries (cough
China cough) drag their feet, or whether it would adopt a purist free-trade
rule. The answer seems to be in - the WTO is going to treat cap-and-trade
the same way it treats VATs, with border taxes allowed if they can be seen
as reducing distortions.
One way to think about this is to say that the price of emissions licenses
is ultimately a tax on consumers - and consumers should pay the same tax
on emissions tied to imports as they do on emissions tied to domestic pro-
duction. (Thats the same reason you can charge VAT on imports.)
The same logic would also suggest that export subsidies are OK, but from
an environmental point of view they’re a bad idea; more broadly, the WTO
view doesn’t really take on the problem of negative externalities generated
by foreigners producing for themselves.
But still, a sensible judgment.”
The New York Times writes under the title ”Possible Plan for Tariffs on Imports
From China Remains Alive in House Climate Bill” on its web site (Friedman 2009):
”A House committee working on sweeping energy legislation seems deter-
mined to make sure that the United States will tax China and other carbon
polluters, potentially disrupting an already-sensitive climate change debate
in Congress. The Ways and Means Committee’s proposed bill language
would virtually require that the president impose an import tariff on any
country that fails to clamp down on greenhouse gas emissions. ...
But associations that represent importers and multinational corporations
are raising red flags, warning that the language could lead to trade wars,
hurt the United States’ ability to export low-carbon technology and harm
consumers.”
Moreover, The New York Times writes under the title ”Obama Opposes Trade Sanc-
tions in Climate Bill” (Broder 2009):
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”’At a time when the economy worldwide is still deep in recession and we’ve
seen a significant drop in global trade,’ Mr. Obama said, ’I think we have to
be very careful about sending any protectionist signals out there.’ He added,
’I think there may be other ways of doing it than with a tariff approach.’”
From an economic point of view, the topic ”carbon content of trade” is related to the
issue of carbon leakage. This issue has been extensively investigated in the literature
- with diverse results and conclusions.1 Following Marschinski et al. (2009), carbon
leakage can occur through three channels: ”(1) free-rider leakage, i.e. lower incentives
to contribute to the provision of a public good (environmental quality) as a strategic
response to another actor’s effort; (2) specialisation leakage, i.e. relocation of production
of energy-intensive goods due to changes in relative prices; (3) supply-side leakage, where
decreased demand in one region leads to drops in fossil fuel prices and therefore results
in higher consumption in other parts of the world.” Our CGE (computable general
equilibrium) analysis will capture the second and the third channel.
Several studies have recently estimated carbon emissions implicitly embodied in
traded commodities for different countries and specifically for China.2 Shui and Harriss
(2006) estimate that US CO2 emissions would be 3 to 6% higher if the goods imported
from China were produced in the USA, and that 7 to 14% of China’s CO2 emissions can
be attributed to exports for US consumers.
Peters and Hertwich (2008) calculate carbon contents of trade based on the GTAP
6 data set for 2001. (Herein, net carbon exports mean implicit CO2 exports via exports
of commodities minus implicit CO2 imports via imports of commodities.) They find net
carbon imports for the Annex B region of 5.6% relative to total CO2 emissions produced
in this region, and relative net carbon exports of 8.1% for the non-Annex B region. In
particular, according to their calculations China’s net carbon exports amount to 17.8%
of its total produced emissions, US net carbon imports amount to 7.3%, Japan’s to
15.3%, and Germany’s to 15.7%. Switzerland (122.9%) and Latvia (60.7%) are the most
intensive net carbon importers among Annex B countries, while Hong Kong (182.2%),
the rest of South African CU (176.4%) and Mozambique (172.4%) are the main net
carbon importers among all countries. South Africa (38.2%) and the Russian Federation
(21.6%) are the most intensive net carbon exporters among all countries.
Pan et al. (2008) estimate China’s emissions in 2006 on a consumption basis amount-
1Compare for example IPCC (2007). Sijm et al. (2004) provide a detailed study. Marschinski et al.
(2009) provide a recent review.
2For a ”review of input-output models for the assessment of environmental impacts embodied in
trade” see Wiedmann et al. (2007). For an overview of quantitative analyses of CO2 embodiment in
international trade see Liu and Wang (2009).
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ing to 3.8Gt of CO2 rather than 5.5Gt on the standard production basis. This implies
that China’s net carbon exports amount to 1.7Gt in 2006.
These results emphasize the relevance of consumption based emissions accounting
as a policy option that takes implicit international carbon trade into account. Also,
in the absence of a global carbon price as the first best solution, carbon based border
tax adjustments could internalize the negative external effects of carbon emissions as a
second best solution.
But a number of authors, such as Bhagwati and Mavroidis (2007), question the
economic, juristic and political feasibility of carbon content based border tax adjustment
(BTA).
In the CGE model based literature on border tax adjustment, possible competi-
tiveness disadvantages for firms within the European emissions trading scheme towards
non-EU firms play a central role. Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008a) compare border tax
adjustment based on imported quantities multiplied by domestic carbon content factors
within an integrated emissions trading scheme based on imported emissions created
during the production of imported commodities. They conclude that border tax adjust-
ment protects domestic competitiveness more effectively, while an integrated emissions
trading scheme achieves a greater reduction in emissions abroad. Alexeeva-Talebi et al.
(2008b) conclude from their simulations of the European emissions trading scheme that
market based policy measures such as the Clean Development Mechanism, allowing for
flexibility in the location of emissions savings, can be effective substitutes for border
tax adjustments in unilateral climate policy. Manders and Veenendaal (2008) find that
border tax measures under the European emissions trading scheme significantly reduce
carbon leakage. Furthermore, border tax measures appear beneficial for the EU, while
they may entail a welfare loss for the rest of the world.
Finally, Lessmann et al. (2009) examine a numerical, intertemporal optimization
framework with stable coalitions. They show that carbon based import tariffs increase
the emissions target coalition in an welfare improving way if the tariff rate is small
relative to the Armington elasticity of imports.
Our paper contributes to the CGE model based literature on border tax adjustment
by assuming a carbon based tariff on commodity trade from a region without a binding
emissions target to a region with a binding emissions target. Different to the literature,
our paper neglects competitiveness aspects by not assuming carbon based subsidies on
exports from a region with a binding emissions target to a region without a binding
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emissions target.3
The first contribution of our paper is to calculate and illustrate implicit carbon
contents of commodities traded between China, the industrialized countries and the de-
veloping countries based on the new GTAP 7 data for 2004 (section 3). The second
contribution is to examine the effects of imposing a carbon content based border tax
under a contraction and convergence climate regime with emissions trading on welfare
and emissions in a stylized CGE model (section 4). Based on the results, the paper
derives implications for post-Kyoto policies (section 5). The Appendix provides a de-
scription of the key parameters, variables and equations of the model. The paper starts
with an overview of the underlying three region model (section 2).
2 The three region model
The underlying DART4 model is a recursive dynamic multi-region, multi-sector CGE
model of the world economy. The static part of the model is currently calibrated to the
GTAP 7 database (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) that covers global production and
trade data for countries and regions, commodities and primary factors for the benchmark
year 2004. Emissions data for GTAP 7 are taken from Lee (2008). The model runs under
GAMS MPS/GE. For a detailed description see Klepper and Springer (2000), Springer
(2002) and Klepper et al. (2003).5
The version of the model scrutinized here distinguishes three regions: China (CHI),
industrialized countries (IND) and developing countries (DEV). The industrialized re-
gion encompasses the OECD countries plus Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Singapore and
South Korea, since they are important source countries of FDI to China - and poten-
tial source countries of technology transfer to China (compare Tseng and Zebregs 2002,
Whalley and Xin 2006). The model distinguishes the production factors labor, capital,
land, and natural resources (fossil fuels). In order to analyze climate policies, CO2 emis-
sions are linked to the use of fossil fuels in production and consumption. The current
sectoral aggregation covers 30 sectors in each region.
Each commodity market is perfectly competitive. Product and factor prices are
fully flexible. The model incorporates two types of agents for each region: producers
3Meade (1974) and Grossman (1980) show under which conditions an equal border tax on all imports
and a corresponding subsidy on all exports leads to a readjustment of the exchange rate without real
economic effects. In our current analysis these criteria are not fulfilled.
4Dynamic Applied Regional Trade.
5The description in this section follows Hu¨bler (2009).
123
(one producer per production sector and region) and consumers (one private and one
public consumer per region). Producer behavior is derived from cost minimization for a
given output. Consumers receive all income generated by providing primary factors to
production processes. Consumers save a fixed share of income and invest it into capital
for production in each period. Herein, investments are produced like commodities by
using production inputs. The disposable income (net of savings and taxes) is then used
for utility maximization by purchasing and consuming commodities. The expenditure
function is modeled as a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) composite, which
combines an energy bundle with a non-energy bundle.
Factor markets are perfectly competitive with full employment of all factors. La-
bor is a homogenous good, being mobile across industries within regions, but being
internationally immobile. While in the basic version of the DART model capital is also
internationally immobile, in this version capital is internationally mobile between the in-
dustrialized region and China. The benchmark values of foreign capital located in China
are taken from the China Statistical Yearbook (2006, 2007). All regions are linked by
bilateral trade flows, and all commodities except the investment good are traded among
regions. Domestic and foreign commodities imported from different regions are imper-
fect (Armington) substitutes.
The model is recursive-dynamic; it solves for a sequence of static one-period equilibria
for future time periods. The major exogenous, regionally different driving factors of
the model dynamics are population growth, total factor productivity growth, human
capital growth and investment in capital. The model assumes constant, but regionally
different growth rates of human capital (educational attainment) taken from Hall and
Jones (1999). Population growth rates and labor participation rates are taken from the
PHOENIX model (Hilderink 2000). The resulting GDP growth paths are in line with
recent projections by OECD (2008).
Technological progress has an exogenous part in every region. It consists of improve-
ments in total factor productivity and in energy biased technological progress. In the
latter case, a given output quantity can ceteris paribus be produced with a smaller vol-
ume of energy inputs. In China, technological progress in a certain sector additionally
increases with the import intensity of the related product, with the foreign capital in-
tensity in this sector and with forward and backward linkages across sectors within the
production chain. Technological progress decreases the closer the Chinese technology
124
level comes to the technology frontier given by the industrialized region.6 This results
in a process of technological convergence.7
3 Carbon content of trade
We calculate the implicit carbon contents of traded commodities using the GTAP 7
data set for 2004 (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) in combination with emissions data
computed from the GTAP 7 data set (Lee 2008).8 Such implicit carbon contents capture
all emissions that occur during the production processes of commodities. Our calculation
improves on Pan et al. (2008) by using the new GTAP 7 data and by distinguishing
intermediate good inputs by country of origin (for detailed explanations see Ackerman
et al. 2007). The latter aspect seems important for computing Chinese carbon contents
of trade, since a substantial part of Chinese exports is produced by using imported
intermediate goods (so that the value added is relatively low).
In the first step, we derive an input-output table, in other words a 90× 90 Leontief
technology matrix Λ, from the GTAP 7 data. In each column, it describes the production
of a commodity i (in a sector i) in region r. The first columns contain all commodities i
produced in the first region, the following columns contain all commodities produced in
the second region and so on. Within each column, commodities i are listed in the same
order representing the intermediate good inputs that are necessary to produce one output
unit of commodity i in region r. At this point, the GTAP 7 data set does not provide
bilateral trade flows of intermediate goods. It does, however, provide bilateral data on
total trade flows µ (for intermediate input use plus consumption) and it does provide
bisectoral data on total imported intermediate inputs ι of firms (without distinguishing
by source country). Therefore, we use the following weighting algorithm to compute
bilateral intermediate good flows ιb from sector ii in region rr to sector i in region r:
ιb(rr, r, ii, i) = ι(r, ii, i)
µ(rr, r, i)∑rr µ(rr, r, i) (1)
The underlying assumption is that the distribution of source countries of imports is the
same for intermediate good imports as for total imports.
In the second step, we compute the Leontief inverse χ containing the volumes of all
6For further details see Hu¨bler (2009).
7Full technological catching up would be far beyond the time horizon of our analysis.
8For this section, we only need the GTAP 7 data set, not the CGE model itself. Like Peters and
Hertwich (2008), we do not distinguish intermediate inputs by source country, since the GTAP data do
not provide bilateral intermediate good flows.
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commodities that are necessary to satisfy the demand for one unit of each commodity,
and additionally to satisfy the need for intermediate inputs throughout all production
stages. Herein, Ξ is a 90× 90 identity matrix.
χ = Λ× χ+ Ξ ⇔ χ = [Ξ− Λ]−1 (2)
In the third step, we derive the direct emissions per unit of output i, denoted by the
1×90 vector ε. These direct emissions occur in each production stage via direct inputs of
fossil fuels (coal, gas and oil).9 For this purpose, we use the data on direct emissions that
Lee (2008) computes from the GTAP 7 data. She takes into account that, depending on
the region, a certain share of oil and gas goes into plastic products within the chemical
sector. She also takes into account that the oil sector encompasses processes where oil
inputs are not burned, but refined in order to gain improved oil products. In this case,
she assumes that the resulting emissions are zero.
In the fourth step, we multiply ε with χ. As a result, we obtain the 1 × 90 carbon
intensity vector ζ that contains the emissions over all intermediate production stages
that occur when producing one unit of each commodity i in each region r.
ζ = ε× χ (3)
Figure 1 shows the results for the benchmark year 2004.10 The figure illustrates that Chi-
nese (CHI) products have the highest carbon (CO2) intensities (except transportation
trn), on average about 3.1kg/US$. Especially, the Chinese carbon content of electric-
ity generation (egw) is extremely high due to the importance of inefficient coal power
in China.11 As expected, commodities produced in the developing countries (DEV)
have the second highest carbon contents, on average about 1.6kg/US$, and commodi-
ties produced in the industrialized countries (IND) have the lowest carbon intensities,
on average about 0.7kg/US$.
9Assume, steal production uses electricity and burns oil when running machines. Then, only these
direct emissions from burning oil are included at this stage of the calculation.
10We distinguish 30 sectors: agriculture and food (agr), textiles, apparel and leather (tex), beverages
and tobacco (bev), business services (bui), chemicals, rubber and plastic (crp), culture and recreation
(cus), coal (col), communication (com), construction (con), crude oil (cru), electricity supply (egw),
electrical equipment (elm), ferrous metals (fem), financial intermediation (fin), gas (gas), machinery
(mac), metal products (met), minerals (min), non-ferrous metals (nfm), non-metallic mineral products
(nmm), other manufacturing (otm), paper products and publishing (pap), petroleum and coal (oil), trade
and wholesale (trd), public services (pub), real estate (ree), transport machinery (trm), transportation
(trn), water supply (wat), wood (woo).
11The emissions intensity of gas in China was obviously an outlier. Therefore, we assumed it is equal
to the emissions intensity of gas in developing countries. For further comments on accounting problems
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Figure 1: Carbon intensities of products
In the fifth step, total carbon contents of traded commodities per year can easily be
computed by multiplying the carbon intensity factors shown in Figure 1 by the related
volumes of commodity trade. (Note that implicit carbon trade within regions is not
included.) Figure 2 shows the results for exports of each region. As expected, the ranking
of implicit Chinese carbon export volumes is similar to the ranking of commodity export
volumes. The three highest and almost equal carbon volumes are embodied in exports
of textiles, apparel and leather (tex); electrical equipment (elm) and machinery (mac).
Chemicals, rubber and plastic (crp) contribute the fourth highest carbon export volume
which is lower than that the three highest volumes. All other products contribute lower
carbon export volumes. The other developing countries obviously export substantial
carbon volumes via transportation services (trn);12 non-ferrous (nfm) and ferrous (fem)
metals; via agricultural and food products (agr); via crude oil (cru); and via petroleum
and coal products (oil).
Figure 3 illustrates the result of summing up over carbon contents of traded com-
modities per region for the benchmark year 2004. The triangle in Figure 3 visualizes the
total quantities of CO2 in Gt (Giga tons) that are implicitly traded between regions.
While about 1.6Gt flow from the developing countries to the industrialized countries,
China alone exports about 1.1Gt to the industrialized countries. CO2 exports from the
in the GTAP data see Peters and Hertwich (2008) and their supporting information.
12The high volume of carbon exports via transportation services stems from the high export volume
of transportation services given by the GTAP 7 data.
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Figure 2: Implicit carbon contents of exported products
industrialized countries to the developing countries and China, as well as CO2 flows
from the developing countries to China and vice versa, are relatively low. Figure 3
does not show implicit carbon trade within regions. The implicit carbon trade within
the industrialized region (between industrialized countries) is substantial; it amounts to
2.7Gt. The implicit carbon trade within the developing region amounts to 0.7Gt.
The percentage numbers show net CO2 exports (implicit CO2 exports minus imports)
relative to total emissions that are actually generated in each region. As expected, China
is a major net carbon exporter (24% of total Chinese emissions), while the industrialized
region is a net carbon importer (15% of total emissions). The developing region is a net
carbon exporter as well (12% total emissions).13
These outcomes indicate that a climate regime in the industrialized region alone is
not sufficient. It potentially increases production in the developing countries and China
and imports of the produced commodities to the industrialized region as emphasized by
the carbon leakage literature. Therefore, it seems straight forward to consider policies
of lowering implicit carbon trade.
13Compared with Peters and Hertwich (2008) who calculate the carbon contents of trade based on
GTAP 6 for the year 2001, implicit carbon carbon exports of China have risen from 0.8Gt (24.4% of
total Chinese emissions) in 2001 to 1.4Gt (31.3%) in 2004. Relative carbon imports of China have risen
from 0.2Gt (6.6%) to 0.3Gt (7.7%). Thus, net carbon exports of China have risen from 0.6 (17.8%) to
1.1Gt (23.6% ≈ 24%). According to Pan et al. (2008), China’s net CO2 exports amount to 1.7Gt in the
year 2006.
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Figure 3: Interregional carbon contents of trade
4 Border tax adjustment
Thus, this section compares four policy scenarios: (1) A worldwide contraction and
convergence scenario starting in 2012 including all regions, denoted by ”+chi”. Per
capita emissions of the three regions converge year by year so that equal per capita
emissions will be reached in the year 2050, while the model runs only until 2025 in
our current analysis. In each year, regions receive emissions permits according to their
current per capita based emissions goals and are allowed to trade emissions permits
with the other regions. The emissions cap covers all sectors, and emissions permits
can be perfectly traded across sectors and regions. (2) The same policy scenario, now
excluding China, denoted by ”-chi”. This is our reference scenario; that is we measure
accumulated welfare in other scenarios relative to this scenario. (3) The latter scenario
excluding China, now with a carbon based border tax adjustment, denoted by ”-chi-
bta”. The border tax revenue is received by the importing region that has a binding
emissions target (IND or DEV). (4) The latter scenario with border tax adjustment,
now additionally with import tariffs imposed by China as a reaction to the border tax
adjustment, denoted by ”-chi-contra”. For this purpose, we assume an additional tariff
rate of 5% on all products imported to China.
The regional emissions targets under the contraction and convergence regime follow
the rule (Peterson and Klepper 2007):
θCO2(t, r) = θCO2(2011, r)
2050− t
38
+ θCO2(2050)
t− 2012
38
, ∀t ≥ 2012 (4)
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Figure 4: CO2 emissions under a worldwide carbon price (scenario +chi)
Regional emissions in 2011, denoted by θCO2(2011, r), are derived from the solution of
the CGE for 2011. The global emissions level in 2050 is set exogenously to about 18.3Gt
CO2 which corresponds roughly to a 450ppm CO2 intensity target (compare IPCC
2001).14 As a result, per capita emissions converge step by step from their regionally
different levels in 2012 to an equalized level of 2t per capita in 2050.
The carbon based ad valorem tariff rate τBTA(t, CHI, r, i) is endogenously adjusted,
where t denotes time (years), CHI denotes China as the exporting country, r denotes
importing regions, and i denotes sectors or commodities. In the absence of the first best
solution, a carbon price in all sectors in all regions, we aim at a second best solution by
pricing imports as if they had been produced domestically. The tax rate depends on the
carbon intensities of commodities that are traded from China into the industrialized or
developing region, denoted by ζ(CHI, i). This implies that policy makers exactly know
the real implicit carbon contents of the imported products in the benchmark year.15
14Without any climate policy, global emissions would be 39.2Gt CO2 in 2025, and 62.7Gt CO2 in
2050, according to our simulations.
15This is a difference to Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008) who assume that imported commodities are
taxed as if they were produced with domestic technologies. We rather follow the scenario of integrated
emissions trading, as described by Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008), where importers have to buy emissions
permits according to the emissions that indeed occurred during the production of the imported goods.
Nevertheless, we measure emissions intensities in the benchmark year and keep them constant thereafter.
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Figure 5: CO2 emissions under a worldwide carbon price excluding China (scenario -chi)
Furthermore, the tariff rate depends on the current carbon price pCO2(t) and on the
current (Armington composite) import price of the commodity pM (i, t). The border tax
adjustment is then given by the following constraint:16
τBTA(t, CHI, r, i) =
pCO2(t)
pM (t, r, i)
ζ(CHI, i) (5)
Thus, imports of commodities are due to the same carbon tax as the corresponding
domestically produced commodities. As a result, across sectors, the carbon based tax
rate is mainly determined by the carbon intensity. Over time, it basically follows the
development of the carbon price. The carbon based tariff rate in 2012 varies between
0.06% for real estate; 0.2% for communication, public services and others; and almost
5% for gas and electricity. According to the simulation, the CO2 price will rise up to 48
US-$ per ton of CO2 in 2025. As a consequence, the carbon based tariff rate will rise up
to 20% for paper, oil, minerals and metals; around 30% for coal, chemicals and water;
around 40% for ferrous and non-ferrous metals; more than 50% for non-metallic mineral
products; and 170% for electricity, given that China’s energy supply will still strongly
16Rearranging the equation and multiplying by the volume of imports M(t, r, i) yields: M(t, r, i) ·
pM (t, r, i) · τBTA(t, CHI, r, i) =M(t, r, i) · ζ(CHI, i) ·pCO2(t). Now, the left hand side is the total tax to
be paid for importing commodity i into region r, given the ad valorem tax rate τBTA(t, CHI, r, i). The
right hand side computes the carbon content of commodity i and prices it at the current carbon price.
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Figure 6: CO2 price under different policy scenarios
rely on coal.17
Figure 4 illustrates the emissions paths of the three regions under a worldwide carbon
price. It turns out that China will become an emissions permit seller (selling 1.5Gt of
CO2 in 2025), because it can save emissions at low marginal costs. The industrialized
countries have to reduce emissions substantially over time while they buy emissions
permits (amounting to 2.2Gt in 2025) in order to dampen the yearly emissions cuts.
The developing countries are allowed to increase their total emissions due to their high
populations and population growth. Therefore, they can achieve economic development
without being hindered by tight emissions constraints. They are even willing to sell
emissions permits to the industrialized countries (0.7Gt in 2025).
Figure 5 illustrates the emissions paths under a worldwide carbon price excluding
China (-chi). Now, global emissions are in total higher (by almost 2Gt in 2025) than in
the scenario including China (+chi). Both, the industrialized and the developing region
must reduce emissions to a somewhat larger extent compared to scenario +chi, because
China does no longer supply additional emissions permits, while the per capita based
emissions targets for the other two regions remain as before.
This effect becomes obvious in Figure 6. When China joins the post-Kyoto regime
17Again, the gas sector in China appears as an outlier; the related border tax rate would almost be
250%.
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Figure 7: Accumulated, discounted welfare effects of the policy scenarios with respect to
reference scenario -chi
(+chi), the time path of the carbon price is significantly lower. On the other hand,
the carbon price paths almost coincide across the policy scenarios -chi, -chi-bta, and
-chi-contra.
We now examine how the border tax adjustment affects emissions and exports in
relation to each other. In particular, we compute the relative change in world wide
emissions in scenario -chi-bta with respect to scenario -chi for each year. This relative
change rises from -0.02% in 2012 to -0.72% in 2025. Additionally, we compute the
relative change in Chinese exports in scenario -chi-bta with respect to scenario -chi.
This relative change rises from -0.25% in 2012 to -8.64% in 2025. We then derive the
following impact measure:
ω(t) =
EM−chi−bta(t,WORLD)−EM−chi(t,WORLD)
X−chi−bta(t, CHI)−X−chi(t, CHI) (6)
This impact measure describes the change in global emissions EM(t,WORLD) relative
to the change in Chinese exports X(t, CHI) due to the introduction of the border
tax adjustment policy for each period of time t in the CGE. The CGE analysis shows
that ω(t) declines from about 1.5kg/US-$ in 2012 to about 1.0kg/US-$ in 2025. For
comparison, in section 3 we found an average carbon intensity of commodities from
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China of about 3.1kg/US-$ and of commodities from other developing countries of about
1.6kg/US-$. The impact measure may be lower than the average carbon intensities of
commodities because of replacement of part of Chinese exports by Chinese supply to
the local market and by domestic supply to the local markets in the industrialized and
developing region. As a consequence, emissions decline by less than the corresponding
implicit carbon content of traded commodities.
Figure 7 shows accumulated, discounted welfare effects18 based on the relative Hicks
equivalent variation for the different policy scenarios under scrutiny with respect to
reference scenario -chi. Herein, the welfare effects do not include climate change damage,
and they do not take capital stocks that remain in the final period into account. The
figure reveals that the lower carbon price in scenario +chi compared to scenario -chi is
significantly beneficial for the developing region. China is to a somewhat larger extent
worse off than the developing region is better off, while the industrialized region is almost
unaffected. The reason for this outcome is probably the higher price of Chinese exports
due to the carbon tax. As a result, the industrialized region on the one hand benefits
from a lower global carbon price, on the other hand suffers from higher prices of Chinese
commodities which it imports to a large extent, while the developing region does not.
However, these welfare effects are all rather small.
On the contrary, the introduction of a carbon based border tax under a post-Kyoto
regime without China in scenario -chi-bta creates a relatively high welfare loss for China.
The developing and the industrialized region benefit from the border tax revenues. On
the other hand, the carbon price (as shown in Figure 6) and consequently emissions are
to a very small extent affected by the border tax: Global CO2 emissions drop by 0.1Gt
in 2025, while the CO2 price rises by 0.3 US-$ per ton. If China reacted by imposing
an additional import tariff of 5% on all commodities, all regions would be slightly worse
off compared to scenario -chi-bta, while there would be practically no change in global
emissions.
Finally, one side aspect is worth mentioning. In the benchmark year 2004, per
capita CO2 emissions are about 3t in China, on average 2t in the developing region,
and 11t in the industrialized region. Running scenario +chi forces per capita emissions
targets to converge to 2t per capita for all regions in 2050. Allowing for interregional
emissions permit trading, the realized emissions in 2050 are 1t per capita in China and
the developing region, and 7t per capita in the industrialized region, since the latter
18Accumulated over the time frame 2004 to 2025, discounted at a rate of 2% per year.
134
region strongly buys emissions permits from the former regions. Running scenario -chi,
per capita emissions in 2050 would be 8t in China, 1t in the developing region, and 6t in
the industrialized region. This means, the industrialized region now buys more permits
from the developing countries, but in total the industrialized region buys less permits
since China’s emissions permits are not on the market.
5 Conclusion
We examined implicit carbon flows through commodity trade between the industrialized
countries, the developing countries, and China. The large volume of carbon that is
implicitly exported from China to the industrialized countries points to a substantial
carbon leakage problem: If China does not join a post-Kyoto climate regime, emissions
intensive production can be shifted to China, and commodities are exported to the
industrialized countries, which undermines the climate regime.
Hence, border tax adjustments based on the carbon contents of traded commodities
are a straightforward policy option. They can shift demand towards less carbon intensive
products and locations of production. However, our analysis indicates that such policies
might have small effects on the global carbon price and on global carbon emissions.
They might rather make the industrialized and the other developing countries better
off and China significantly worse off due to an income transfer through tax revenues.
Against this background, carbon based border tax adjustment policies appear as a good
menace, also as a suitable measure for collecting tax revenues from Chinese producers,
but not as an appropriate measure for reducing global emissions or for reducing the
global carbon price in the presence of an emissions cap.
The inclusion of China into a global post-Kyoto regime appears to be a more effective
policy option with respect to the reduction of carbon emissions. China is able to save
emissions substantially and to become an emissions permits seller when joining a per
capita emissions based contraction and convergence regime - however at a relatively small
Chinese welfare loss due to the emissions cap. The potential reason is that according to
the data and the model, China has very low marginal emissions abatement costs. The
additional emissions permits supply reduces the global carbon price, which creates a
welfare improvement for the developing region. The industrialized region on the other
hand, seems not to benefit significantly from China’s inclusion into the post-Kyoto
regime. The reason is probably the fact that the introduction of a carbon price in China
raises the price of Chinese commodities which the industrialized region imports at a
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large scale. Against this background, at first place not the industrialized countries, but
the developing countries may call for an early inclusion of China into a global climate
regime.
Policy makers would need to consider the following aspects. In the model, border
tax adjustment is done under perfect knowledge of the implicit carbon content factors
of products imported from China. In reality, true implicit carbon content factors of
different products from different countries are certainly hard to estimate and to verify,
which complicates the implementation of border tax adjustment policies. The opposite
assumption that the carbon content factors of imported products from different countries
are homogenous and equal to the carbon content factor of the corresponding domestically
produced products would discriminate against exporters with low carbon intensities and
benefit exporters with high carbon intensities.
On the other hand, in the current model, carbon content factors for different products
are measured in the benchmark year 2004 and then kept constant. This eliminates any
incentive for producers to reduce emissions in order to reduce the tax rates that are
applied to their production. The opposite assumption would be that carbon content
factors are truly endogenous, that is they are measured and adjusted simultaneously.
Both assumptions appear not very appropriate with respect to Chinese exports. The
former assumption, as it is implemented in the model, does not acknowledge efforts
to reduce emissions. The latter assumption would require that Chinese firms regularly
provide exact information on their energy inputs (or emissions outputs) to European or
US policy makers. Perhaps, a reasonable policy would be in between both assumptions:
Carbon intensity factors could be estimated (on a rough sectoral base) and updated after
a certain period of time, for instance after five years. This would take energy intensity
improvements of exporting economies like China into account without the necessity
of large bureaucratic effort to measure and verify carbon emissions permanently. This
would also create an incentive for the Chinese government to foster energy and emissions
saving policies such as the Five Years Plan. Another option in between both assumptions
would be the following: Policy makers estimate carbon intensity factors (on a rough
sectoral base) and give firms the chance to improve the estimates by making their
true emissions transparent. But herein again the problem of verifying the emissions
of (Chinese) firms occurs.
However, our analysis involves numerous uncertainties, especially concerning future
technological progress and economic growth. Moreover, the GTAP 7 data seem to in-
corporate inconsistencies between intermediate inputs in currency value terms and fossil
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fuel (emissions) inputs in physical value terms and differences in accounting emissions in
few cases. Therefore, the results should be treated with caution, at least in quantitative
terms. The analysis rather aims at explaining potential policy outcomes qualitatively.
A detailed long-run analysis would require adjusting the carbon content factors
of products over time depending on changes in the production and trade structure.
Future research may also explicitly model endogenous technological progress including
the rising share of renewables and possibly CCS (carbon capture and storage) since the
deployment of new technologies strongly effects future emissions paths and since coal
power plays a major role in China. It might turn out that international transfer of low
carbon energy technologies is a more promising option than imposing trade barriers for
successfully dealing with climate change.
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7 Appendix
This section contains key equations of the CGE model. For further details and data
sources see Klepper and Springer (2000), Springer (2002), Klepper et al. (2003) and
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Hu¨bler (2009). Tables 1 and 2 explain the meaning of the parameters and variables.19
The equations are written in quantities, while all prices are fully endogenous.
Accumulated, discounted welfare effect excluding climate change damage is derived from
the relative Hicks equivalent variation of policy scenario 1 compared with reference
scenario 0:
W (r) =
∑2025
t=2004{P [pC(2004, r), U1(t, r)]− P [pC(2004, r), U0(t, r)]}(1− ρ)(t−2004)∑2025
t=2004 P [pC(2004, r), U0(t, r)](1− ρ)(t−2004)
(7)
Households equate expenditure to income:
pCC = pKK + pLL+ pBB + pCO2EM +R(.), ∀(t, r) (8)
Capital accumulation with a constant depreciation rate and saving rate:
K(t+ 1, r) = [1− δ(r)]K(t, r) + σ(r)Y (t, r) (9)
Interregional capital mobility :
K(t, IND) = cet[K(t, IND), F (t, CHI)] (10)
Exogenous labor augmentation (via population growth and educational improvements):
L(t+ 1, r) = [1 + λ(t, r)]L(t, r) (11)
Basic production structure (producers minimize costs taking input and output taxes τ (.)
into account):
cet(D,X) = ltf〈N, ces{B, cd[K,L,E]}〉, ∀(t, r, i), r ∈ {IND,DEV } (12)
Basic production structure in China (producers minimize costs taking input and output
taxes τ (.) into account):
cet(D,X) = ltf〈N, ces{B, cd[cd(K,F ), L,E]}〉, ∀(t, CHI, i) (13)
19The 30 production sectors are listed as a footnote in section 3.
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Imported and domestically bought commodities form a consumption bundle:
C(t, r) = ces[D(t, r, i),M(t, r, i)] (14)
Linking CO2 emissions to fossil fuels (col, gas, oil) in an energy bundle:
E = cd{cru, egw, ltf [EM(e), e]}, ∀(t, r) (15)
Armington aggregation of imports from different regions (where export subsidies, and
carbon and non-carbon based import tariffs τ (.) are imposed on traded commodities):
M(t, r, i) = ces{ltf [X(t, rr, r, i),Υ(rr, r, i)]} (16)
Exogenous total factor productivity improvement:
A(t+ 1, r, i) = [1 + ϑA(r)]A(t, r, i), ∀r ∈ {IND,DEV } (17)
Exogenous and endogenous total factor productivity improvement in China:
A(t+ 1, CHI, i) = [1 + ϑA(r) + TA(t, i)]A(t, CHI, i) (18)
Exogenous energy efficiency improvement:
E(t+ 1, r, i) = [1− ϑE(r)]E(t, r, i), ∀r ∈ {IND,DEV } (19)
Exogenous and endogenous energy efficiency improvement in China:
E(t+ 1, CHI, i) = [1− ϑE(CHI)− TE(t, i)]E(t, CHI, i) (20)
Herein, the strength of total factor productivity improvements in China increases with
the intensities of foreign capital, of vertical linkages within the production chain, of
imports, and with the distance to the technology frontier:
TA(t, i) = f [FI(t, i), V I(t, i),MI(t, i)][YL(t, IND, i)− YL(t, CHI, i)] (21)
The strength of energy efficiency improvements increases with the same factors:
TE(t, i) = f [FI(t, i), V I(t, i),MI(t, i)][YE(t, IND, i)− YE(t, CHI, i)] (22)
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Symbol Explanation
f(.) General function
ces(.) [cet(.)] Constant elasticity of substitution [transformation] function
cd(.) Cobb-Douglas function
ltf(.) Leontief function
t Time, year [2004; 2025] (climate policy starts in 2012)
r [rr] Region {IND, DEV, CHI}
i [ii] Sector, commodity (30 sectors, see footnote in section 3)
e Fossil fuels {col, gas, oil} (subset of i)
ρ Time discount rate (0.02 per year)
δ(r) Capital depreciation rate
σ(r) Saving rate
λ(t, r) Population growth rate plus rate of educational improvement
ϑA(r) Rate of exogenous general technological progress
ϑE(r) Rate of exogenous energy biased technological progress
τ (.)(.) Tax rate
Υ(rr, r, i) Transportation costs (of transporting from rr to r)
Table 1: Parameters
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Symbol Explanation
W (r) Accumulated, discounted welfare effect
U(t, r) Utility of the representative consumer
P (.) Expenditure
C(t, r) Consumption (private and public)
D(t, r, i) Production for domestic use
X(t, r, i) [X(t, rr, r, i)] Exports [bilateral trade from rr to r]
M(t, r, i) Imports
K(t, r) [K(t, r, i)] Capital endowment [production input]
F (t, CHI) [F (t, CHI, i)] Endowment of CHI with capital from IND [production input]
L(t, r) [L(t, r, i)] Labor endowment [production input]
B(t, r) [B(t, r, i)] Land and natural resources endowment [production input]
EM(t, r, e) [EM(t, r, e, i)] CO2 Emissions permits endowment [production input]
N(t, r, i) [N(t, r, ii, i)] Intermediate good input [flow from ii to i]
R(.) Total tax revenue
p(.) Price
A(t, r, i) Total factor productivity
E(t, r, i) Energy input
FI(t, i) Foreign capital intensity in China
(
F
K
)
MI(t, i) Import intensity in China
(
M
D+X
)
NI(t, ii, i) Intermediate good flow intensity in China (from ii to i)
(
N
D+X
)
V I(t, i) Vertical linkage intensity in China
with respect to upstream u and downstream d sectors[∑
u6=i FI(t, r, u)NI(t, r, u, i) +
∑
d 6=i FI(t, r, d)NI(t, r, i, d)
]
YL(t, r, i) Labor productivity
(
D+X
L
)
YE(t, r, i) Energy productivity
(
D+X
E
)
TA(t, i) Rate of endog. general tech. progress in China
TE(t, i) Rate of endog. energy biased tech. progress in China
Table 2: Variables
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Chapter 5: 
Costs of Climate Change: 
The Effects of Rising Temperatures 
on Health and Productivity in Germany 
Michael Hübler 0F1, Gernot Klepper 1F2 & Sonja Peterson 2F3 
April 13, 2008 
 
Abstract 
The aim of the study is to quantify climate induced health risks for 
Germany. Based on high resolution climate scenarios for the period 
2071 to 2100 we forecast the number of days with heat load and cold 
stress. The heat frequency and intensity rise overall but more in the 
south. Referring to empirical studies on heat induced health effects we 
estimate an average increase in the number of heat induced casualties 
by a factor of more than 3. Heat related hospitalization costs increase 
6-fold not including the cost of ambulant treatment. Heat also reduces 
the work performance resulting in an estimated output loss of between 
0.1% and 0.5% of GDP. 
 
JEL Classifications: I10, Q51, Q54 
Keywords: Costs of climate change, health effects, heat waves, mortality,  
   hospitalization costs, labor productivity 
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1   Introduction 
Climate change is a complex phenomenon that alters the whole environment in which 
humans live. Assessing the potential impacts of climate change on human health 
provides already a challenging task. Evaluating these effects in terms of the economic 
cost that these health effects may impose on an economy is even more challenging. 
The range of potential health effects from climate change is quite large encompassing 
direct effects such as the impact of heat load on human health and well-being but also 
indirect effects that result from climate induced storms and floods, tick-borne and 
food-borne diseases and allergies causing plants. Since it is difficult to attribute future 
economic costs to these indirect impacts, this study concentrates on the direct effects 
of heat load. 
In the summer of 2003 thousands of people died in Germany and other 
European countries due to long periods of intensive heat. Yet, fatal outcomes are just 
the peak of a variety of heat related health risks and negative effects for human well-
being and performance. Table 1 summarizes estimates of the tremendous health 
impacts of the heat wave 2003 – in terms of increased mortality and increased 
emergency hospital admissions for different European States.  
There is no mono-causal relationship between temperature and detrimental 
health effects, though. The most important variables influencing the risk of 
detrimental health effects are low as well as high temperatures, humidity, wind and 
short- and long-wave radiant fluxes. Furthermore, different risks such as adverse 
physical conditions (high blood pressure, heart, kidney, liver or metabolic diseases 
etc.) and low physical fitness influence the effect of heat load. The main individual 
risk, however, is age. Older people (as well as young children) are most susceptible to 
heat, because weakness and diseases occur increasingly with higher age while the 
human adaptation capacity decreases. Therefore it is not surprising that fatalities due 
to heat load mostly occur in hospitals and nursing homes.3F4 
 Generally, humans are able to adapt to changing climatic conditions via more 
efficient sweating and improved blood- and fluid-circulation. We call this 
physiological adaptation. High temperatures in the first half of a year, when the 
affected people have not yet adapted are thus especially dangerous.4F5 Furthermore, 
people can adapt their behaviour to climate change, generally speaking by living 
                                                 
4 Calado et al. (2005). 
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healthier. Action plans can be prepared in hospitals and old people’s homes to 
organize the adaptation measures during heat waves. 
 
 
Place Number of cases of 
heat mortality 
Number of hospital 
emergency admissions 
Source 
Europe 25 000 – 35 000  Cited in Koppe et al. 
(2003), compare with 
Kosatsky (2005) 
Germany 7 000  Zebisch et al. (2005) 
Baden-
Württemberg 
1 100; 16 - 24 % 
increase 
 Cited in Koppe et al. 
(2003) 
England 2 091; 17 % increase, 
23 % increase among 
people aged 75 years 
or older, 85  % of 
victims older than 75 
years 
1 % increase among 
people up to 64 years, 
6 % increase among 
people aged 75 years or 
older 
Johnson et al. (2005) 
London 616; 42 % increase, 
59 % increase among 
people aged 75 or 
older 
4 % increase among 
people up to 64 years, 
16 % increase among 
people aged 75 or older 
Johnson et al. (2005) 
France 14 800; 16 % 
increase, 80  % of 
victims older than 75 
years, 70 % mortality 
increase among 
people aged 75 to 94 
years, 120 % 
mortality increase for 
people older than 94 
 EEA (2004), 
Kosatsky (2005) 
 
Netherlands 650  WHO Europe (2005) 
Switzerland 975; 6.9 % increase  WHO Europe (2005) 
Italy 9 704, 92 % of 
victims older than 75 
years 
 WHO Europe (2005), 
Conti et al. (2005)  
Portugal 1 854; 40 %  
increase, 58  % up to 
96.6 % of victims 
older than 75 years 
11.6  % increase; 27.2 % 
increase among people 
aged 75 or older 
Calado et al. (2005), 
Kovats and Jendritzky 
(2006) 
Table 1: Estimated impacts of the European heat wave in 2003  5F6 
 
In this context, heat warning systems can help to adapt behaviour on time. They lead 
to the category of technical solutions (financed by public or private investment). 
                                                                                                                                           
5 Kalkstein and Davis (1989). 
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Climate related building design and air-conditioning in buildings are typical technical 
solutions. Adaptation possibilities are related to people’s social status, because 
poverty reduces the possibilities for heat protection through technical and structural 
measures, care and services. Single older people miss support and surveillance, and 
restricted mobility reduces the possibilities to “escape” from high temperatures (see 
Basu and Samet, 2002). 
Against this background, the aim of this study is to quantify climate induced 
health risks for Germany. It addresses scientists, decision makers, medical care 
personnel and the public, providing findings on future health risks, so that appropriate 
mitigation and adaptation measures can be derived. This interdisciplinary work 
combining scientific knowledge from the meteorological, geographical, medical and 
economic field is probably one of the first attempts to systematically quantify future 
negative health effects of climate change in Germany. The focus is on such effects for 
which there is at least some quantitative information. For this reason we estimate heat 
induced mortality, hospitalization costs and losses in labor productivity. For mortality 
we also consider the effects of less coldness in winter. The estimates predict a 
regionally differentiated increase in heat load within Germany and consequently 
substantially higher negative health impacts and production losses in some regions. 
The mortality rise during the summer clearly dominates the possible mortality 
decrease during the winter. (For more detailed results than presented in this study, see 
Hübler and Klepper 2007). Since there are many uncertainties in past parameter 
values and unknown future development paths, the study is only a first step in this 
direction. And it has the drawbacks of a typical partial equilibrium model. The study 
does neither account for future changes in the sectoral pattern of the economy nor for 
changes of prices and quantities that are relevant for assessing future economic 
impact. Moreover, it does not include future adaptation, which can significantly 
reduce the negative effects. (The estimations are based on a population that is more or 
less adapted to the present climate.)  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we explain forecasts of the climate 
model REMO6F7 based on IPCC scenarios for Germany in the period 2071-2100. Using 
these climate data we compute additional days p. a. (per annum) with heat load. In 
                                                                                                                                           
6 For further literature reviews on heat related mortality see Basu and Samet (2002) and Kovats and 
Jendritzky (2006). 
7 REMO has been criticized concerning the estimation of precipitation (the use of different time scales 
and deviations of the results depending on the spatial resolution). The problem has been explained and 
corrected (Max-Planck-Institut 2006), and precipitation is not the focus of our examination.  
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section 3 we derive approximations of the resulting increase in mortality as an 
indicator for the future health risk. In section 4 we try to estimate the economic costs 
of non fatal heat risks focussing on the costs of hospitalization and the reduction in 
labor output. In both sections 3 and 4 we apply parameter values from existing 
empirical studies for our estimations. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2   Heat scenarios for Germany 
Climate change causes worldwide higher temperatures with different regional 
patterns. To generate heat and coldness scenarios for Germany in the necessary high 
spatial resolution we use the Regional Climate Model REMO. The model, the 
underlying emission scenarios and the resulting forecasts are described in the 
following subsections.  
 
2.1 Employed climate models and climate scenarios 
 
The Regional Climate Model REMO7F8 computes climate data with a high temporal 
and spatial resolution (10 km times 10 km, 121 squares in the horizontal, 103 in the 
vertical axis) for Germany and the surroundings. 
Future emissions paths depend on the uncertain development of the world 
economy. The forecasts therefore use the emission scenarios of the IPCC (2001) that 
are based on different plausible assumptions on important determinants for emissions 
such as economic activities and economic integration. Scenario A2 is the business as 
usual case. In scenarios A1B and B1 emissions rise till 2050 and then fall until 2100. 
While B1 implies rigorous climate protection measures, this study mainly refers to 
scenario A1B with a medium emissions increase. 
The climate data computed by REMO are then used as inputs for the so called 
climate “Michel” model developed by the German Weather Service.8F9 This complete 
human temperature exchange model combines data on temperature, humidity, wind 
speed, radiation, clothing and physical activity of affected persons to calculate the so-
                                                 
8 Jacob (2001); REMO is run by the Max Planck Institute (MPI) for Meteorology in cooperation with 
Deutsches Klimarechenzentrum (DKRZ), both located in Hamburg. 
9 Fanger (1972), Gagge et al. (1986), VDI (1994 and 1998), Staiger et al. (1997), Jendritzky et al. 
(1990), Jendritzky et al. (2000). For a description of risk factors see Havenith (2005). 
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called perceived temperature for a typical reference person. Perceived temperature is 
a measure of how temperature affects human well-being. For instance, the heat wave 
in 2003 had such severe effects in France because humidity was higher than in other 
countries like Germany. 
For practical applications it is useful to convert the perceived temperature into 
classes of thermal perception or classes of thermo-physiological stress according to 
Jendritzky et al. (2000). The 6 am and 12 am values of perceived temperatures are 
smoothed by applying half a Gaussian filter over 41 days. The longer ago a value, the 
lower its weight. The smoothed values are then used to define dynamic limits for the 
classes of perceived temperature composed of fixed (2/3 weight) and variable (1/3 
weight) limits.9F10 This method imitates the human ability to adapt to climatic changes 
in the short-run. The procedure is also used in the heat warning system of the German 
Weather Service.10F11 
2.2 Heat scenarios 
To generate heat scenarios for the period 2071-2100 we calculate the average number 
of days p. a. with heat stress from the temperature data sorted in classes of perceived 
temperature according to Jendritzky et al. (2000). In the illustrations heat stress 
encompasses the classes of strong and extreme heat stress, i. e. perceived 
temperatures of at least 32 °C. 
The numbers of additional days with heat stress for the period 2071-2100 and 
for the different IPCC scenarios are given by the difference to a reference run for 
1971-2000 (CTL = control). The reference run uses actually measured greenhouse 
gas concentrations as inputs. The total number of future hot days results from adding 
the expected additional number of hot days to the actually observed number of hot 
days in the reference period 1971-2100. The following map (Figure 1a) shows the 
number of days with (strong and extreme) heat stress for the REMO experiment A1B 
(2071-2100) minus the number of hot days in the control run CTL (1971-2000) in 
Germany and the surroundings in 10 km times 10 km resolution.  
                                                 
10 Koppe and Jendritzky (2005), Koppe (2005). 
11 http://www.dwd.de/de/WundK/Warnungen/Hitzewarnung/Kriterien.htm. 
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Figure 1a: Additional number of days with (strong or extreme) heat stress, REMO 
experiment A1B (2071‐2100) minus control run CTL (1971‐2000) in Germany 
 
 
All experiments (B1, A1B and A2) forecast a significant increase in the frequency of 
days with strong or extreme heat at the end of the 21st century (2071-2100) compared 
to the end of the 20th century (1971-2000) and result in two to five times as many hot 
days. In general, the number of hot days per year rises from north to south Germany. 
(Note that acclimatisation will weaken the north-south gradient of heat stress.) 
Experiment A1B predicts one additional day with strong or extreme heat at the coast 
in the north, seven to 15 in the middle of Germany and 26 near the Lake Constance 
and in Munich (Figure 1a). Scenario B1 with lower emissions yields one additional 
hot day at the coast and around 18 near the Lake Constance in the south (Figure 1b). 
The results of scenario A2 (not shown) are very similar to those of A1B. 
Accordingly, the regional climatic differences will increase in Germany. Figures 1a 
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and 1b also reveal the heat island effect in cities like Hamburg, Berlin and Munich, 
that means, higher temperatures in densely populated areas compared with the 
surrounding areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Additional number of days with (strong or extreme) heat stress, REMO 
experiment B1 (2071‐2100) minus control run CTL (1971‐2000) in Germany 
 
The comparison of Figure 1a with 1b clearly shows that a successful mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions (assumed in scenario B1) can significantly reduce future 
heat load. 
Additionally, we use temperature time series data for the German federal 
states, forecasted for one city in each state like Frankfurt/Main for Hessen. Figure 2 
shows for Frankfurt/Main the rising trends of heat days p. a. for B1, A1B, A2 and for 
the base run CTL. It is again obvious, that a successful emissions mitigation policy, 
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represented by scenario B1, reduces the occurrence of heat and consequently the 
related health risks. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Additional number of days per year with strong or extreme heat stress in 
Frankfurt/Main (Hessen), moving averages over 5 years 
2.3 Coldness scenarios 
Climate change will not only increase summer temperatures and the likelihood of heat 
waves, but will also lead to higher average temperatures during the winter. 11F12  
Analogously to the heat forecast we estimate future cold stress as the average 
number of days per year with cold stress according to the IPCC scenarios B1, A1B 
and A2 for 2071-2100 and compare the results with the control run CTL for 1971-
2000. We aggregate the number of days with light, modest, strong and extreme cold 
stress, i. e. perceived temperatures of 0 °C or lower, since there were no days with 
strong and extreme cold stress (perceived temperatures of -26 °C or lower) and only 
few days with moderate cold stress (from -13 °C to -26 °C) in the past (in CTL). 
                                                 
12 It is not clear if events of strong cold stress will occur more often in the future. 
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Figure 3: Reduction in the number of days per year with (light, moderate, strong or 
extreme) cold stress, control run CTL (1971‐2000) minus REMO experiment A1B 
(2071‐2100) in Germany 
 
Obviously, the reduction of cold stress is highest in the north-east of Germany 
reaching a decrease of 30 days in scenario B1 and 44 days in A1B (Figure 3) and A2. 
The reduction in cold days amounts to 10 to 20 days in the middle of Germany in B1 
and up to 25 days in A1B and A2. In all scenarios the lowest decrease of ca. two days 
per year is found at the upper Rhine rift in the south-west.12F13 Moreover, the reduction 
of average coldness rises with altitude, which is obvious in the higher German 
regions and in the Alps. 
 
                                                 
13 Since we include light cold stress, the reported total decrease of cold days becomes relatively high. 
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3  Temperature induced fatalities 
In this section we use information on the relationship of temperature and mortality 
from the literature and combine it with the heat and coldness scenarios described 
before as well as with statistical population data in order to estimate future climate 
change induced changes in mortality. Section 3.1 refers to heat load and section 3.2 to 
cold stress. 
3.1 Heat induced mortality 
Our estimation model refers to McMichael et al. (2002) and relates heat induced 
mortality to the predicted additional number of hot days: 13F14  
pdd
M
TTD seasonk
w
kwkw
W
w
K
k
⋅⋅⋅⋅+= ∑∑ 365)( ,,0,      (3.2-1) 
 
D average total number of heat induced deaths p. a. in Germany 2071-2100 for 
IPCC scenario A1B 
Tw,k  average number of additional days p. a. in 2071-2100 in perceived 
temperature class k in location w 
T0,w,k  actually measured average number of days p. a. in 1971-2000 in perceived 
temperature class k in location w 
Mw absolute mortality over the whole base year 2005 in federal state w 
dk  average relative mortality increase in perceived temperature class k 
dseason seasonal mortality adjustment 
p  demographic change (age structure and population size) 2050 relative to 2005 
in Germany 
In two different runs w represents first one location for each federal state (W = 16) 
and second the 121 times 103 fields, each with a size of 10 km times 10 km. The 
temperature classes k (K = 3) are strong and extreme as well as moderate heat stress, 
all causing increased mortality. 
                                                 
14 Absolute numbers are written in capital letters, relative numbers in small letters. 
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Tw,k is the average number of additional days p. a. in the prediction period 
(A1B, 2071-2100) compared to the reference period (CTL, 1971-2000) when the 
threshold of perceived temperature class k is reached in location w. Tw,k is given by 
the climate forecast explained in section 2.2 and can be expressed as follows, where j 
(J = 30) is the time index for years in the prediction or reference period:  
 
200019711
,,
210020711
,,, /)(/)(
−=−=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∑∑ JTJTT J
j
kwj
J
j
kwjkw    (3.2-2) 
 
In order to calculate the total number of heat related future fatalities in the first run, 
we add T0,w,k, the actually measured average number of days p. a. in the reference 
period 1971-2000, to the estimated number of hot days. Since past observations are 
not available in 10 km times 10 km resolution, we cannot add T0,w,k, in the second run. 
Mw is the absolute number of deaths in general (due to any reason for death) in 
the base year 2005 in federal state w.14F15 In case of 10 km times 10 km squares, Mw is 
the mean mortality rate in Germany multiplied by the population size in the square.15F16 
Dividing by 365 yields the number of deaths per day.  
dk denotes the percentage increase in general mortality Mw due to heat stress of 
class k. We use parameter values from Laschewski and Jendritzky (2002) for the 
period 1968-1997 in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg and observations during 
the heat wave 2003 in Baden-Württemberg reported by Koppe et al. (2003) that refer 
to classes of perceived temperatures. Based on Laschewski and Jendritzky (2002) we 
compute the mortality increase for moderate heat stress amounting to approximately 
6.6 %; according to Koppe et al. (2003) the mortality increase for strong heat stress is 
about 9.3 %. For extreme heat stress no suitable information is available. 
Extrapolation yields an increase of 12.0 % (linear extrapolation) and 14.8 % 
(exponential extrapolation), respectively. 
Furthermore, we take the seasonal adjustment of the general mortality, denoted by 
dseason, into account, because winter mortality is circa 8 % higher than the yearly 
average mortality while summer mortality is about 8 % lower.16F17 The mortality change 
referring to the summer is therefore multiplied by the factor 0.92. 
                                                 
15 Statistisches Bundesamt (2006a). 
16 Data from Landscan (2001). 
17 Calculation based on Laschewski and Jendritzky (2002). 
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p is the demographic adjustment coefficient. The number of people below the 
age of 75 will decrease by 18 % (p(74-) = 0.82) until 2050, and the number of people 
aged 75 years and more will increase by 95 % (p(75+) = 1.95) resulting in a decrease 
of total German population by 9.3 %. 17F18 In accordance with the experiences of the heat 
wave in 2003 we assume that 80 % of all heat stress victims are people aged 75 years 
and more (m(75+) = 0.8) and carry out sensitivity analyses to control for different 
parameter assumptions.18F19 The following formula captures the demographic change: 
)74())75(1()75()75( −⋅+−++⋅+= pmpmp    (3.2-3) 
m(75+) share of people of age 75 and more among heat fatalities during the heat 
wave 2003 
p(75+) number of people of age 75 and more in 2050 relative to 2005 
p(74-) number of people of age 74 and less in 2050 relative to 2005 
Since there is a lack of more disaggregated information, we assume that the 
demographic development is the same across all federal states and 10 km times 10 km 
squares. Moreover, we neglect population movements within Germany (that will 
mainly take place from the east to the west and to the south of Germany) as well as 
international migration.  
The calculations result in a substantially increased heat related mortality at the 
end of the 21st century. The first run on federal state level yields on average ca. 
16 700 heat induced deaths p. a. in the period 2071 to 2100 (using exponential 
extrapolation for the class of extreme heat stress) which can be disaggregated as 
follows: Today’s number of deaths amounts to ca. 4 500 (bottom part in Figure 4). 
This value is not measured but is generated by the model as a reference. Without 
demographic change the prediction yields about 5 200 additional heat induced deaths 
(middle part in Figure 4). The joint effect of a decrease in total population and an 
almost doubling number of elderly people creates ca. 7 000 additional potential heat 
victims, since the latter effect dominates (upper part in Figure 4). This means, the 
total number of heat induced fatalities rises by the factor 3.7. Excluding today’s 
                                                 
18 Calculation with data from Statistisches Bundesamt (2006a). We use population forecasts for 2050 
since the forecasts by Statistisches Bundesamt do not include the period 2051-2100. 
19 Shares of affected elderly people reported in the literature vary between 44 % (in the USA) and 
96.6 % (in Portugal); overview in table 1; EEA (2004), p. 74; Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 
for the USA cited in Uphoff and Hauri (2005). 
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number of heat related deaths from the calculation leads to ca. 9 000 additional future 
deaths p. a. 
Accordingly, the future health risk increases substantially without appropriate 
mitigation and adaptation efforts. It is important to note that these estimations do not 
include any adaptation to climate change and hence overestimate the real effects. 
Furthermore, we do not take into account the so-called “harvesting effect”, meaning 
that a certain number of sick and elderly people might have died even without heat in 
the near future. The heat event shifts the date of death forward. As a consequence the 
mortality ratio can decrease under its average level after the heat event.  
 
 
Figure 4: Number of heat induced deaths p. a. in Germany, 2071‐2100 (exponential 
extrapolation for extreme heat stress) 
 
 
Subtracting these casualties will in the short-run probably result in an up to 25 % 
reduction of the mortality numbers for Germany. However, Koppe (2005) finds 
(referring to Baden-Württemberg, 1968-2003) that the extent of the “harvesting 
effect” differs substantially, being much higher for people younger than 75 years 
(85.4 % for moderate heat load and 50.7 % for strong heat load) than for people in the 
age of at least 75 years (17.7 % for moderate heat load, only 2.1 % for strong heat 
load).  
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Figure 5: Distribution of additional heat induced deaths p. a. per 10 km times 10 km 
sectors in Germany, 2071‐2100, A1B (exponential extrapolation for extreme  
heat stress) 
 
 
Furthermore, we carry out sensitivity analyses for the parameters “heat related 
mortality increase dk” and “share of elderly people among heat victims m(75+)”. Both 
vary with time and region and depend on the adaptation status and adaptation ability 
of the affected population and can thus not be determined exactly. The vertical 
sensitivity bar on the left hand side shows the range of total outcomes from about 
11 500 to about 21 500 when dk varies by ±30 % in accordance with the range of 
findings in the literature. The vertical sensitivity bar on the right hand side of Figure 4 
shows the range of total mortality from ca. 13 500 to ca. 19 000 when m(75+) is 
changed between 50 % and 100 %, again referring to the findings in the literature (see 
Table 1). In the second run we compute heat induced mortality in 10 km times 10 km 
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resolution visualized in Figure 5. Obviously, most heat fatalities will be in the regions 
with the highest population densities, i. e. in the cities, and the health risk increases 
from north-east to south-west (in accordance with Figure 1a). 
Adding up the numbers of all 10 km times 10 km sectors yields the average 
additional number of heat related deaths in Germany p. a. amounting to 8 500 
(compared to almost 9 000 in the first run ignoring the base value of today’s 
observations).19F20 
These results have a similar order of magnitude as studies for the UK, 
Portugal and Australia.20F21 A test run using the number of hot days in the year 2003 as 
an input indeed reproduces the estimated ca. 7 000 heat victims in Germany. 
3.2 Coldness induced mortality 
While we expect dangerous health impacts in summer, there might be positive effects 
in winter due to less coldness. There are much less empirical studies on the 
relationship of health and coldness and the role of age as a risk factor than for heat. 
The time lags of low temperature events and health effects are much longer than in 
summer, and the correlation is statistically weaker. The medical causality is different, 
and it is not evident, whether the health risk steadily increases with lower 
temperatures. To get an idea of the effects in winter we nevertheless apply again 
model equation (3.2-1), this time in high spatial resolution only (w refers to 10 km 
times 10 km sectors) with the following new parameters: 
Tw,k is now the average reduction of the number of days p. a. with cold stress 
in the prediction period (A1B, 2071-2100) compared to the reference period (CTL, 
1971-2000). k encompasses the classes of perceived temperature with light and 
moderate cold stress.  
T0,w,k, the actually measured average number of days p. a. with cold stress in 
the reference period 1971-2000, is not available in the high resolution and therefore 
not included here. 
                                                 
20 Same demographic adjustment as in the first run. Ignoring the base value means excluding the lower 
part in figure 6 as well as part of the upper (demographic) part in figure 6, because today’s base value 
is expanded by the demographic factor, which is included in the upper part. 
21 Overview of heat victims prognoses in Kovats and Jendritzky (2006, p. 87) 
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Mw is the general mean mortality rate of Germany multiplied by the 
population size in a 10 km times 10 km square as before.21F22 Dividing by 365 in the 
formula yields the number of deaths per day. 
dk is the relative increase in general mortality Mw due to cold stress of class k. 
Since we expect less days with cold stress in the future, this mortality increase will 
occur less frequently. We use again parameter values from Laschewski and 
Jendritzky (2002) that refer to classes of perceived temperature. The value for 
moderate cold stress is ca. 9.3 %. The value for light cold stress is computed as the 
average of mortality from 0 to -12 °C amounting to approximately 5.7 %.22F23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of the reduction in coldness induced deaths p. a. per 10 km 
times 10 km sectors in Germany, 2071‐2100, A1B 
 
 
                                                 
22 Data from Landscan (2001). 
23 Laschewski and Jendritzky (2002) eliminate the impact of influenza epidemics by smoothing outliers 
in the mortality data. 
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General mortality in winter is about 8 % higher than the yearly average. 
Hence, the adjustment coefficient dseason is 1.08. 
According to Hassi (2005) elderly people are very susceptible to cold stress. 
Thus, it appears plausible to apply the same demographic adjustment factor p as for 
heat load making both results comparable.23F24 (80 % of the affected people are at least 
75 years old.) 
The resulting map (Figure 6) shows the highest expected reduction in winter 
mortality in areas with the highest population densities, i. e. in the cities. Comparing 
Hamburg, Berlin and Munich reveals higher mortality risk reductions in the north and 
north east compared to the south of Germany (in accordance with Figure 3). 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of the increase in heat related deaths and the reduction in 
coldness related deaths p. a.  in Germany, 2071‐2100, A1B, both computed in 10 km 
times 10 km resolution without base observations from the past 
 
Adding up the numbers of all 10 km times 10 km sectors yields the average reduction 
in heat related deaths in Germany p. a. amounting to ca. 5 200 compared with 8 500 
p. a. due to heat in summer, assuming the same demographic adjustment (age effect). 
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Hence, on average, the dangers of heat dominate the possible health advantages of 
milder winters by far, and the uncertainties of the estimations for the winter are 
higher than those of the summer. Figure 7 visualizes these results. A calculation 
without the age effect leads to only ca. 3 000 p. a.  
A comparison of Figures 5 and 6 shows that in most parts of Germany the 
positive and negative thermal effects roughly balance each other. While only the 
north-eastern region with its mild maritime climate can benefit from a positive net 
effect, dangerous heat impacts dominate in the south and south-west. This outcome 
has to be interpreted with caution though: A zero or slightly positive net effect in 
some regions does not mean that there is no need to react. Even though there might be 
advantages in winter, the harmful impacts in summer can be avoided via natural 
adaptation and feasible adaptation activities.  
 
4   Economic costs of heat 
Casualties represent the most extreme danger of heat. As described in Table 1, the 
European heat wave in 2003 also caused a rise in hospital emergency admissions. 
This fact is confirmed by a study for the USA: Semenza et al. (1999) find 11 % more 
hospital emergency admissions during the heat wave 1995 in Chicago in general and 
35 % more admissions in the age group 65 years and more. Nevertheless, the 
empirical evidence is much weaker than for heat related mortality. Moreover, heat 
can negatively affect well-being making us feel uncomfortable and exhausted and 
entails difficulties to concentrate. These aspects are hard to quantify, but become 
evident when doing physical or mental work.  
Estimating the economic costs of the different effects of heat entails a number 
of methodological problems. The main problem is that our temperature scenarios are 
for the time period 2071 to 2100, while it is not possible to obtain resilient forecasts 
of the development of the German society and economy over the next 100 years. We 
thus assess the costs of heat referring to the current gross national income, to the 
current sectoral structure, to current prices and to today’s (medical and general) 
                                                                                                                                           
24 Data on England show a higher coldness risk for people aged more than 75 years. 
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technologies. There is also a lack of hospitalization data referring to perceived 
temperatures. Again, we neglect any kind of adaptation to climate change. 
In section 4.1 we use the indicator “hospital emergency admissions” to get an idea of 
the costs associated with serious illnesses. In section 4.2 we obtain a rough estimate 
of the effects of heat on labor productivity. (We abstain from a monetary valuation of 
the fatalities estimated in section 3.1.)  
4.1 Heat induced hospitalization costs 
Since there is no suitable information on medical treatment in practises and the 
related costs of treatment and medication, our estimation refers to statistics on the 
influence of heat on hospital emergency admissions and hospitalization costs. 
Moreover, it is difficult to identify the quantitative influence of temperature on 
specific diseases and the costs directly related to those diseases. 
The projection of hospital costs is based on the estimation of additional heat 
days for the 16 reference places in different federal states for the IPCC scenario A1B 
in 2071 to 2100. The estimation model24F25 is similar to formula (3.2-1): 25F26 
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TTH ⋅⋅⋅+= ∑∑ 365)( ,,0,     (4.2-1) 
H average total hospitalization costs p. a. in Germany in the prediction period 
2071-2100 for IPCC scenario A1B 
Tw,k  average number of additional days p. a. in the prediction period in perceived 
temperature class k in location (federal state) w 
T0,w,k  actually measured average number of days p. a. in the reference period 1971-
2000 in perceived temperature class k in location w 
Sw absolute number of new patients over the whole base year 2004 in federal 
state w 
Kw general hospitalization costs per case in federal state w 
                                                 
25 Similar McMichael et al. (2002) predicting mortality increases. 
26 Absolute numbers are written in capital letters, relative numbers in small letters. 
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hkp  average relative increase in the number of hospital emergency admissions in 
perceived temperature class k, the demographic change p (age structure and 
population size) 2050 relative to 2005 in Germany is included 
Tw,k and T0,w,k are given by the climate data as before.  
Sw denotes the base number of new patients over the whole base year 2004 in 
federal state w and Kw the related average medical treatment costs per case of medical 
treatment.26F27  
hkp is the average relative increase in the number of hospital emergency 
admissions in the classes of moderate, strong and extreme heat load including the 
demographic development. There is no information available on the relationship of 
perceived temperature and emergency cases in Germany. Thus, we apply parameter 
values in absolute temperatures from a study for England during the heat wave 2003. 
In this statistical analysis Johnson et al. (2005) find a 1 % rise in hospital emergency 
admissions in the age group up to 64 years and a 6 % increase for people aged 75 
years and more at maximal temperatures in the range of about 25 to 31 °C. According 
to Johnson et al. (2005) hospital emergency admissions decrease by 4 % in the age 
group 65 to 74 years. These values are applied to the class of moderate heat load 
referring to the temperature range during the heat wave 2003 in England. In London 
maximum temperatures during the heat wave 2003 were in the range of 35 to 38 °C. 
So, we apply the following numbers to the class of strong heat stress: A 4 % increase 
of hospital admissions in the age class up to 64 years, a 5 % decrease in the age group 
65 to 74 years and a 16 % rise among people aged 75 and older. Due to a lack of 
information on extreme heat stress we compute the related hospital admission 
changes via (linear and exponential) extrapolation. 
The relative mean change hkp can then be expressed in the following way: 
)7465()7465()7465()64()64()64( −⋅−⋅−+−⋅−⋅−= kkpk hpsharehpshareh     
)75()75()75( +⋅+⋅++ khpshare         (4.2-2) 
Where share(.) is the share of people in the age group in parentheses among the 
people who left hospital in the reference year 2004.27F28 
                                                 
27 Statistisches Bundesamt (2004a), Statistisches Bundesamt (2004b). 
28 Statistisches Bundesamt (2006b). 
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p(.) denotes the size of the age group in parentheses in 2050 relative to 2004.28F29 
(This includes the change of the whole population size.) We assume that the 
demographic development is the same across all federal states.  
hk (.) are the parameter values for the classes k of moderate, strong and extreme heat 
stress and the age groups in parentheses derived from England and London as 
described above. 
A methodologically precise calculation requires the following consideration: 
Hospitalization costs in the reference year 2004 already include heat induced costs. 
So, before calculating the future heat related cost increase, today’s heat induced costs 
need to be subtracted:  
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H0 denotes heat related hospitalization costs in the reference year. Thus, total 
reference year hospitalization costs net of heat effects become slightly smaller than 
before, because we diminish base costs Sw · Kw by H0: 
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The result shown in Figure 8 indicates average hospitalization costs of about 495 
million € per year in the period 2071 to 2100. This corresponds to an increase by a  
factor 6 compared to the climatic reference period 1971 to 2000. On the other hand, 
this number represents only 0.88 % of total German hospitalization costs (for all 
kinds of diseases) and 0.27 % of German health care expenses. Figure 8 shows that 
more frequent and more intensive heat directly causes costs of ca. 222 million € 
(middle part), while the demographic change (age effect) contributes 191 million € 
(upper part). The base value of 82 million € (lower part) was not measured in the past 
but is generated by the model. 
The reaction of emergency cases to heat hkp is a crucial parameter. Hence, we 
carry out a sensitivity analysis varying the impact of heat on emergency cases by ±30 
% according to the magnitudes found in the literature. This yields total hospitalization 
                                                 
29 Statistisches Bundesamt (2006a). 
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costs in the range of 300 to 700 million € p. a., represented by the vertical bar in 
Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8: Hospitalization costs p.a. in Germany, 2071‐2100 (exponential 
extrapolation for extreme heat stress) 
 
4.2 Heat induced production loss 
A number of studies investigate work performance or mental and mechanical abilities 
under different thermal environments and find evidence for strong negative effects of 
temperatures above the most comfortable level of slightly more than 20 °C. The 
studies describe human performance reductions in a range of 3 % to 50 % for 
temperatures higher than the comfortable level, reaching up to 75 % at temperatures 
of 35 to 37 °C.29F30 For instance, office staff reached the maximal performance at 23 °C 
and only 70 % of the maximum at 30 °C. However, the range of results is large, and 
the economic interactions are complex. A more detailed forecast would need to 
distinguish between indoor and outdoor work as well as mental and physical work. 
These aspects have not been implemented in this first attempt and leave room for 
                                                 
30 Wyon (1986), Kampmann (2000), Parsons (2003), Bux (2006). 
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further research. In this calculation we do not take into account any effects of 
coldness, rain or storms on production, either. 
Assuming that heat directly reduces labor output, from a macroeconomic point 
of view the estimation model has the following form:30F31 
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L average GDP loss p. a. in Germany in the prediction period 2071-2100 for 
IPCC scenario A1B 
L0 heat related GDP loss in Germany in the reference year 2004 (generated by 
the model) 
Tw,k  average number of additional days p. a. in the prediction period in perceived 
temperature class k in location (federal state) w 
GDPw gross domestic product in the reference year 2004 in federal state w 
q wage share in Germany in the reference year 2004 
gk mean relative productivity reduction when the threshold of perceived 
temperature class k is reached 
GDPw is the gross domestic product on German federal state level in 2004. This 
implies that the forecast refers to the GDP in the reference year 2004, because the 
development of GDP cannot be predicted till the end of the 21st century. 
Demographic change is neglected as well as technological progress, since both 
aspects cannot properly be implemented in a simple model. A possible interpretation 
is that the output expansion via technological progress just compensates the output 
loss due to a shrinking and ageing society. 
As in the calculation of hospital costs we account for today’s negative heat 
effects. German GDP would be higher, if temperatures were in the range of slightly 
more than 20 °C that is most comfortable for human beings, during the whole year. 
Equations (4.3-2) describe how to compute today’s heat impact on production L0. 
                                                 
31 Absolute numbers are written in capital letters, relative numbers in small letters. 
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The wage share q is defined as labor income relative to total income in the 
economy, which is 68.4 % in Germany in the reference year 2004. We assume the 
same wage share in all federal states.31F32 It is unclear to what extent the productivity of 
machines, controlled by people who suffer from heat, also decreases. Thus, 
production losses focus on the production factor labor only. Again, changes of q due 
to the demographic and technological progress cannot be predicted in this simple 
model. 
Since the quantitative impact of heat on work performance is unclear, we 
make the conservative assumption that there is no negative effect of moderate heat 
load and apply the range of scientific results cited by Bux (2006) for gk, i. e. a 
productivity reduction of 3 % to 12 %.  
Figure 9 shows the economic loss due to a heat induced labor productivity 
decrease under two different impact assumptions. In the first case labor productivity 
is assumed to fall by 3 % on days with strong or extreme heat stress. Today’s 
reference heat loss generated by the model amounts to approximately 540 million € 
(lower part), equal to 0.03 % of today’s GDP; the estimated future loss is almost 2 
billion € (upper part), together ca. 2.5 billion € or 0.12 % of today’s GDP. 
 
 
Figure 9: Heat related production loss in Germany p. a., 2071‐2100 under two 
different impact assumptions 
                                                 
32 Statistisches Bundesamt (2006c), Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung, 24.4, referring to 2004. 
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Assuming gk equal to 12 % for strong and extreme heat, the estimation results in a 
base value of about 2.4 billion € or 0.11 % of today’s GDP and in an additional future 
heat loss of almost 8 billion €, in total ca. 10.4 billion € or 0.48 % of today’s GDP. 
If strong heat stress causes a productivity loss of 3 % and extreme heat a loss 
of 12 %, the resulting total economic loss will be 6 billion €, which is between the 
results described above. 
Using numbers of 30 % to 50 % mentioned in the literature for gk, the heat 
related losses today (2.7 % of today’s GDP) and in the future (5 % of today’s GDP) 
are much higher. These outcomes need to be treated with caution though, since this 
first attempt does not differentiate between different kinds of work.  
The calculations are based on IPCC scenario A1B. Using IPCC scenario B1 
(low emissions) and a 12 % heat impact on labor productivity yields an additional 
loss of ca. 4.2 billion €, which is significantly lower than in the A1B scenario (almost 
8 billion €, representing the expected emissions development). Consequently, a 
successful reduction of greenhouse gas emissions clearly lowers the economic loss.  
Figure 10 illustrates the different magnitudes of average per capita income 
losses across the German federal states.32F33 The southern states Bavaria (Bayern) and 
Baden-Württemberg not only face the most severe heat load, but also have the highest 
total GDPs and high per capita incomes. Consequently, the per capita income losses 
reach around 50 € per person and year in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, while the 
mean income reductions in Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 
(Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) amount to ca. 5 € p. a. and person only. Although the 
heat load is rather low in the northern cities Hamburg and Bremen, their estimated per 
capita income losses are about the German average loss of ca. 24 € p. a., because the 
per capita incomes in these northern cities are relatively high. 
The results have a similar magnitude as cost estimates of around 10 billion € 
for Europe for the heat summer 2003.33F34 Nevertheless, so far the economic impacts of 
heat waves have not been evident in countries’ growth rates.34F35 According to our 
results, heat already has a high negative influence on the German economy today 
                                                 
33 Population data for 2004 from Statistisches Bundesamt (2005), Bevölkerungsfortschreibung; graphic 
based on a map of Germany from Universität Trier (2007). 
34 Michael Heise, chief economist of the Allianz Group, cited in Welt am Sonntag (23.07.2006), this 
number includes other economic effects of heat besides health impacts. 
35 Michael Heise and Claudia Kemfert, cited in Welt am Sonntag (23.07.2006). 
 171
which will substantially sharpen in the future. The main caveat is that we do not take 
into account who is affected by heat to what extent and who is not, and that such a 
disaggregated view is hard to predict for the end of the 21st century. Maybe most 
people will work in air conditioned environments, and machines will do any physical 
work, so that heat will have little influence on labor output. 
 
Figure 10: Heat related income losses p. a. and per capita, 2071‐2100 across German 
federal states in 2004‐€ 
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5  Conclusion  
Climate change will lead to a number of detrimental health impacts. In this study we 
focus on the effect of heat load on human well-being. The study is based on high 
resolution computations of climate data for the period 2071 to 2100 in Germany 
referring to IPCC scenarios. We calculate the change in the number of days with 
thermal stress. For this purpose, we apply perceived temperatures including humidity, 
wind and radiation, which better describe the heat subjectively felt by human beings 
than normal absolute temperatures. The results are then used to derive rough 
estimates of heat related health problems: the potential change in mortality, the 
potential costs of hospital emergency admissions, and the macroeconomic costs of a 
reduced work performance. 
Heat induced mortality is examined as an indicator for the future health risk, 
since in contrast to particular heat related diseases sufficient statistical information on 
mortality is available. We expect an increase of heat related casualties by a factor of 
3.7 at the end of the century compared with today. This increase is partly due to the 
rising share of elderly people who are known to suffer most from heat waves. The 
negative effects of heat waves, mainly in the south of Germany, dominate the 
reduction in the number of casualties because of milder winter periods by far. We do 
not take into account that a certain number of sick and elderly people might have died 
even without heat in the near future. Subtracting these casualties can possibly reduce 
the mortality numbers by up to 25 % (in the short-run).  
The majority of negative health effects will not lead to deaths but may require 
medical assistance. Due to a lack of data we concentrate on heat induced hospital 
admissions. We find future hospitalization costs of 300 to 700 million € p. a. for 
Germany at today’s prices, i. e. a 6-fold cost increase.  
Finally, we look at the labor productivity of people under future heat load. A 
rough calculation yields a reduction of German GDP by 0.1 to 0.5 percent, i. e. a loss 
4 times larger than at today’s climate. These costs are significantly higher than the 
estimated hospitalization costs. 
This study represents a first attempt to quantify the effects of climate change 
on health in Germany. The focus on direct temperature related effects was determined 
both by the size of the project and by the lack of conclusive results from the different 
disciplines concerned with the quantitative assessment of climate related health risks. 
The underlying empirical evidence of heat related hospital admissions and thermal 
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impacts on work performance shows a large variance. The results could become more 
robust if a larger research project brought together further interdisciplinary expert 
knowledge. A more detailed analysis of the working conditions in different sectors 
would enhance the quality of the estimates. Furthermore, more research is necessary 
to quantify the influence of climate change on health and productivity during the cold 
period of the year. 
These estimates are all performed without considering physiological 
adaptation of the population and without including adaptation strategies in order to 
illustrate the size of the problem and because we did lack information on adaptation 
costs. Taking adaptation into account would change the numerical results and the 
appearance of the presented figures. One of the challenging tasks would be to assess 
different adaptation options and the related costs. While physiological and 
behavioural adaptation are hard to quantify in monetary terms, the cost of private and 
public adaptation measures (such as building design and urban planning) could be 
estimated. The simulations based on different IPCC scenarios also show that the 
health impacts can differ substantially depending on the emission path of greenhouse 
gases, thus indicating the benefits of mitigating climate change can be substantial. An 
analysis of the benefits of mitigation compared with the costs of adaptation would 
constitute a fruitful extension of the research that is presented here. 
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